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Full-Text Articles in Law
Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney
Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney
Michigan Law Review
There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disapproval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, imposes significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The consequent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is unhealthy from a democratic perspective …
Incorporating The Suspension Clause: Is There A Constitutional Right To Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners?, Jordan Steiker
Incorporating The Suspension Clause: Is There A Constitutional Right To Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners?, Jordan Steiker
Michigan Law Review
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court adopted generous standards governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. At that time, the Court suggested, rather surprisingly, that its solicitude toward such petitions might be constitutionally mandated by the Suspension Clause, the only provision in the Constitution that explicitly refers to the "Writ of Habeas Corpus." Now, thirty years later, the Court has essentially overruled those expansive rulings, and Congress has considered, though not yet enacted, further limitations on the availability of the writ. Despite these significant assaults on the habeas forum, the constitutional argument appears to have been entirely abandoned. The …
Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins
Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins
Faculty Publications
With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decision making. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the …
The Death And Transfiguration Of Frye, Richard D. Friedman
The Death And Transfiguration Of Frye, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The rule of Frye v. United States was seventy years old, and had long dominated American law on the question of how well established a scientific principle must be for it to provide the basis for expert testimony. Even after the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, several of the federal circuits, as well as various states, purported to adhere to Frye's "general acceptance" standard. But now, unanimously, briefly, and with no apparent angst, the United States Supreme Court has held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. that the Frye rule is incompatible with the Federal Rules.
Taxation Of Punitive Damages Obtained In A Personal Injury Claim, Douglas A. Kahn
Taxation Of Punitive Damages Obtained In A Personal Injury Claim, Douglas A. Kahn
Articles
The author explains that in recent court opinions and commentaries concerning whether punitive damages are taxable, considerable weight has been given to a negative inference that appears to lurk in a 1989 amendment to the relevant code provision, section 104(a)(2). To the contrary, he argues, the legislative history of that amendment and the form that the bill had when it was reported out of the Conference Committee establish beyond doubt that no such inference is warranted.