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Full-Text Articles in Law
Capture And Counteraction: Self- Help By Environmental Zealots (Allen Chair Symposium 1996: The Future Of Environmental And Land-Use Regulation), James E. Krier
Capture And Counteraction: Self- Help By Environmental Zealots (Allen Chair Symposium 1996: The Future Of Environmental And Land-Use Regulation), James E. Krier
Articles
Self-help is a largely neglected topic in American legal studies.1 With the exception of a survey by a group of law students published a dozen years ago,2 there appears to be little, if anything, in our legal literature that confronts the subject in a systematic way.3 This is so, at least, if one defines self-help as I do. To me, the term refers to any act of bypassing the formal legal system in order to get what one wants.
Groping And Coping In The Shadow Of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory And The Elementary Economics Of Failure, James W. Bowers
Groping And Coping In The Shadow Of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory And The Elementary Economics Of Failure, James W. Bowers
Michigan Law Review
Part I briefly examines the conventional explanation for bankruptcy's defining characteristic, its default distributional rule. It concludes that the conventional explanation is insufficiently informative for us to tell whether the Bankruptcy Code (Code) is actually working or not. Part II argues that the only existing systematic attempt to explain bankruptcy law, the so-called "Creditors' Bargain" Theory, is inadequate for two reasons. First, the predictions it generates are belied by real-world events. Second, it is mistaken on theoretical grounds, primarily because it ignores how debtors are likely to manage their assets. Part III presents the Murphian theory of failing behavior, the …
Rethinking The Class Action: A Policy Primer On Reform, John C. Coffee Jr.
Rethinking The Class Action: A Policy Primer On Reform, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Today, virtually everyone has a proposal for "reforming" class action litigation but both consensus and coherence are lacking. Some proposals are bluntly restrictive. For example, the Reagan Administration would reduce attorney's fees, place a ceiling on product liability, and partially repeal treble damage statutes. In the same vein, the United States Supreme Court has shown itself parsimonious on the question of fee awards, by authorizing fee waivers, approving offers of settlement that seemingly permit fee shifting against the plaintiff's attorney, and curtailing the traditional bases on which a fee award may be enhanced. Other proposals have offered essentially neutral procedural …