Law Commons^™

Another Can Of "Crawford" Worms: Certificates Of Nonexistence Of Public Record And The Confrontation Clause, Keith Hollingshead-Cook

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' When the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington in 2004, it established a new standard for assessing the scope of this right and determining when hearsay is admissible as trial evidence against a criminal defendant. Rather than basing decisions regarding a defendant's right to confrontation on a judicial inquiry into the reliability of a particular statement, an approach typified by the Court's earlier decision of Ohio v. …

Faint-Hearted Fidelity To The Common Law In Justice Scalia’S Confrontation Clause Trilogy, Ellen Yee

ellen yee

FAINT-HEARTED FIDELITY TO THE COMMON LAW IN JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TRILOGY Ellen Liang Yee ABSTRACT In Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008), the Supreme Court issued the third Confrontation Clause opinion in its recent Crawford trilogy. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Giles Court reiterated its interpretive approach in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” The Court’s decision purports to hold that a defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment confrontation …

Coconspirators, “Coventurers,” And The Exception Swallowing The Hearsay Rule, Ben L. Trachtenberg

Faculty Publications

In recent years, prosecutors - sometimes with the blessing of courts - have argued that when proving the existence of a “conspiracy” to justify admission of evidence under the Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule, they need show only that the declarant and the defendant were “coventurers” with a common purpose, not coconspirators with an illegal purpose. Indeed, government briefs and court decisions specifically disclaim the need to show any wrongful goal whatsoever. This Article contends that such a reading of the Exception is mistaken and undesirable. Conducted for this article, a survey of thousands of court decisions, including the …

Melendez-Diaz V. Massachusetts: The Future Of The Confrontation Clause, Joseph Henn

Barry Law Review

The purpose of this article is to show the error in the majorities’ decision in Melendez-Diaz by approaching the issue from two perspectives. First, by investigating the cases and legal doctrines created by the Supreme Court in the years preceding Melendez-Diaz, this article will demonstrate why the case was erroneously decided. Second, this article explores the possibility that the majority decision was correct and thus the recently devised standard in Crawford v. Washington is inherently flawed. This article will further discuss the prior application of law before the Melendez-Diaz decision, offer analysis on the string of cases that led …

But What If The Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right To Confront Hidden Declarants Found In Transcripts Of Former Testimony, Peter Nicolas

Articles

In Part I of this Article, I will illustrate the hidden declarant issue through a series of hypotheticals that highlight both the hearsay and Confrontation Clause problems associated with proving former testimony. Next, in Part II, I will demonstrate that treating the hidden declarant's statements as testimonial, and thus subject to exclusion on Confrontation Clause grounds, is consistent with Crawford and its progeny.

I will then demonstrate, in Part III, that historically, in both England and the United States, the accused had the right to confront hidden declarants, and that the historical exception for former testimony does not extinguish the …

"I'M Dying To Tell You What Happened": The Admissibility Of Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, Peter Nicolas

Articles

This Article demonstrates the existence and delineates the scope of a federal constitutional definition of "dying declarations" that is distinct from the definitions set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts. This Article further demonstrates that states have state constitutional definitions of "dying declarations" (for purposes of interpreting state constitutional analogues to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) that may differ in important respects from the federal constitutional definition of "dying declarations."

This Article then shows that some of the definitions of "dying declarations" contained in federal and state hearsay exceptions exceed the federal and …