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- Negligence (5)
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Articles 1 - 30 of 64
Full-Text Articles in Law
Torts—Negligence—Standard Of Care, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Torts—Negligence—Standard Of Care, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Buffalo Law Review
Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N. Y. 268, 107 N. E. 2d 441 (1952y, rev'g 279 App. Div. 746, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 334 (2d Dep't 1951).
Torts—Negligence—Causation, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Torts—Negligence—Causation, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Buffalo Law Review
Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N. Y. 498, 104 N. E. 2d 872 (1952), rev'g 278 App. Div. 743, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 519 (4th Dep't 1951).
Torts—Negligence—Indemnity, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Torts—Negligence—Indemnity, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Buffalo Law Review
McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N. Y. 314, 107 N. E. 2d 463 (1952).
Torts—Intentional Torts—Right Of Privacy, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Torts—Intentional Torts—Right Of Privacy, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Buffalo Law Review
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 360, 107 N. E. 485, 489 (1952).
Torts—Unemancipated Minor Allowed Tort Action Against Parent For Negligence, Irwin N. Davis
Torts—Unemancipated Minor Allowed Tort Action Against Parent For Negligence, Irwin N. Davis
Buffalo Law Review
Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio 566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (1952).
Torts—Negligence—Duty, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Torts—Negligence—Duty, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Buffalo Law Review
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951), rev'g 278 App. Div. 913, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417 (Ist Dep't 1951).
Torts—Intentional Torts—Libel, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Torts—Intentional Torts—Libel, Ralph Halpern, Sheldon Hurwitz
Buffalo Law Review
Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 304 N. Y. 244, 107 N. E. 2d 62 (1952).
Libel—Executive Immunity—Scope Of Executive Authority Broadly Interpreted, Frank J. Laski
Libel—Executive Immunity—Scope Of Executive Authority Broadly Interpreted, Frank J. Laski
Buffalo Law Review
Matson v. Margiotti, __ Pa. __, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952).
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Damage Action For Breach Of Racial Restrictive Covenant, Richard W. Pogue S.Ed.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Damage Action For Breach Of Racial Restrictive Covenant, Richard W. Pogue S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiffs sued at law to recover damages for breach of a racial restrictive covenant, alleging that defendants violated the covenant by conveying restricted property to persons of the Negro race and placing them in possession and occupancy. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, held, affirmed. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents the maintenance of an action for breach of racial restrictive covenants. Phillips v. Naff, (Mich. 1952) 52 N.W. (2d) 158.
Evidence-Presumptions-Plaintiff's Res Ipsa Loquitur Against Defendants Presumption Of Due Care, Bernard A. Petrie S.Ed.
Evidence-Presumptions-Plaintiff's Res Ipsa Loquitur Against Defendants Presumption Of Due Care, Bernard A. Petrie S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiff sued for injuries resulting when an automobile which defendant was driving and in which plaintiff was sleeping left the highway. There was evidence that defendant suffered retrograde amnesia and could not recall the circumstances of the accident. The court, instructing on res ipsa loquitur for plaintiff, told the jury that it might infer negligence from the fact that the automobile inexplicably left the highway. The court also instructed that, if the jury believed that defendant suffered a loss of memory, defendant was presumed to have exercised due care. Verdict for defendant. Plaintiff contended that instruction on the presumption of …
Negligence-Immunity Of Charitable Institutions From Suit, W. Garrett Flickinger S.Ed.
Negligence-Immunity Of Charitable Institutions From Suit, W. Garrett Flickinger S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
A patient of defendant charitable hospital died as a result of the transfusion of an incorrect blood type and it was shown that one of defendant's employees had correctly typed the blood but negligently mislabeled it. The widower and children of the deceased brought an action in negligence for damages and the circuit court allowed recovery. On appeal, held, affirmed. The defendant hospital is liable in damages for the death of the deceased caused by the negligence of its employee notwithstanding the fact that defendant is a charitable institution and that the hospital authorities exercised due care and caution …
Negligence-Right To Recover For Pre-Natal Injurie, James S. Taylor S.Ed.
Negligence-Right To Recover For Pre-Natal Injurie, James S. Taylor S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
The plaintiff-infant by his guardian ad litem brought an action against the defendant alleging that while he was en ventre sa mere during the ninth month of his mother's pregnancy, he sustained, through the defendant's negligence, such serious injuries that he was born permanently maimed and disabled. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate division affirmed. On appeal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. A complaint alleging pre-natal injuries tortiously inflicted on a nine month foetus viable at the time and actually born later states a good cause of action. Woods …
Admiralty-Recovery For Negligent Invasion Of Contractural Interest In Use Of Ship, Duncan Noble S. Ed.
Admiralty-Recovery For Negligent Invasion Of Contractural Interest In Use Of Ship, Duncan Noble S. Ed.
Michigan Law Review
A fishing vessel just beginning a voyage was negligently struck by another ship and laid up for a period of time for repairs. The crew were to have been compensated on the so-called "lay plan," 32% of the gross catch going to the jointly-owned vessel and gear, and 68% being split equally among the crew of ten, which included one of the joint owners. On a libel filed originally by seven of the crew members, but later joined by both owners and the remaining two of the crew, the trial court allowed recovery of the cost of repairs to the …
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Justification For A Directed Verdict In Favor Of The Plaintiff, William A. Bain, Jr. S. Ed.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Justification For A Directed Verdict In Favor Of The Plaintiff, William A. Bain, Jr. S. Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Defendant was driving his car along a straight and unobstructed stretch of gravel road when it ran off the road, overturned, and injured the plaintiff, who was a passenger. There was some conflict in the evidence as to the speed of the car and the only evidence that the defendant could offer as to the cause of the accident was a statement that it could have been the gravel or a tie rod. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, affirmed. The car left a straight and unobstructed highway and there is no showing …
Torts-Assault And Battery-Use Of Traps To Protect Property From Felonious Taking, Charles E. Oldfather S. Ed.
Torts-Assault And Battery-Use Of Traps To Protect Property From Felonious Taking, Charles E. Oldfather S. Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries. Defendant planted two sticks of dynamite in the floor beneath the door of his mining warehouse in order to prevent repeated thefts of personal property from the building. The dynamite was rigged to explode when the door was opened. Plaintiff, with the intent of stealing whatever he could, broke the lock, opened the door, and from the ensuing explosion received leg and foot injuries. Plaintiff's act was a statutory felony. Defendant testified that he in good faith thought that the amount of dynamite used would merely frighten the plaintiff. Trial court held the …
Eads V. Marks, Jesse W. Carter
Eads V. Marks, Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
Family that alleged injury to minor was caused by dairy's breach of agreement to place milk bottles only in family's refrigerator, out of reach of the minor, should have been allowed to amend their complaint to state a cause of action in tort.
Ward V. Jones [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Ward V. Jones [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
The dismissal, after a general demurrer was sustained, of a plaintiff's action for wrongful death was proper where the plaintiff failed to present a verified claim for damages in writing and file the claim with the clerk of the municipality.
Flores V. Brown [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Flores V. Brown [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
Damages for wrongful death were the sum of those suffered by each heir or parent and when the heirs were not husband and wife, the negligence of one was not imputed to the others.
Hamasaki V. Flotho [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Hamasaki V. Flotho [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
The trial court was not required to order a new trial on damage issues alone where damages awarded in a personal injury suit against a driver, the car's owner, and the driver's employer were so low that the jury had clearly compromised on liability.
Cary V. Wentzel [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Cary V. Wentzel [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
Where a jury verdict was the result of compromise, there had been no acceptable determination of liability, the driver was entitled to a new trial on that issue, and an order limiting a new trial to the issue of damages was an abuse of discretion.
Leipert V. Honold [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Leipert V. Honold [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
Partial new trial on damages was improperly ordered as issue of liability was very close and record evidence suggested that award was the result of a compromise, and thus, it would have been unjust to have a new trial limited to issue of damages.
Rose V. Melody Lane Of Wilshire [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Rose V. Melody Lane Of Wilshire [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
Grant of a new trial in favor of a customer on issue of damages, in his action to recover for personal injuries sustained in the owner's establishment, was improper. The nominal award by the jury indicated indecision as to owner's res ipsa liability.
Norris V. Pacific Indem. Co. [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Norris V. Pacific Indem. Co. [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
Where a permittee had neither express nor implied permission for the delegation of the use of the car to another, the driver was not protected by an omnibus clause covering permittees and was therefore not entitled to coverage under the policy.
Scott V. Burke [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Scott V. Burke [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
It was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur as well as the conflicting presumption of due care that arose if defendant driver was truly unable to recall the cause of the accident.
Rodabaugh V. Tekus [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Rodabaugh V. Tekus [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
The doctrine of last clear chance rarely applied in cases involving high speed collisions between vehicles because it was extremely difficult to determine which party, if any, had a meaningful last clear chance to avoid an accident.
Sexton V. Brooks [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Sexton V. Brooks [Dissent], Jesse W. Carter
Jesse Carter Opinions
In plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained through a fall on a cement walk, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the applicable rules of law, therefore, judgment for plaintiff was improper.
Particularizing Standards Of Conduct In Negligence Trials, James Fleming Jr., David K. Sigerson
Particularizing Standards Of Conduct In Negligence Trials, James Fleming Jr., David K. Sigerson
Vanderbilt Law Review
The general principles to be applied by court or jury in deciding whether conduct is reasonable have been examined elsewhere.' The problem to be dealt with here concerns the specific application of the law's standard of conduct to concrete cases. How, that is, may it be shown what a party or his opponent should have done, in the way of taking precautions or the like, in the situation presented by the evidence? What kinds of proof or argument are available to make this showing? When must such a showing be made by proof? Is the jury or court to determine …
Torts-Statutes-Unsatisified Judgment And Hit-And-Run Provisions As Supplementing Financial Responsibility Acts, Herbert L. Meschke
Torts-Statutes-Unsatisified Judgment And Hit-And-Run Provisions As Supplementing Financial Responsibility Acts, Herbert L. Meschke
Michigan Law Review
In 1947, North Dakota enacted legislation providing that one who recovers a judgment in an action for damages for personal injuries or death resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle and who cannot execute the judgment because of the defendants' inability to pay and lack of property, may receive payment from the state unsatisfied judgment fund upon application to the court and assignment of the judgment to the state. The fund was created, and is to be maintained, by a special assessment on motor vehicle owners. 1951 North Dakota legislation provides that any person who has a cause of …
Municipal Corporations--Liability For Torts, W. O. S.
Municipal Corporations--Liability For Torts, W. O. S.
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.
Negligence—Last Clear Chance—Emergency Rule, Gordon F. Crandall
Negligence—Last Clear Chance—Emergency Rule, Gordon F. Crandall
Washington Law Review
P was helping to push F's car out of a ditch and while standing beside the car he failed to see the approach of D's auto over the crest of a hill 250 feet behind him. D saw F's automobile partially blocking the road and tried to stop or avoid it, but his car went out of control, slid broadside down the slippery road and struck P, pinning him between the two cars as they collided. The trial court gave the jury an instruction on last clear chance, apparently for the reason that although D was unable to stop his …