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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Global Architecture Of Financial Regulatory Taxes, Carlo Garbarino, Giulio Allevato
The Global Architecture Of Financial Regulatory Taxes, Carlo Garbarino, Giulio Allevato
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Article endeavors to broaden the analysis of available policy tools to address the problems created by financial crises and discusses how, in addition to direct regulation, certain tax measures having a regulatory nature may operate to address the so-called “negative externalities” often associated with those crises. There is a negative externality when an economic agent making a decision does not pay the full cost of the decision’s consequences. In such cases, the cost to society as a whole is greater than the cost borne by the individuals creating the economic impact. In practice, negative externalities result in market inefficiencies …
Mandatory Arbitration In Consumer Finance And Investor Contracts, Michael S. Barr
Mandatory Arbitration In Consumer Finance And Investor Contracts, Michael S. Barr
Articles
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses are pervasive in consumer financial and investor contracts—for credit cards, bank accounts, auto loans, broker-dealer services, and many others. These clauses often ill serve households. Consumers are typically presented with contracts on a “take it or leave it” basis, with no ability to negotiate over terms. Arbitration provisions are often not clearly disclosed, and in any event are not salient for consumers, who do not focus on the importance of the provision in the event that a dispute over the contract later arises, and who may misforecast the likelihood of being in such a dispute. The …
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …
The Systematic Risk Of Private Funds After The Dodd-Frank Act, Wulf A. Kaal
The Systematic Risk Of Private Funds After The Dodd-Frank Act, Wulf A. Kaal
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created under the Dodd-Frank Act with the primary mandate of guarding against systemic risk and correcting perceived regulatory weaknesses that may have contributed to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) collects data pertaining to private fund advisers in order to facilitate FSOC’s assessment of non-bank financial institutions’ potential systemic risks. Evidence that the SEC’s data collection encounters accuracy and consistency problems might hamper FSOC’s ability to evaluate the systemic risk of private fund advisers. The author shows that while the SEC’s data plays a crucial role in all …
The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis
The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis
Articles
This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm …
A Framework On Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, Margaret Ryznar, Karen E. Woody
A Framework On Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, Margaret Ryznar, Karen E. Woody
Marquette Law Review
There are two primary but different methods of controlling behavior, whether it is the behavior of individuals or corporations: to incentivize it or to regulate it. Governments are in a unique position to employ either or both options because of their ability to pass regulatory schemes and to extend tax incentives. This Article analyzes the two methods of shaping corporate behavior, examining the regulation issue through the case of the conflict minerals provision of the Dodd–Frank Act and examining the taxation issue through several examples of corporate tax incentives.
The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.
The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, U.S. bank regulation and bankruptcy have become far more closely intertwined. In this Article, I ask whether the new synthesis of bank regulation and bankruptcy is coherent, and whether it is likely to prove effective.
I begin by exploring some of the basic differences between bank resolution, which is a highly administrative process in the U.S., and bankruptcy, which relies more on courts and the parties themselves. I then focus on a series of remarkable new innovations designed to facilitate the rapid recapitalization of systemically important financial institutions: convertible contingent capital …
Credit Rating Agency Review Board: The Challenges And Implications Of Implementing The Franken-Wicker Amendment To Dodd-Frank, Christopher R. Dyess
Credit Rating Agency Review Board: The Challenges And Implications Of Implementing The Franken-Wicker Amendment To Dodd-Frank, Christopher R. Dyess
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, critically review, and determine whether a hypothetical credit rating agency board, as suggested in the Franken-Wicker Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, is a viable option for combating the conflict of interest problem between credit rating agencies and issuers. Research methodology includes a careful review of various ways to structure the board and the potential unintended consequences of doing so. The Author uses original research hand-collected from video of the Credit Ratings Roundtable conducted in Washington D.C. on May 14, 2013. The Credit Ratings Roundtable brought together experts from the credit rating industry …
Fraud Is Already Illegal: Section 621 Of The Dodd-Frank Act In The Context Of The Securities Laws, Nathan R. Schuur
Fraud Is Already Illegal: Section 621 Of The Dodd-Frank Act In The Context Of The Securities Laws, Nathan R. Schuur
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, lawmakers and the public focused on abuses in the securitization industry. Abacus, a Synthetic CDO created by Goldman Sachs & Co., became a symbol of what many felt was a corrupt system when it became known that Goldman and Fabrice Tourre, a Vice President at its Correlation Trading Desk, had assisted a hedge fund in designing the security to fail. Perceived failings of the securities laws to prevent transactions like Abacus spurred Congress to enact Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits conflicts of interest in asset-backed securitizations. But the law is …
Restoring Confidence In The Financial Services Industry: Advocating For A Uniform, Rules-Based Fiduciary Standard, Katelin Eastman
Restoring Confidence In The Financial Services Industry: Advocating For A Uniform, Rules-Based Fiduciary Standard, Katelin Eastman
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Accountability And Independence In Financial Regulation: Checks And Balances, Public Engagement, And Other Innovations, Michael S. Barr
Accountability And Independence In Financial Regulation: Checks And Balances, Public Engagement, And Other Innovations, Michael S. Barr
Articles
Financial regulation attempts to balance two competing administrative goals. On the one hand, as with much of administrative law, accountability is a core goal. Accountability undergirds the democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies. On the other hand, unlike with much of administrative law, independence plays a critical role.' Independence helps to protect financial regulatory agencies from political interference and-with some important caveats-arguably helps to guard against some forms of industry capture. In addition, with respect to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), independence serves to improve the credibility of the Fed's price stability mandate by insulating its decisionmaking from politics and, in …
The Financial Industry's Plan For Resolving Failed Megabanks Will Ensure Future Bailouts For Wall Street, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
The Financial Industry's Plan For Resolving Failed Megabanks Will Ensure Future Bailouts For Wall Street, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The high-risk business model of large financial conglomerates (frequently called “universal banks”) was an important cause of the financial crisis. Universal banks rely on cheap funding from deposits and shadow banking liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the capital markets. By combining deposit-taking and short-term borrowing with underwriting, market making, and trading in securities and derivatives, the universal banking model creates a strong likelihood that serious problems occurring in one sector of the financial industry will spread to other sectors. To prevent such contagion, federal regulators have powerful incentives to bail out universal banks and protect all of their …
Implementing Symmetric Treatment Of Financial Contracts In Bankruptcy And Bank Resolution, E. J. Janger, John A.E. Pottow
Implementing Symmetric Treatment Of Financial Contracts In Bankruptcy And Bank Resolution, E. J. Janger, John A.E. Pottow
Articles
Financial contracts come in many forms and serve many functions in both the financial system and the broader economy. Repos secured by U.S. Treasury securities act as money substitutes and can play an important role as part of the money supply, while similarly structured repos, secured by more volatile collateral, may be used as speculative devices or hedges. Swaps can be used to insure against various types of market risk, from interest rates to oil prices, or they can operate as vehicles for highly leveraged investments. The parties to these instruments are sometimes major financial institutions and, other times, ordinary …