Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Jurisprudence (3)
- Legal Education (3)
- Law and Politics (2)
- Law and Society (2)
- Legal Profession (2)
-
- Legal Writing and Research (2)
- Anthropology (1)
- Arts and Humanities (1)
- Criminal Law (1)
- History (1)
- Human Rights Law (1)
- International Humanitarian Law (1)
- International Law (1)
- Judges (1)
- Law and Philosophy (1)
- Law and Race (1)
- Legal (1)
- Legal History (1)
- Legislation (1)
- Litigation (1)
- Natural Law (1)
- Other Arts and Humanities (1)
- Property Law and Real Estate (1)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (1)
- Social and Cultural Anthropology (1)
- Institution
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Law Is Made Of Stories: Erasing The False Dichotomy Between Stories And Legal Rules, Stephen Paskey
The Law Is Made Of Stories: Erasing The False Dichotomy Between Stories And Legal Rules, Stephen Paskey
Journal Articles
When lawyers think of legal analysis, they think chiefly of logic and reason. Stories are secondary. As Michael Smith explains, our legal system “is not founded on narrative reasoning” but on “a commitment to the rule of law.” The article suggests that this dichotomy between “rule-based reasoning” and “narrative reasoning” is false, and that narrative and stories are central to legal reasoning, including rule-based reasoning. In doing so, the article uses literary narrative theory to show that every governing legal rule has the structure of a “stock story”: the elements of the rule correspond to elements of a story. It …
Of Gangs And Gaggles: Can A Corporation Be Part Of An Association-In-Fact Rico Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, And Rhetorical Perspectives, Randy D. Gordon
Of Gangs And Gaggles: Can A Corporation Be Part Of An Association-In-Fact Rico Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, And Rhetorical Perspectives, Randy D. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Over 30 years ago, courts of appeals began to hold that the RICO statute’s definition of association-in-fact enterprise is broad enough to include corporations as constituent members, even though that definition states that such an association is limited to a “group of individuals.” This Article demonstrates why these cases were wrongly decided from a variety of perspectives: linguistic, systemic and consequentialist. It also suggests a strategy for correcting this widespread interpretive error and provides evidence that the Supreme Court may be disposed to agree that the lower courts have uniformly erred.
On Legal Scholarship, Danielle K. Citron, Robin West
On Legal Scholarship, Danielle K. Citron, Robin West
Shorter Faculty Works
Academic critics contend that legal scholarship is overly argumentative or too “normative,” simply stating what the law should be, as well as what the law is. It isn’t about pure scholarship’s pursuit of knowledge within the discipline of a recognized academic field. Critics from the bar and the judiciary proffer the opposite complaint: legal scholarship is too academic and not professional enough, enamored with fads, unmoored from any discipline and of little use to the practicing lawyer or sitting judge. Law schools’ legions of cost-conscious critics complain that paying high salaries to professors with low course loads drives up tuitions. …
Breaking Glass: Identity, Community And Epistemology In Theory, Law And Education, Francisco Valdes
Breaking Glass: Identity, Community And Epistemology In Theory, Law And Education, Francisco Valdes
Articles
No abstract provided.
Law And Artifice In Blackstone's Commentaries, Jessie Allen
Law And Artifice In Blackstone's Commentaries, Jessie Allen
Articles
William Blackstone is often identified as a natural law thinker for whom property rights were preeminent, but reading the Commentaries complicates that description. I propose that Blackstone’s concept of law is more concerned with human invention and artifice than with human nature. At the start of his treatise, Blackstone identifies security, liberty and property as “absolute” rights that form the foundation of English law. But while security and liberty are “inherent by nature in every individual” and “strictly natural,” Blackstone is only willing to say that “private property is probably founded in nature.” Moreover, Blackstone is clear that there is …
Pragmatic Liberalism: The Outlook Of The Dead, Justin Desautels-Stein
Pragmatic Liberalism: The Outlook Of The Dead, Justin Desautels-Stein
Publications
At the turn of the twentieth century, the legal profession was rocked in a storm of reform. Among the sparks of change was the view that "law in the books" had drifted too far from the "law in action." This popular slogan reflected the broader postwar suspicion that the legal profession needed to be more realistic, more effective, and more in touch with the social needs of the time. A hundred years later, we face a similarly urgent demand for change. Across the blogs and journals stretches a thread of anxieties about the lack of fit between legal education and …
The Judge And The Drone, Justin Desautels-Stein
The Judge And The Drone, Justin Desautels-Stein
Publications
Among the most characteristic issues in modern jurisprudence is the distinction between adjudication and legislation. In the some accounts, a judge's role in deciding a particular controversy is highly constrained and limited to the application of preexisting law. Whereas legislation is inescapably political, adjudication requires at least some form of impersonal neutrality. In various ways over the past century, theorists have pressed this conventional account, complicating the conceptual underpinnings of the distinction between law-application and lawmaking. This Article contributes to this literature on the nature of adjudication through the resuscitation of a structuralist mode of legal interpretation. In the structuralist …