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Full-Text Articles in Law
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
In the realm of Federal Courts, the question of “implied rights of action” asks when, if ever, may a plaintiff bring a federal right of action for the violation of a federal statute that does not expressly create one. Justice Scalia argued that a court should not entertain an action for damages for the violation of a federal statute unless the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress meant to create a right of action. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. Certain judges and scholars have argued …
Before Interpretation, Anya Bernstein
Before Interpretation, Anya Bernstein
Journal Articles
What a statutory interpretation opinion interprets may seem given. It is not: this article shows how judges select what text to interpret. That text may seem to carry with it one of a limited range of contexts. It does not: this article shows how judges draw on a variety of factors to situate the texts they interpret in unique, case-specific contexts. Selecting and situating form the infrastructure of interpretation. Their creativity and choice provide the basis on which assertions of determinate meaning are made. That process reveals how contestation and indeterminacy permeate legal interpretation even as judicial opinions seek to …
Ditching Your Duty: When Must Private Entities Comply With Federal Antidiscrimination Law?, Tara Knapp
Ditching Your Duty: When Must Private Entities Comply With Federal Antidiscrimination Law?, Tara Knapp
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
This Commentary considers how the Fifth Circuit characterizes “services, programs, and activities” of public agencies in Ivy v. Williams, in the context of determining whether a private entity is subject to federal antidiscrimination law. “Services, programs, and activities” of public agencies must comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, whether directly distributed by a public or a private entity. This Commentary argues private driving schools in Texas that distribute a driving course necessary to obtaining a drivers’ license are subject to Title II because the providing the course functionally constitutes a program of the Texas Education …
Simmons V. Briones, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 9, Annie Avery
Simmons V. Briones, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 9, Annie Avery
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries
A judgment for penalty attorney fees and costs against a driver in an action that arises out of a motor vehicle accident is not a “judgment . . . upon a cause of action” arising out of the use of a motor vehicle such that its nonpayment may result in the suspension of driving privileges under NRS § 485.302.
Toward A Federal Jurisprudence Of Trade Secret Law, Sharon Sandeen, Christopher B. Seaman
Toward A Federal Jurisprudence Of Trade Secret Law, Sharon Sandeen, Christopher B. Seaman
Faculty Scholarship
The May 2016 enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), which created a new federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, raises a host of issues that federal courts will have to consider under their original subject matter jurisdiction, rather than applying state law through the courts’ diversity jurisdiction. This means that for the first time, an extensive body of federal jurisprudence will be developed to govern the civil protection and enforcement of trade secrets in the United States. In addition, due to the DTSA’s changes to the existing federal criminal law governing trade secrets, …
Chevron Is A Rorschach Test Ink Blot, Jack M. Beermann
Chevron Is A Rorschach Test Ink Blot, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
I agree with Alan Morrison that, in some circumstances, courts should defer to legal determinations made by administrative agencies. I disagree, however, with Alan’s view that Chevron provides a suitable framework for such deference. It really boils down to my disagreement with the first sentence of Alan’s article: “In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court unanimously adopted an approach to interpreting federal statutes under which the courts are required to give substantial deference to the interpretations by the administrative agencies that enforce them.”1 In fact, the Supreme Court adopted nothing in Chevron related to …
The Inference From Authority To Interpretive Method In Constitutional And Statutory Domains, Kevin M. Stack
The Inference From Authority To Interpretive Method In Constitutional And Statutory Domains, Kevin M. Stack
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Should courts interpret the Constitution as they interpret statutes? This question has been answered in a wide variety of ways. On the one hand, many scholars and jurists understand constitutional and statutory interpretation as largely overlapping, continuous, or converging. For some, this overlap follows directly from the Constitution's status as a form of legislated law. In this way of thinking, because the Constitution, like a statute, was bargained over and formally adopted, it should be interpreted in accordance with general principles applicable to legislated law. Proponents of this view argue that if constitutional interpretation appears distinctive in practice, that is …
Judges’ Varied Views On Textualism: The Roberts-Alito Schism And The Similar District Judge Divergence That Undercuts The Widely Assumed Textualism-Ideology Correlation, Scott A. Moss
Publications
No abstract provided.
Chevron's Interstitial Steps, Cary Coglianese
Chevron's Interstitial Steps, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. …
R. V. Safarzadeh-Markhali: Elements And Implications Of The Supreme Court's New Rigorous Approach To Construction Of Statutory Purpose, Marcus Moore
All Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Safarzadeh-Markhali holds great significance, beyond Criminal Law, in the area of Statutory Interpretation: in Markhali, the Court decisively endorses a new rigorous approach to construing legislative purpose. Previously, while legislation itself was long-interpreted utilizing rigorous approaches, legislative purpose was typically construed ad hoc while providing only summary justification. Markhali’s new framework is distinct from prior approaches in at least four ways: (1) It expressly acknowledges the critical importance of purpose construction in many cases; (2) It is conscious of how a less-than-rigorous approach risks being self-defeating of larger legal analyses in which the …
Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than eighty cases per year. …