Law Commons^™

Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes Of Financial Institutions And The Path To Financial Crisis In Sweden And The United States, Erik F. Gerding

Faculty Scholarship

This article presents the following model of two regulatory classes of financial institutions interacting in financial and political markets to spur deregulation and riskier lending and investment, which in turn contributes to the severity of a financial crisis: 1) Regulation creates two categories of financial institutions. The first class faces greater restrictions in lending or investment activities but enjoys regulatory subsidies, such as an explicit or implicit government guarantee, while the second class is more loosely regulated and can make riskier loans or investments and earn additional profits. 2) These additional profits leads to calls for deregulation to enable the …

The Hidden Cost Of Auto Bailouts, Nathan B. Oman

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

In this article I argue that crisis-driven corporate governance reform efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom that aim to empower shareholders are misguided, and offer an explanation of why policymakers in each country have reacted to the financial crisis as they have. I first discuss the risk incentives of shareholders and managers in financial firms, and examine how excessive leverage and risk-taking in pursuit of short-term returns for shareholders led to the crisis. I then describe the far greater power and centrality that U.K. shareholders have historically possessed relative to their U.S. counterparts, and explore historical and …

Insurance Perspectives On Federal Financial Regulatory Reform: Addressing Misunderstandings And Providing View From Different Paradigm, Jeffrey E. Thomas

Faculty Works

Much of the current call for Federal regulatory reform of insurance is based on fundamental misunderstandings regarding American International Group (AIG) and the financial crisis, and because insurance, which is regulated predominately at the state level, provides a different, and potentially useful, regulatory paradigm. The first section of this article will analyze the role of insurance in the financial crisis. It exposes the misunderstandings and explain how insurance had little, if any, role in the crisis. The second section outlines the current, state-based regulatory paradigm for insurance, and will explain how this paradigm has become a barrier for Federal reform …

A Tale Of Two Crises, William K. Black

Faculty Works

The savings and loan debacle of the 1980s was the worst financial scandal in U.S. history. The estimated present value cost to the taxpayers was $150-175 billion ($1993). The debacle was a major contributor to a sharp recession in real estate values in the Southwest. However, it had only a negligible effect on the general economy.

The Japanese economy, the second largest in the world, also experienced a crisis in the 1980s. Twin “bubbles” in its stock and real estate markets hyper inflated for most of the decade of the 1980s. In general, the bigger the bubble, the worse the …

Successful Financial Regulators Think Like Public Health Experts: Why Regulators Must Fight 'Control Fraud' Like Public Health Specialists, William K. Black

Faculty Works

“Control fraud” is the leading cause of bank failures and financial crises. In “control fraud” the persons controlling a seemingly legitimate entity use it as a weapon to defraud. This essay analyzes the role of regulators in two epidemics of control fraud: the savings & loan debacle of the 1980s and the ongoing financial crises that first became acute in the nonprime mortgage sector.

Effective regulation is essential to prevent and contain such epidemics. An epidemic is the natural outcome of a “pathogenic environment” which requires a reservoir of hosts for the pathogens to infect, and “vectors” to spread the …

How Trust Is Abused In Free Markets: Enron’S 'Crooked 'E’', William K. Black

Faculty Works

A market can have a lemon's problem when one party to the transaction has far superior information to the other and defects are not obvious. The classic bad car, the "lemon" led to the name for this theory. A lemon's market is inefficient. Both consumers and reputable sellers of high quality goods are harmed by the consumer's inability to distinguish superior goods. Frauds, who sell poor quality goods by misrepresenting quality are the only winners. Markets beset by lemon's problems may be improved by government intervention, which can aid both consumers and honest sellers.

In his article "How Trust is …

Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes Of Financial Institutions And The Path To Financial Crisis In Sweden And The United States, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

This article presents the following model of two regulatory classes of financial institutions interacting in financial and political markets to spur deregulation and riskier lending and investment, which in turn contributes to the severity of a financial crisis: 1) Regulation creates two categories of financial institutions. The first class faces greater restrictions in lending or investment activities but enjoys regulatory subsidies, such as an explicit or implicit government guarantee, while the second class is more loosely regulated and can make riskier loans or investments and earn additional profits. 2) These additional profits leads to calls for deregulation to enable the …

The Best Of Times, The Worst Of Times: Securities Regulation Scholarship And Teaching In The Global Financial Crisis, Joan Macleod Heminway

Scholarly Works

This short piece is an annotated version of remarks that I gave to introduce a roundtable discussion on securities regulation scholarship at the University of Maryland School of Law program on “Corporate Governance and Securities Law Responses to the Financial Crisis” held on April 17, 2009. The piece represents my current thoughts about what it is like to teach, research, and write in the area of securities regulation. Ultimately, the message I deliver is a positive one; there is much opportunity for securities regulation teachers and scholars in an environment like the one we have been wrestling with since at …

Lessons From The Financial Crisis, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

What lessons can we learn from the financial crisis concerning the issues of systemic risk, firms too big to fail, and the income inequality in the United States today?

In light of the public anger over the financial crisis and bailouts to firms deemed too big to fail, this Essay first addresses the issue of systemic risk posed by mergers generally and those in the financial services industries specifically. The federal government heard concerns in the 1990s about mega-mergers in the financial industry. The Department of Justice, for example, heard concerns that the Citibank-Travelers merger would create an institution too …