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Full-Text Articles in Law
Zombie Energy Laws, Joshua C. Macey
Zombie Energy Laws, Joshua C. Macey
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article traces the development of three legal rules—cost recovery for vertically integrated utilities, the requirement that regulators assess the financial viability of energy projects before issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and the filed rate doctrine—that emerged out of the view that electric power companies should be shielded from market forces. It argues that important elements of these legal rules have become “zombie energy laws.” Zombie energy laws are statutes, regulations, and judicial precedents that continue to apply after their underlying economic and legal bases dissipate. Zombie energy laws were originally designed to protect consumers by, among …
A Laboratory Of Regulation: The Untapped Potential Of The Hhs Advisory Opinion Power, Christopher J. Climo
A Laboratory Of Regulation: The Untapped Potential Of The Hhs Advisory Opinion Power, Christopher J. Climo
Vanderbilt Law Review
Of late, the federal government's approach to regulation of hospitals and other healthcare providers asks them to do more with less. Both the government and private insurers have increasingly assigned hospitals and other providers with financial responsibility for the quality of the care they provide to federal beneficiaries.' At the same time, experts predict that reimbursement rates by both the government and private insurers will fall as a result of the Affordable Care Act's recent efforts to increase access to healthcare. Facing a widening gap between expectations of quality and availability of financial resources, healthcare providers will need to pursue …
Bargaining Theory And Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic Of Inefficient Regulation, David B. Spence, Lekha Gopalakrishnan
Bargaining Theory And Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic Of Inefficient Regulation, David B. Spence, Lekha Gopalakrishnan
Vanderbilt Law Review
In this Article David Spence and Lekha Gopalakrishnan pro- pose a new understanding of regulatory bargaining. Economists and others have long argued that the American regulatory system is unnecessarily inefficient. Critics charge that the system is both substantively inefficient, in that it sometimes mandates the use of inefficient means for achieving a regulatory goal, and procedurally inefficient, in its over-reliance on rules. These arguments have led to a wave of regulatory reform experiments in the federal bureaucracy, many of which seek to promote positive-sum changes in regulatory policy through bargaining among private- and public-sector stakeholders. As several commentators have noted, …