Law Commons^™

Shareholder (And Director) Fiduciary Duties And Shareholder Activism, Paula J. Dalley

ExpressO

Recent attention to shareholder activism in the business and academic press has ignored the legal ramifications of that phenomenon. Under current law, shareholders are neither principals nor agents of the corporation, the board of directors, or the other shareholders; those seeking to increase shareholder power must confront this legal reality. Specifically, proposals for increased shareholder power on the one hand and recent investor attempts to gain actual management control on the other must both be considered in light of the shareholders’ lack of fiduciary responsibility. Moreover, all directors, including those representing “activist” shareholders, are obligated to exercise independent judgment about …

Managers' Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Christopher W. Frost, Rutheford B. Campbell

ExpressO

In this article, the authors consider the nature of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties in periods when the company is in financial distress. This matter is important not only to corporate managers, who need clear rules regarding their duties, but also to equity and debt investors, who must understand the nature of corporate fiduciary duties in order to price the capital that they contribute to the enterprise and allocate the financial risks of loss to the most efficient risk bearer from among the investors.

Unfortunately, courts – especially the important Delaware courts – have made a mess of all of this. …

Galactic Stupidity And The Business Judgment Rule, David Rosenberg

ExpressO

The article examines whether the business judgment rule allows courts to review the substantive wisdom of decisions made by corporate directors. Although the conventional view among legal scholars is that the business judgment rule precludes such review, the article concludes that Delaware courts must sometimes examine the substance of directors’ decisions in order to determine whether those directors acted in good faith. Where the evidence shows that a director acted in a rational way (and therefore in good faith) in arriving at a decision, courts will not review the substance of that decision. However, where a director made a decision …

Good Faith, State Of Mind, And The Outer Boundaries Of Director Liability In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner

ExpressO

The Delaware General Corporation Law was amended in 1986 to permit shareholder-approved exculpatory charter provisions shielding directors from monetary liability for certain types of fiduciary duty breaches, explicitly excepting breaches of the duty of loyalty and conduct not in "good faith" – evidently distinct concepts in the Delaware legislature’s view. This paper examines the development of corporate fiduciary duty doctrine in Delaware leading up to and following this statutory amendment, focusing particularly on the Delaware courts' evolving conception of the meaning and doctrinal status of good faith. Specifically, the paper argues that Delaware's statutory exculpation regime and good faith case …