Law Commons^™

The Canons Of Statutory Construction And Judicial Constraints: A Response To Macey And Miller, Lawrence C. Marshall

Vanderbilt Law Review

Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller claim to have set out to provide a positivist explanation for why judges ever invoke canons in the course of interpreting statutes.' In truth, though, their question is a far broader one. What they really seek to explain is why judges ever use any interpretive tools in the course of interpreting statutes. Why, Macey and Miller want to know, don't judges simply decide what result in the case will best promote a good outcome on the grounds of public policy, intrinsic fairness, economic efficiency or wealth maximization? This question is perplexing to Macey and …

The Canons Of Statutory Construction And Judicial Preferences, Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller

Vanderbilt Law Review

A regrettable side-effect of Karl Llewellyn's interesting critique of the canons of statutory construction was that intellectual debate about the canons was derailed for almost a quarter of a century. In his critique, Professor Llewellyn purported to show that the canons of statutory construction were useless as rules for guiding decisions. His claim, that every canon could be countered by an equal and opposite counter- canon, transformed the canons from exalted neutral principles into "conclusory explanations appended after the fact to justify results reached on other grounds."

This Article's first goal is to demonstrate that Karl Llewellyn's critique was largely …

Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You?, Stephen F. Ross

Vanderbilt Law Review

Over forty years ago, in the Symposium we commemorate today, Professor Karl Llewellyn wrote a devastating critique of the canons of statutory construction. For virtually every canon of construction, he demonstrated that there was another canon that could be employed to reach the opposite result. His point was not to be critical, but to argue proscriptively that the process of statutory construction requires an interpretation in light of a judicial determination of "some assumed purpose."'

Other commentators, both before and after the publication of Llewellyn's magnificent contribution to the Vanderbilt Law Review, have taken a different approach. These observers have …

Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, And The Limits Of Practical Reason: A Response To Farber And Ross, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law Review

Daniel Farber' and Stephen Ross, in separate contributions to this Symposium, raise the most crucial question in modern statutory interpretation, a question that exposes the profound triviality of the canons of statutory construction that Karl Llewellyn so effectively attacked. Ross points out that the legislature can control, or at least attempt to control, the judicial use of the canons by the way it drafts the statute and by effective use of supplementary materials such as mark-ups, committee reports, and floor debates. Farber, in his critique of formalism, demonstrates that formalist interpretation is an impediment to effective statutory drafting. Inherent in …

The Role Of International Law As A Canon Of Domestic Statutory Construction, Ralph G. Steinhardt

Vanderbilt Law Review

From the beginning of our constitutional life, the Supreme Court has articulated principles that structure the juridical relationship between international law and domestic law. These principles purportedly offer rules of decision for resolving in domestic courts the potential in-consistencies between external and internal sources of law, and they do so with the surface simplicity of axioms. Treaties, for example, cannot trump constitutional norms.' Customary international law can provide a rule of decision at least in the absence of controlling legislative or executive acts. In the case of an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty and a statute, the latter-in-time prevails. When …

A Better Theory Of Legal Interpretation, Charles P. Curtis

Vanderbilt Law Review

We have, almost all of us, I think, been brought up in the belief that the interpretation of legal documents consists essentially in a search for the intention of the author. I take it the classic, and I am sure the most elegant, exposition of this doctrine is the paper which Vaughan Hawkins, almost ninety years ago, in 1860, read before the juridical Society. Thayer printed it as an appendix in his Preliminary Treatise on Evidence and said of it, "the nature of the inquiry is described with penetration and accuracy." Hawkins states our creed in a few sentences...

"[I]n …

Factors Influencing Judges In Interpreting Statutes, Arthur W. Phelps

Vanderbilt Law Review

There has been recent discussion of abandoning the literal meaning rule and most of the other rules of statutory construction. A broader principle is favored which will allow the full play of the rational processes of the court. This view has great appeal, and, in terms of freeing judges who apply rules as rules without regard to their object, serves a need. But if it means a sudden release of the judiciary from always starting with a statute as it reads--as it is written--as it has meaning for most of us--it is a harmful suggestion. Law is something more than …

Remarks On The Theory Of Appellate Decision And The Rules Or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, Karl N. Llwellyn

Vanderbilt Law Review

One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there is no single right and accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases. For

(1) Impeccable and correct doctrine makes clear that a case "holds"with authority only so much of what the opinion says as is absolutely necessary to sustain the judgment. Anything else is unnecessary and "distinguishable" and noncontrolling for the future. Indeed, if the judgment rests on two, three or four rulings, any of them can be rightly and righteously knocked out, for the future, as being thus "unnecessary." Moreover, any …

The Position Of Statutory Construction In Present Day Law Practice, John W. Macdonald

Vanderbilt Law Review

Even the title assigned to this article emphasizes a point of view. We will consider the position of statutory construction not from the aspect of judges, appellate or trial, who must decide cases. Instead we are to look at the subject from the point of view of the practitioner, the lawyer himself. The practice of law is of course varied. And there are many fields of knowledge which control that practice. Some of these obviously do not involve law at all. The lawyer is a litigator, an advocate in court or before quasi-judicial bodies. He is also a counsellor, an …

Statutory Construction In Resolving Conflicts Between State And Local Legislation, Charles S. Rhyme

Vanderbilt Law Review

As creatures of the states, our municipalities occupy a unique position in our governmental scheme. Not endowed with sovereignty, the municipality possesses no inherent powers, and can only do that which is authorized by the state.' The exercise of local powers, therefore, becomes the exercise of those powers which have been conferred upon it by state legislative action. Possible exceptions to this are those states in which "home rule" has been constitutionally conferred upon municipalities, by which authority to form local governments and to administer municipal affairs in the manner desired by the local electorate prevails. In view of the …

Some Statutory Construction Problems And Approaches In Criminal Law, James C. Quarles

Vanderbilt Law Review

Statutory construction and interpretation, important in every field of law, is vital in a field containing a large number of legislative acts and a considerable body of appellate court decisions construing them. For this reason alone, statutory construction problems are particularly significant in criminal law. Many American jurisdictions punish no activity other than that expressly declared criminal by statute.' The Federal Government, which of course punishes no crimes except those defined by Congress, has contributed to this growth of the criminal law through the imposition of many duties and the proscription of various activities relating to the collection of revenue, …

Legal Writing On Statutory Construction, Paul H. Sanders, John W. Wade

Vanderbilt Law Review

This review does not purport to provide a complete critique of the various works in the field of Statutory Construction. It is not directed primarily to the specialist. Instead, it is intended to bring together for the benefit of the general practitioner the various books and other writings on the subject and thus amounts essentially to a bibliography. But an effort has been made to suggest the approach of the longer works and to estimate in some measure their value. Thus this symposium on the subject of Statutory Construction can be rounded out by providing convenient reference to other writings …