Law Commons^™

Collaborative Divorce: What Louis Brandeis Might Say About The Promise And Problems?, Susan Saab Fortney

Susan S. Fortney

No abstract provided.

Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle And The Moral Life Of Judges, Barry Sullivan

Barry Sullivan

No abstract provided.

Procedural Due Process Claims, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

Justice Lewis F. Powell's Baffling Vote In Roe V. Wade, Samuel W. Calhoun

Samuel W. Calhoun

No abstract provided.

Public Reporting Of Courts’ Performance – How Is This Best Achieved?, Matthew S.R. Palmer

The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer

In this address Matthew Palmer suggests: 1 The disclosure of information, probably more information than the judiciary feels comfortable disclosing, in a simple, straightforward, unvarnished way, is essential to the medium term constitutional legitimacy of the judiciary. 2 Judges, public servants and politicians speak different languages. Recognising the differences is the first step to a better understanding of, and communication with, each other and, perhaps to mitigating the potential for constitutional conflicts to get out of hand. 3 It’s not constitutionally appropriate for the executive or legislative branches of government to decide, over the wishes of the judiciary, on the …

Why Justice Kennedy's Opinion In Windsor Short-Changed Same-Sex Couples, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s decision in United States v. Windsor—invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act—made the same mistake as his decision in Lawrence v. Texas: it relied upon abstract notions of ‘liberty’ rather than the text-based guarantee of equality. Same-sex couples deserve more. They are entitled to equal treatment under the United States Constitution. Bans on same-sex marriage cannot be supported by a rational state interest, and instead constitute impermissible discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. By issuing a doctrinally muddled decision that included discussions of federalism, liberty, due process, and equal protection, Justice Kennedy missed an …

The Japanese Constitution As Law And The Legitimacy Of The Supreme Court’S Constitutional Decisions: A Response To Matsui, Craig Martin

Craig Martin

This article, from a conference at Washington University School of Law on the Supreme Court of Japan, responds to an article by Shigenori Matsui, “Why is the Japanese Supreme Court is so conservative?” Professor Matsui’s article makes the argument that a significant factor is the extent to which the judges fail to view the Constitution as positive law requiring judicial enforcement. It is novel in its emphasis on an explanation grounded in law, and the decision-making process, rather than the political, institutional, and cultural explanations that are so often offered. In this article, Borrowing from Kermit Roosevelt’s arguments on judicial …

Deliberative Democracy And Weak Courts: Constitutional Design In Nascent Democracies, Edsel F. Tupaz

Edsel F Tupaz

This Article addresses the question of constitutional design in young and transitional democracies. It argues for the adoption of a “weak” form of judicial review, as opposed to “strong” review which typifies much of contemporary adjudication. It briefly describes how the dialogical strain of deliberative democratic theory might well constitute the normative predicate for systems of weak review. In doing so, the Article draws from various judicial practices, from European supranational tribunals to Canadian courts and even Indian jurisprudence. The Article concludes with the suggestion that no judicial apparatus other than the weak structure of judicial review can better incite …

Sovereignty And The American Courts At The Cocktail Party Of International Law: The Dangers Of Domestic Invocations Of Foreign And International Law, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

With increasing frequency and heightened debate, United States courts have been citing foreign and “international” law as authority for domestic decisions. This trend is inappropriate, undemocratic, and dangerous. The trend touches on fundamental concepts of sovereignty, democracy, the judicial role, and overall issues of effective governance. There are multiple problems with the judiciary’s reliance on extraterritorial and extra-constitutional foreign or international sources to guide their decisions. Perhaps the most fundamental flaw is its interference with rule of law values. To borrow from Judge Harold Levanthal, the use of international sources in judicial decision-making might be described as “the equivalent of …

The Non-Political Branch (Reviewing Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice And Consent: The Politics Of Judicial Appointments (2005)), Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The Futile Quest For A System Of Judicial “Merit” Selection, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

Pay No Attention To That Man Behind The Robe: Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, And Judges As Politicians, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

State Laws And The Independent Judiciary: An Analysis Of The Effects Of The Seventeenth Amendment On The Number Of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws Unconstitutional, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

In recent years, the Seventeenth Amendment has been the subject of legal scholarship, congressional hearings and debate, Supreme Court opinions, popular press articles and commentary, state legislative efforts aimed at repeal, and activist repeal movements. To date, the literature on the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment has focused almost exclusively on the effects on the political production of legislation and competition between legislative bodies. Very little attention has been given to the potential adverse effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the relationship between state legislatures and the federal courts. This Article seeks to fill part of that literature gap, applying …

"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Article reexamines the doctrine of public use under the Takings Clause and its ability to impede takings for private use through an application of public choice theory. It argues that the judicial validation of interest-group capture of the condemnation power through a relaxed public use standard in Takings Clause review can be explained by interest group politics and public choice theory and by institutional tendencies inherent in the independent judiciary. Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it …