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Articles 1 - 28 of 28
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Fiduciary Theory Of Governmental Legitimacy And The Natural Charter Of The Judiciary, Luke A. Wake
The Fiduciary Theory Of Governmental Legitimacy And The Natural Charter Of The Judiciary, Luke A. Wake
Luke A. Wake
In legal academia, there are various claims as to the proper role of the courts and the standard of review to be employed in evaluating claims of right. These competing judicial philosophies have been the subject of great debate in recent years. Yet underlying these debates is the question of rights and whether men are entitled, in justice, to assurances of personal autonomy, or whether the concept of rights is a mere legal fiction.
In a recent article in the Journal of Law and Philosophy, Evan Fox-Decent argues that individuals are entitled, at a minimum, to certain guarantees of bodily …
A Modest Appeal For Decent Respect, Jessica Olive, David C. Gray
A Modest Appeal For Decent Respect, Jessica Olive, David C. Gray
Faculty Scholarship
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release for nonhomicide crimes if the perpetrator was under the age of eighteen at the time of his offense. In so holding, Justice Kennedy cited foreign and international law to confirm the Court’s independent judgment. In his dissent, Justice Thomas recited now-familiar objections to the Court’s reliance on these sources. Those objections are grounded in his originalist jurisprudence. In this short invited essay, which expands on prior work, we argue that Justice Thomas should abandon these …
A Modest Appeal For Decent Respect, Jessica Olive, David C. Gray
A Modest Appeal For Decent Respect, Jessica Olive, David C. Gray
David C. Gray
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release for nonhomicide crimes if the perpetrator was under the age of eighteen at the time of his offense. In so holding, Justice Kennedy cited foreign and international law to confirm the Court’s independent judgment. In his dissent, Justice Thomas recited now-familiar objections to the Court’s reliance on these sources. Those objections are grounded in his originalist jurisprudence. In this short invited essay, which expands on prior work, we argue that Justice Thomas should abandon these …
Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism?: It Depends, Lee J. Strang
Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism?: It Depends, Lee J. Strang
Lee J Strang
In this Article, I accomplish two goals: first, I describe the rise of popular constitutionalism as a movement in the legal academy along with its basic tenets; and second, I demonstrate that, given the diversity of originalist scholarship, originalism’s relationship to popular constitutionalism depends on the version of originalism one adopts. In the heart of Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, I describe five axes upon which originalism pivots toward or away from popular constitutionalism. My claim is that the nuances of contemporary originalist scholarship—characterized by these five axes—make it impossible to definitively describe the relationship between originalism and popular constitutionalism.
The Rhetoric Of Originalism, David Finkelstein
The Rhetoric Of Originalism, David Finkelstein
David Finkelstein
Justice Stevens has recently observed that originalism "holds out objectivity and restraint as its cardinal and, it seems, only virtues." McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3118 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This article critically examines the notion that non-originalist methods of interpretation invite subjectivity into the process and are therefore insufficient to constrain. I suggest that the originalist's dissatisfaction with ordinary methods of interpretation rests of bad philosophy of language, and that properly thought through, Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations point to a better way of thinking about meaning in general, and legal interpretation in particular.
I Swear: The History And Implications Of The Fourth Amendment’S “Oath Or Affirmation” Requirement, David S. Muraskin
I Swear: The History And Implications Of The Fourth Amendment’S “Oath Or Affirmation” Requirement, David S. Muraskin
David S Muraskin
This article seeks to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment’s “Oath or affirmation” requirement. Fourth Amendment scholarship and jurisprudence typically dismiss the requirement as a mere procedural formality. However, reviewing pre-Revolution law and commentaries, early legal developments in the States, and the American justice manuals—treatises published by legal scholars to inform and influence judges and practitioners within the new nation—this article argues that the oath requirement is key to understanding and effectuating the Amendment’s purpose. The article demonstrates that the Amendment was partly motivated by a fear of how the Crown used its search and seizure power, as a primary investigatory tool …
Fighting The Culture War As A Neutral Observer: A Profile Of Justice Scalia’S Machinations In Lawrence V. Texas, George D. Miller
Fighting The Culture War As A Neutral Observer: A Profile Of Justice Scalia’S Machinations In Lawrence V. Texas, George D. Miller
George D Miller
The purpose of this comment is to identify and determine the function of those machinations in the culture war as well as to demonstrate their patent shortcomings. In Part I, it will examine how Justice Scalia plays the “lifestyle card,” a subtle but powerful sign of his allegiance to the far right social and political agenda. Because of the controversy of this charge, much evidence will be adduced to demonstrate that the contemporary use of the word “lifestyle” reinforces a negative connotation of a promiscuous lifestyle often associated with the myth of hyper-sexuality, suggesting gay people “recruit” vulnerable heterosexuals and …
Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai
Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …
Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai
Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai
Michigan Law Review
Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …
An Originalist Theory Of Precedent: The Privileged Place Of Originalist Precedent, Lee Strang
An Originalist Theory Of Precedent: The Privileged Place Of Originalist Precedent, Lee Strang
Lee J Strang
In this Article, I show that originalism retains a robust role for originalist precedent thereby enabling originalism to fit our legal practice and appropriate the normative attractiveness of stare decisis. This Article therefore fills a prominent gap in originalist theory.
First, I briefly review the debate in originalism over the role of constitutional precedent.
Second, I describe how participants in our legal practice can distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent using a standard called Originalism in Good Faith. Under Originalism in Good Faith, precedents that are a good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning, are originalist …
Charters, Compacts And Tea Parties: The Decline And Resurrection Of A Delegation View Of The Constitution, Edward A. Fallone
Charters, Compacts And Tea Parties: The Decline And Resurrection Of A Delegation View Of The Constitution, Edward A. Fallone
Edward A Fallone
This article seeks to address a gap in constitutional law scholarship: the absence of a systematic examination of the manner in which the contractual nature of the Constitution illuminates the original understanding of the text. By closely examining the historical evidence, I argue that the interpretation of the Constitution has been influenced by dueling conceptions of contractual origin. One view treats the Constitution as a charter that delegates limited and defined authority to the federal government. The second view treats the Constitution as a compact the terms of which reflect a bargain between the federal government and a discrete body …
The Right To Arms In The Living Constitution, David B. Kopel
The Right To Arms In The Living Constitution, David B. Kopel
David B Kopel
This Article presents a brief history of the Second Amendment as part of the living Constitution. From the Early Republic through the present, the American public has always understood the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right to own firearms for self-defense. That view has been in accordance with élite legal opinion, except for a period in part of the twentieth century.
"Living constitutionalism" should be distinguished from "dead constitutionalism." Under the former, courts looks to objective referents of shared public understanding of constitutional values. Examples of objective referents include state constitutions, as well as federal or state laws to protect …
Originalism And Summary Judgment, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Originalism And Summary Judgment, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has revolutionized modern criminal procedure by invoking the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to strike down several sentencing innovations. This revolution has been led by members of the Supreme Court who follow an "originalist" method of constitutional interpretation. Recent work by the legal historian Suja Thomas has raised the question whether a similar "originalist" revolution may be on the horizon in civil cases governed by the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial. In particular, Professor Thomas has argued that the summary judgment device is unconstitutional because it permits judges …
The Functions Of Ethical Originalism, Richard A. Primus
The Functions Of Ethical Originalism, Richard A. Primus
Articles
Supreme Court Justices frequently divide on questions of original meaning, and the divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect are the Justices’ leanings about the merits of cases irrespective of originalist considerations. The same is true for law professors and other participants in constitutional discourse: people’s views of original constitutional meaning tend to align well with their (nonoriginalist) preferences for how present constitutional controversies should be resolved. To be sure, there are exceptions. Some people are better than others at suspending presentist considerations when examining historical materials, and some people are better than others at recognizing when …
Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Nevada Law Journal
This article will appear in a Symposium on comparative legal hermeneutics that includes four articles by American scholars and four articles by Brazilian scholars. I argue that the "ugly American" hermeneutics exemplified in Justice Scalia's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller is unfortunate, even if we supplement Justice Scalia's hermeneutical fantasy with the much more careful and balanced philosophical work by Larry Solum, Keith Whittington and other scholars. Nevertheless, the pragmatic work of interpretation by lawyers and judges in the day-to-day world of legal practice shows a plain-faced integrity of which we Americans can be proud.
Exposing The Contradiction: An Originalist's Approach To Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is A Constitutional Misinterpretation, Jason A. Crook
Exposing The Contradiction: An Originalist's Approach To Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is A Constitutional Misinterpretation, Jason A. Crook
Nevada Law Journal
Few phrases in American jurisprudence have created more of a stir or inspired greater controversy than the seventeen words that comprise the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Drafted by the Reconstruction Congress in the aftermath of the Civil War, these words have been used to strike down maximum-hours legislation, permit the instruction of foreign languages in schools, and even establish the right of minors to purchase contraceptives. In light of its linguistic incongruity and the versatility of its judicial precedents, one could fairly state that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause has been the subject …
Commandeering The People: Why The Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, Randy E. Barnett
Commandeering The People: Why The Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” includes what is called an “individual responsibility requirement” or mandate that all persons buy health insurance from a private company and a separate “penalty” enforcing this requirement. In this paper, I do not critique the individual mandate on originalist grounds. Instead, I explain why the individual mandate is unconstitutional under the existing doctrine by which the Supreme Court construes the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the tax power. There are three principal claims.
First (Part II), since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has developed a doctrine allowing the regulation of …
Comparative Originalism, David Fontana
Comparative Originalism, David Fontana
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Jamal Greene has written an important paper examining originalism in other countries. This short response argues that comparing the United States with Canada and Australia (the countries Professor Greene mostly examines) involves comparing quite different countries, because the Canadian and Australian constitutions reorganized preexisting institutions, whereas the United States had more of a nation-creating, revolutionary constitution. Other countries that arose out of more revolutionary events, such as certain post-colonial African and Latin American nations, have also tended to feature originalist arguments. When the nation predates the creation of a constitution, key cultural and political understandings also predate the constitution, thereby …
Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe
Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe
Faculty Scholarship
Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …
The Death Of Suspicion, Fabio Arcila Jr.
The Death Of Suspicion, Fabio Arcila Jr.
Scholarly Works
This article argues that neither the presumptive warrant requirement nor the presumptive suspicion requirement are correct. Though representative of the common law, they do not reflect the totality of our historic experience, which includes civil search practices. More importantly, modern developments - such as urban life and technological advancements, the rise of the regulatory state, and security concerns post-9/11 - have sufficiently changed circumstances so that these rules are not just unworkable now, they are demonstrably wrong. Worst of all, adhering to them has prevented us from formulating a more coherent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. A new paradigm confronts us, in …
Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Scholarly Works
This article will appear in a Symposium on comparative legal hermeneutics that includes four articles by American scholars and four articles by Brazilian scholars. I argue that the "ugly American" hermeneutics exemplified in Justice Scalia's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller is unfortunate, even if we supplement Justice Scalia's hermeneutical fantasy with the much more careful and balanced philosophical work by Larry Solum, Keith Whittington and other scholars. Nevertheless, the pragmatic work of interpretation by lawyers and judges in the day-to-day world of legal practice shows a plain-faced integrity of which we Americans can be proud.
Originalism, John Marshall, And The Necessary And Proper Clause: Resurrecting The Jurisprudence Of Alexander Addison, Patrick J. Charles
Originalism, John Marshall, And The Necessary And Proper Clause: Resurrecting The Jurisprudence Of Alexander Addison, Patrick J. Charles
Cleveland State Law Review
However, to give Marshall full credit for the “choice of means” doctrine is unfair, he was not the first to lay claim to the doctrine when interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, the philosophical and legal influences of John Marshall have been the speculation of scholarly discourse for some time. For instance, many legal commentators and historians have attributed the influence of Marshall's opinions to being a strong Federalist because many of his opinions echo the Federalist interpretation of the Constitution. However, Marshall's opinions were also influenced by factors that sometimes conflicted with Federalist thought. This Article does not …
Guns, Originalism, And Cultural Cognition, Jamal Greene
Guns, Originalism, And Cultural Cognition, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
In a legal regime whose canonical text is Marbury v. Madison, it should be unremarkable that the Supreme Court's actions are bounded rather severely by public opinion. What makes the proposition remarkable – enough to be well worth Barry Friedman's time – is also what makes Marbury remarkable: namely, that judges so often go out of their way to deny it. Though not unheard of, it is rare for a judge to advertise that the content of a constitutional rule she is announcing is motivated by public opinion. Such an admission would be self-defeating, since it invites the charge …
A Review Of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), Jeffrey S. Sutton
A Review Of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), Jeffrey S. Sutton
Michigan Law Review
I was eager to enter the judiciary. I liked the title: federal judge. I liked the job security: life tenure. And I could tolerate the pay: the same as Richard Posner's. That, indeed, may have been the most flattering part of the opportunity-that I could hold the same title and have the same pay grade as one of America's most stunning legal minds. Don't think I didn't mention it when I had the chance. There is so much to admire about Judge Posner-his lively pen, his curiosity, his energy, his apparent understanding of: everything. He has written 53 books, more …
Commerce, Jack M. Balkin
Commerce, Jack M. Balkin
Michigan Law Review
This Article applies the method of text and principle to an important problem in constitutional interpretation: the constitutional legitimacy of the modem regulatory state and its expansive definition of federal commerce power Some originalists argue that the modem state cannot be justified, while others accept existing precedents as a "pragmatic exception" to originalism. Nonoriginalists, in turn, point to these difficulties as a refutation of originalist premises. Contemporary originalist readings have tended to view the commerce power through modem eyes. Originalists defending narrow readings offederal power have identified "commerce" with the trade of commodities; originalists defending broad readings of federal power …
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race And The Case Against Terry V. Ohio, Lawrence Rosenthal
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race And The Case Against Terry V. Ohio, Lawrence Rosenthal
Lawrence Rosenthal
Perhaps no decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable search and seizure” has come in for more criticism than Terry v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court concluded that even absent probable cause to arrest, a brief detention and protective search of an individual comports with the Fourth Amendment “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . .” Terry is frequently denounced as granting the …
Evolving Away From Evolving Standards Of Decency, John F. Stinneford
Evolving Away From Evolving Standards Of Decency, John F. Stinneford
John F. Stinneford
No abstract provided.
The Neglected History Of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, Wesley M. Oliver
The Neglected History Of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, Wesley M. Oliver
Wesley M Oliver
Originalism has focused the attention of courts and academics on Framing Era history to interpret constitutional limits on police conduct. Previously unexplored sources reveal, however, that Framing Era limits on officers were expressly abandoned as professional police forces were created in the mid-nineteenth century and charged with aggressively investigating and preventing crime. The modern scheme of judicially supervised police investigations was then implemented after corruption and scandals of the 1920s. The development of modern criminal procedure has a rich historical background, but it has almost nothing to do with the events of the Framing Era.