Law Commons^™

Is Intent Relevant?, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

The role of intent in federal antitrust cases has been characterized as “unsettled” and “controversial.” Many lower courts, scholars, and practitioners recognize that intent evidence is relevant in antitrust cases. But jurists and scholars oriented by neoclassical economic theory disagree.

Using the developments in the behavioral economics literature, this Article reexamines the relevancy of intent evidence in civil antitrust cases. The analysis is organized around two issues: First is intent legally relevant in civil antitrust cases? Second if intent evidence is relevant, for what purpose?

Intent evidence, this Article concludes, is relevant. The behavioral economics experiments confirm what many have …

Behavioral Antitrust And Monopolization, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

One hot topic is whether Google has violated the antitrust laws. Another important topic is how behavioral economics can enrich antitrust policy. This Essay examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law. The Essay first discusses trial-and-error learning as an entry barrier. This is timely given the current debate over the entry barriers of the search engine market.

The Essay next discusses behavioral exploitation to maintain a monopoly. The behavioral economics literature can help explain the European Commission’s tying claims against Microsoft, why the Commission’s original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission’s remedy involving …

Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently interventionist. Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the “extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.

This Essay draws …

Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust is thriving internationally. On the other hand, antitrust’s influence has diminished domestically. Over the past thirty years, there have been fewer antitrust investigations and private actions. Today the Supreme Court complains about antitrust suits, and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a regulatory framework. So what happened to the antitrust movement in the United States?

Two import factors contributed to antitrust policy’s domestic decline. The first is salience, especially the salience of the U.S. antitrust goals. In the past thirty years, enforcers and courts abandoned …

Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

An Updated Quantitative Study Of Iqbal's Impact On 12(B)(6) Motions, Patricia W. Moore

Faculty Articles

The effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on pleading standards and behavior is a source of significant legal debate. This article serves as a follow-up to Professor Moore's 2010 empirical study on Iqbal's effect on courts' rulings on motions to dismiss complaints for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Professor Moore's previous study found a statistically significant increase in the likelihood that a court grants a 12(b)(6) motion with leave to amend following Iqbal. In this article, Professor Moore updates and increases the pool of cases in her database. The updated data …

A Neo-Chicago Approach To Concerted Action, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

In this article, I offer an approach to concerted action that builds on traditional Chicago School analyses of the issue, but adds a focus on the role of communication. Chicago scholars uniformly identify cartels as the primary target of antitrust enforcement. They have also established much of the framework within which courts and economists analyze concerted action. George Stigler’s seminal theory of oligopoly, which sought to identify the determinants of effective collusion, has spawned an enormous literature in game theory that models the pricing behavior of oligopolists. Richard Posner’s early analysis of tacit collusion - rivals’ coordination of noncompetitive pricing …

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its …

The Rule Of Reason And The Goals Of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

In this paper, we discuss the problem of the rule of reason and the welfare standard in antitrust. We begin with the Introduction (Section I), which provides an overview of the problem. In Section II, we review the Supreme Court’s guidance on the standard for conducting a rule of reason analysis. Put simply, the Supreme Court has failed to identify clearly what standard to use in conducting a rule of reason inquiry. After a careful — albeit selective — reading of Supreme Court opinions it is simply not clear. While a case can be made for total welfare as the …

Occupy Wall Street And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Capitalism, some declare, is in crisis. One concern, which the Occupy Wall Street protesters and many Americans share, is how a relatively small group of corporate and wealthy individuals now wields too much economic influence and control in the United States and the world. The prevailing belief is that financial institutions’ power and influence represent a major threat to America.

So what does antitrust have to say about this public unease? Few would likely believe the Supreme Court’s Standard Oil opinion handed down a century ago would relate to their present concerns. That is unfortunate. The concerns Standard Oil raises …

The Rule Of Reason Re-Examined, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

This article analyzes the application of the Rule of Reason as articulated by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States to alleged restraints of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. It argues that the Brandeis formulation, which requires courts to consider a broad range of economic factors and then weigh procompetitive benefits against anticompetitive effects, has proven unwieldy in the hands of trial judges. Because the Brandeis formulation provides little guidance as to how these factors should be weighed, courts have struggled to develop clear, predictable, and consistent standards under section 1. This …

Were Standard Oil's Railroad Rebates And Drawbacks Cost Justified?, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In this essay, written for a symposium on the centennial anniversary of the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision, I reexamine the costjustification question. In the first part, I explain why the cost-justification question is central to the entire case and its acquired and evolving historical meaning. In the second part, I review the evidence of claimed efficiencies passed on to the railroads. I conclude that there is evidence that Standard Oil passed along significant cost savings to the railroads and that these savings could have justified a portion of the rebates and drawbacks. However, I conclude that there is little …

Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when "parallel pricing" – adoption of the same price by every firm in a market – should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of "parallel exclusion" – conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be market entrants. Parallel exclusion merits greater attention, for it can be far more harmful than parallel price elevation. Setting a high price leaves the field open for new entrants and may even attract them. In contrast, parallel action that excludes new entrants both …