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Full-Text Articles in Law

Federal Common Law And Gaps In Federal Statutes: The Case Of Erisa Plan Limitation Periods For Section 502(A)(1)(B) Actions, Jim Greiner Nov 1994

Federal Common Law And Gaps In Federal Statutes: The Case Of Erisa Plan Limitation Periods For Section 502(A)(1)(B) Actions, Jim Greiner

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that federal courts should adopt a uniform national rule that upholds plan provisions modifying the limitation period for a section 502(a)(l)(B) action. Part I examines the reasoning of those courts that have borrowed state law to determine the validity of modifications of the limitation period applicable to actions arising under BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) and under other federal statutes. Part I argues that those courts may have incorrectly characterized the validity of plan limitation periods as an issue of limitation law. As a consequence of this characterization, those courts have followed the Supreme Court's rule that, when borrowing …


Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney Oct 1994

Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disapproval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, imposes significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The consequent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is unhealthy from a democratic perspective …


The New Gold Rush: Mine Tailings In Southeast Alaska And Perversion Of The Clean Water Act, Beth Leibowitz May 1994

The New Gold Rush: Mine Tailings In Southeast Alaska And Perversion Of The Clean Water Act, Beth Leibowitz

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note provides a basic explanation of the mine tailings problem. Part II of this Note discusses the evolution of the agencies' tailings decision and the statutory and regulatory context in which it occurred. Part III outlines briefly the actual decision, which involved the theory that neither the EPA nor the Corps should apply the usual CWA permit requirements to the initial discharge of mine waste. Part IV evaluates the legal basis for that decision and concludes, based on the language of the CWA, the EPA's own prior policy, and judicial precedent, that the decision was without …


Legitimation And Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, And Community In Federal Indian Law, David C. Williams Jan 1994

Legitimation And Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, And Community In Federal Indian Law, David C. Williams

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Absurdity And The Limits Of Literalism: Defining The Absurd Result Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Veronica Dougherty Jan 1994

Absurdity And The Limits Of Literalism: Defining The Absurd Result Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Veronica Dougherty

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

The absurd result principle in statutory interpretation provides an exception to the rule that a statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning. In an age of increasing debate about the proper approach to statutory interpretation, and of increasing emphasis on literal approaches, the absurd result principle poses intriguing challenges to literalism and to theories of interpretation generally.The absurd result principle is extraordinarily powerful. It authorizes a judge to ignore a statute's plain words in order to avoid the outcome those words would require in a particular situation. This is a radical thing; judges are not supposed to rewrite …


Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity In The Logical Structure Of Legal Drafting By Means Of The Prescribed Definitions Of The A-Hohfeld Structural Language, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon Jan 1994

Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity In The Logical Structure Of Legal Drafting By Means Of The Prescribed Definitions Of The A-Hohfeld Structural Language, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon

Articles

Two principal sources of imprecision in legal drafting (vagueness and ambiguity) are identified and illustrated. Virtually all of the ambiguity imprecision encountered in legal discourse is ambiguity in the language used to express logical structure, and virtually all of· the imprecision resulting is inadvertent. On the other hand, the imprecision encountered in legal writing that results from vagueness is frequently, if not most often, included there deliberately; the drafter has considered it and decided that the vague language· best accomplishes the purpose at hand. This paper focuses on the use of some defined terminology for minimizing inadvertent ambiguity in the …