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Full-Text Articles in Law

Deciding The Stop And Frisk Cases: A Look Inside The Supreme Court's Conference, John Q. Barrett Jan 1998

Deciding The Stop And Frisk Cases: A Look Inside The Supreme Court's Conference, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

In our system of constitutional decision-making, the Supreme Court makes law as an institution in its formal written opinions. The Court and its individual members make their official legal marks in the printed pages of the United States Reports. In June 1968, in Terry v. Ohio and Sibron v. New York, the two decisions that approved the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of police stop and frisk practices, the Court filled many official pages with rich discussion. Over the ensuing thirty years, these Court and individual opinions have shaped the course of constitutional analysis in our courts and guided the …


Reconciliation And The Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy Of The 1995-96 Budget "Train Wreck", Anita S. Krishnakumar Jan 1998

Reconciliation And The Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy Of The 1995-96 Budget "Train Wreck", Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

Congress originally conceived of the budget reconciliation process as a minor fallback mechanism for bringing one year's tax and spending policy in line with overall budget targets. Reconciliation has since become central to congressional efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit. This Note argues, however, that reconciliation is limited in its capacity to impel significant budgetary reform. The author demonstrates how, in 1995-96, reconciliation caused repeated breakdowns in governmental budget-making, undermining the entire budget process. The author concludes that the legal, institutional, and political constraints inherent in the reconciliation process will continue to constitute powerful obstacles to congressional efforts to …


State Of Ohio V. Richard D. Chilton And State Of Ohio V. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing And Trial Transcripts, John Q. Barrett Jan 1998

State Of Ohio V. Richard D. Chilton And State Of Ohio V. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing And Trial Transcripts, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

This appendix to Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 749 (1998), includes Biographical Information on the Participants in the Case; and transcripts of the complete pretrial and trial proceedings in the 1964 criminal prosecutions of Richard Chilton and John Terry, arranged by Prof. Barrett to create the organization reflected in the Table of Contents at the beginning of the appendix. Footnotes were added to provide citations and, in a few instances, to clarify the text. Bracketed material was added to correct obvious slips of the tongue or the …


The Street Locations: Downtown Cleveland, October 31, 1963, John Q. Barrett Jan 1998

The Street Locations: Downtown Cleveland, October 31, 1963, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

This appendix to Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 749 (1998), consists of a map drawn by Jill Dinneen (SJU Law '99), based on Sanborn maps from the 1950s and 1960s, photographs and eyewitness descriptions of downtown Cleveland then and now; and a key to marked locations on the map.


All Or Nothing, Or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, And Judgment In Relation To The Work Of An Independent Counsel, John Q. Barrett Jan 1998

All Or Nothing, Or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, And Judgment In Relation To The Work Of An Independent Counsel, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

This Article considers the allocation of power under the independent counsel law between the Attorney General along with the Department of Justice and the independent counsel whose appointment the Attorney General has triggered. Although the law explicitly transfers much of an Attorney General's lawful power to an independent counsel, it does not go far enough in reallocating that power. Thus, it leaves a fundamental gap between what the current statute purports independent counsel to be and what it actually empowers independent counsel to accomplish. After an introduction in Part I, Part II of this article reviews the current legal provisions, …