Law Commons^™

A Non-Contentious Account Of Article Iii's Domestic Relations Exception, James E. Pfander, Emily K. Damrau

Notre Dame Law Review

Scholars and jurists have long debated the origins and current scope of the so-called domestic relations exception to Article III. Rooted in the perception that certain family law matters lie beyond the power of the federal courts, the exception was first articulated in the nineteenth-century decisional law of the Supreme Court and has perplexed observers ever since. Scholarly debate continues, despite the Court’s twentieth-century decision to place the exception firmly on statutory grounds in an effort to limit its potentially disruptive force.

This Article offers a novel, historically grounded account of the domestic relations exception, connecting its origins to the …

The Bill Of Rights As A Term Of Art, Gerard N. Magliocca

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article argues that the use of the “Bill of Rights” to describe the first

set of constitutional amendments emerged long after the Founding as a justification

for expanding federal power at home and abroad. In making that

claim, I challenge two common misconceptions about the Bill of Rights. One

is that the first set of amendments was known by that name from the start.

This is not true. James Madison never said that what was ratified in 1791 was

a bill of rights, and that label was not widely used for those provisions until

after 1900. The second fallacy …

One Federalism And The Judicial Role: Enforcing The Limits Of Article I, Alexa R. Baltes

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Note offers a brief account of the two main theories of

federalism protection: the political safeguards (or process federalism) and

judicial review. Part II then suggests a dual-safeguards approach as the single

constitutionally grounded theory, and proceeds to situate the procedural

safeguards and, importantly, judicial review, in the history, text, and structure

of the Constitution. Next, delving into the Court’s New Federalism line of

decisions, Part III analyzes the implications for these two constitutionally

grounded safeguards to deduce the proper framework for their respective

applications. It suggests that while political safeguards may be conceived in

terms …

Honoring Dan Meltzer, Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

Dan Meltzer was a giant in the field of Federal Courts, and it is hard to overstate his influence on its development. He taught Federal Courts at Harvard Law School and was a long-time co-author of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (“Hart & Wechsler ”), the casebook that created the field and shaped how generations of judges, lawyers, and scholars think about complex questions of federal jurisdiction. In addition, Dan enriched the field immeasurably by writing seminal articles on a wide range of Federal Courts topics. His work was characterized by deep knowledge of the …

A Cause Of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity And The Preemption Of State Lalw, Henry Paul Monaghan

Notre Dame Law Review

In this very brief Essay, I focus on aspects of a topic on which both Danny and I have written and on which our reasoning differed: federal court authority, “sitting in equity,” to enjoin enforcement of state law on federal preemption grounds. In a coercive action brought by the state to enforce the state law, the federal act could of course be set up as a defense. Suppose, however, that alleging “arising under” subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff sues the appropriate state officials to restrain enforcement of the state statute. Many such challenges are readily entertained on the merits, often because …

An Incomplete Discussion Of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction, David L. Shapiro

Notre Dame Law Review

My purpose in this brief Essay is to expand on this theme as it played out in Dan Meltzer’s role as collaborator, friendly critic, and keen analyst, and to do so by exploring a problem that in some ways lies at the heart of our elaborate system of judicial federalism, even though (perhaps because it does not arise that often) it has received somewhat less attention than it deserves. That problem addresses the nature of federal judicial authority—and especially the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—when a federal issue is embedded in, or when its determination may affect the resolution …

On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Essay, written in tribute to Dan Meltzer, I shall attempt to explicate his views regarding statutory interpretation in general, thematic terms. In doing so, I shall register my agreement with virtually all of Dan’s conclusions and frequently echo his practically minded arguments in support of them. But I shall also advance arguments—with which I cannot be entirely sure he would have agreed—that seek to show that his position reflected theoretical insights about how language works, not only in law, but also more generally in life. By seeking simultaneously to defend Dan’s views and to build on them, this …

Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing And The Institutional Framework Of Article Iii: A Comparative Perspective, Vickie C. Jackson

Notre Dame Law Review

In this short Essay, I focus on only one aspect of the broader question of government standing to sue: congressional standing. For one thing, separation of powers problems are more acutely presented in federal level disputes.

Given an increased interest by parts of the Congress, especially the House of Representatives, in seeking to intervene in ongoing litigation, there are pressing new issues in the lower federal courts: U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer recently upheld congressional standing to challenge an asserted violation of the Appropriations Clause in connection with spending under the Affordable Care Act, while rejecting the House’s standing …

Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal And State Courts In Our Federal System, Judith Resnik

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay pays tribute to Daniel Meltzer’s insight that, to the extent “lawyers have a common intellectual heritage, the federal courts are its primary source.” I do so by analyzing how that heritage is made and remade, as political forces press Congress to deploy federal courts to protect a wide array of interests and state courts absorb the bulk of litigation. The heritage that Meltzer celebrated and to which he contributed was the outcome of twentieth-century social movements that focused on the federal courts as hospitable venues, serving as vivid sources of rights and remedies. A competing heritage has since …

Two Aspects Of Liberty, John H. Garvey

Notre Dame Law Review

Liberty in the constitutional sense is always a right against state interference (a “freedom from”). The First Amendment begins by saying that “Congress shall make no law”; it forbids Congress to license or fine or jail people for speaking, or publishing, or assembling. Liberty is also, always, a right to do something (a “freedom to”): to speak, to assemble, to practice religion, to get married, etc. So “freedom from” and “freedom to” are always parts of the same idea, just as “flying from” and “flying to” are aspects of the same airplane trip. Freedom is always the right to do …

Partly Accultured Religious Activity: A Case For Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, Thomas C. Berg

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article argues that we should make real efforts to protect religious freedom for partly acculturated religious activities and organizations. We should not reject their claims broadly or per se and thereby exclude them from the efforts at accommodation that other groups receive. The law should not force all religious organizations and activities into one of the two polar categories, acculturated or unacculturated. Part II of this Article presents several reasons why there is a strong interest in protecting the freedom to engage in partly acculturated religious activity.

Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, And The Establishment Clause, Christopher C. Lund

Notre Dame Law Review

Religious exemptions are important, and sometimes required by the Free Exercise Clause. But religious exemptions can also be troubling, and sometimes forbidden by the Establishment Clause. It is the latter issue with which this Essay concerns itself. But now a different question, which raises a different conception of the Establishment Clause: When are religious exemptions improper or unconstitutional because they burden third parties? This issue of third-party harms has received a lot of attention, especially in light of Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby initially sought an exemption from the contraceptive mandate that would have come at the expense of their employees, …

If Religious Liberty Does Not Mean Exemptions, What Might It Mean? The Founders’ Constitutionalism Of The Inalienable Rights Of Religious Liberty, Vincent Phillip Munoz

Notre Dame Law Review

The Article is divided into three Parts. Part I documents the Founders’ shared understanding that religious liberty is a natural right possessed by all individuals. Part II explains what the Founders meant when they labeled aspects of religious liberty an “unalienable” natural right. The inalienable character of the core of religious liberty reveals what the Founders found special about religion. It also accounts for religion’s special constitutional status, which for the Founders primarily meant specific jurisdictional limits on state sovereignty rather than exemptions. Part III further clarifies the Founders’ constitutionalism of religious freedom by explaining how the Founders understood natural …

Virtue, Freedom, And The First Amendment, Marc O. Degirolami

Notre Dame Law Review

The modern First Amendment embodies the idea of freedom as a fundamental good of contemporary American society. The First Amendment protects and promotes everybody’s freedom of thought, belief, speech, and religious exercise as basic goods—as given ends of American political and moral life. It does not protect these freedoms for the sake of promoting any particular vision of the virtuous society. It is neutral on that score, setting limits only in those rare cases when the exercise of a First Amendment freedom exacts an intolerable social cost. The Article concludes with two speculations. First, it seems we are no longer …

Catholic Constitutionalism From The Americanist Controversy To Dignitatis Humanae, Anna Su

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article, written for a symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of Dignitatis Humanae, or the Roman Catholic Church’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, traces a brief history of Catholic constitutionalism from the Americanist controversy of the late nineteenth century up until the issuance of Dignitatis Humanae as part of the Second Vatican Council in 1965. It argues that the pluralist experiment enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was a crucial factor in shaping Church attitudes towards religious freedom, not only in the years immediately preceding the revolutionary Second Vatican Council but ever since the late nineteenth century, …

Against Martyrdom: A Liberal Argument For Accommodation Of Religion, Paul Horwitz

Notre Dame Law Review

Drawing in part on that literature, and in sympathy with the desire to reaffirm the importance of religious freedom and the accommodation of religious groups and practices without opposing or disdaining liberalism or progressivism altogether,18 this Article offers a liberal argument in favor of the legal accommodation of religion, including the accommodation of illiberal religious groups and practices. Although my own work is substantially pluralist in orientation, the argument here is intended to appeal directly to more “rationalist” liberals.

Religious Majorities And Restrictions On Religion, Brett G. Scharffs

Notre Dame Law Review

Social scientists studying freedom of religion and belief have focused upon two types of restrictions on religious freedom, formal restrictions that take the form of laws and other official legal limitations on freedom of religion and belief, and informal restrictions that take the form of social hostilities towards religion or towards particular religious groups, usually minorities. This Article seeks to build upon this work in three ways: first, by noting the striking correlations between countries with very high or high legal restrictions and social hostilities regarding religion and the frequent presence of a dominant religious group in those countries; second, …

Stop The Reach: Solving The Judicial Takings Problem By Objectively Defining Property, Steven C. Begakis

Notre Dame Law Review

The future of judicial takings may rest on the ability of the Court to define property in a robust and objective way. Property has essential characteristics that make it easily identifiable, the most significant of which are the rights to exclude and use. However, even when a property right does not fit within a neat categorical definition, should that right have a long, well established pedigree in state court precedent, that property right is similarly within the capacity of the reviewing court to identify. And once it is determined that, prior to the judgment, the petitioners possessed a clearly defined …

The Meanings Of The "Privileges And Immunities Of Citizens" On The Eve Of The Civil War, David R. Upham

Notre Dame Law Review

The Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” This “Privileges or Immunities Clause” has been called “the darling of the professoriate.” Indeed, in the last decade alone, law professors have published dozens of articles treating the provision. The focus of this particular study is the interpretation of the “privileges and immunities of citizens” offered by American political actors, including not only judges, but also elected officials and private citizens, before the Fourteenth Amendment, and primarily, on the …

Originalist Or Original: The Difficulties Of Reconciling Citizens United With Corporate Law History, Leo E. Strine Jr., Nicholas Walter

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Article, we focus on a specific question raised by Citizens United, which is whether the Supreme Court’s decision can be justified solely by application of the originalist method of constitutional interpretation, or whether it can only be explained by giving substantial weight to a more modern, evolved understanding of the relevant constitutional provisions. We conclude that however Citizens United is rationalized, it cannot be defended solely or primarily as the product of a disciplined application of the originalist method of constitutional interpretation. Because Citizens United takes a view at odds both with the historical understanding of business …

Standing Doctrine's State Action Problem, Seth Davis

Notre Dame Law Review

Something surprising happened in the 2013 marriage equality cases that did not involve striking down the Defense of Marriage Act. The Supreme Court discovered standing doctrine’s state action problem. In standing doctrine, as elsewhere, the law distinguishes private from governmental action. There are, simply put, different standing rules for state actors than for private litigants. How should the law sort state actors from private litigants for the purposes of standing? In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court held that Article III limits government standing to common law agents who owe fiduciary duties to the state. The Perry Court’s apparent concern was …

Why The Right To Elective Abortion Fails Casey'S Own Interest-Balancing Methodology—And Why It Matters, Stephen G. Gilles

Notre Dame Law Review

Casey adopted a new, interest-balancing framework for the right to elective abortion while preserving the core of that right. But by declining to address whether the right to elective abortion can be justified in interest-balancing terms, Casey opened the door to unduly stringent applications of the undue-burden standard and, no less importantly, to future extensions of the right. By ruling that the state’s interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life outweighs the woman’s interest in an elective abortion, while preserving that right on stare decisis grounds, the Court could ensure that the balance it struck in Casey—and that “was central …

The Curious Case Of Seminole Rock: Revisiting Judicial Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Their Ambiguous Regulations, Peter M. Torstensen Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

Seminole Rock deference warrants reconsideration as it is based on questionable constitutional and pragmatic foundations. This Note argues that courts should provide a meaningful check on agency interpretations by engaging in de novo review of agency resolutions of regulatory ambiguities. Part I explores the development of the Seminole Rock doctrine, from its questionable doctrinal foundations and rapid expansion to the developing concerns regarding its continued validity. In addition, Part I explains the variety of forms that agency interpretations can take, including legal briefs, amicus briefs, and internal memoranda, and discusses their impact in expanding the scope of Seminole Rock deference. …