Law Commons^™

Drawing The Line: The Jurisprudence Of Non-Consensual Pornography And The Implications Of Kanye West’S Famous Music Video, Karla Utset

University of Miami Law Review

In June 2016, American rapper Kanye West premiered the music video for Famous from his seventh studio album “The Life of Pablo.” West’s Famous music video, inspired by Vincent Desiderio’s painting Sleep, features nude replications of several celebrities lying together on a bed. The cinematography is voyeuristic, with one journalist describing the video as “predatory.” In making and publicizing the infamous music video, West failed to seek and acquire the consent of several of the individuals featured. The production received both considerable praise and backlash from artists, critics, and the celebrities depicted.

This Note discusses the jurisprudence of non-consensual pornography, …

United States V. Martignon, Maureen A. Fitzgerald

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Substance And Method In The Year 2000, Akhil Reed Amar

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Exploring The First Amendment Rights Of Teens In Relationship To Sexting And Censorship, Julia Halloran Mclaughlin

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article explores child pornography law in relation to teen sexting conduct. Recently, some teens who engaged in teen sexting have been convicted under child pornography laws and have been required to register as sexual predators. The criminalization of teens for developmentally typical behavior, mimicking the conduct of adults, can result in grave harm to most teens. Furthermore, the application of child pornography laws to teen sexting conduct demonstrates the constitutional overbreadth of the current definition of child pornography. Photographs have an emblematic role in society-capturing and celebrating youth. Moreover, the creation of teen sexting images accompanies a teen's developmental …

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …