Law Commons^™

Dodge V. Ford: What Happened And Why?, Mark J. Roe

Vanderbilt Law Review

Behind Henry Ford’s business decisions that led to the widely taught, famous-in-law-school Dodge v. Ford shareholder primacy decision were three industrial organization structures that put Ford in a difficult business position. First, Ford Motor had a highly profitable monopoly and needed much cash for the just-begun construction of the River Rouge factory, which was said to be the world’s largest when completed. Second, to stymie union organizers and to motivate his new assembly-line workers, Henry Ford raised worker pay greatly; Ford could not maintain his monopoly without sufficient worker buy-in. And, third, if Ford explicitly justified his acts as in …

Book Reviews, Arthur D. Austin, John N. Hazard

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Case Against Oligopoly: A New Perspective--

Campaigns of corporate aggrandizement have always attracted a wide assortment of camp followers, with politicians and academics among the most persistent. To the politician, corporate size is a convenient and headline-provoking punching bag (and, during election time, a plentiful source of funding), while many a professor has established a reputation--and made money--by criticizing, extolling, or analyzing its various components. In a series of public hearings, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, with Dr. John Blair as chief economist, produced a subdued blend of both callings. Drawing heavily but not exclusively from the …

Monopoly Profits, Economic Impossibility, And Unfairness As Anti-Trust Tests, Philip Marcus

Vanderbilt Law Review

One must agree with the district court's observation that the mere fact that one opens a business in an area with the idea that he will succeed and an existing-perhaps poorly run-business will have to withdraw and leave him alone in the field is hardly a situation which the Sherman Act is intended to reach. The Sherman Act does not protect one from competition, least of all a monopolist, which the Gazette admittedly was. And this is true even though the competition is likely to result in a monopoly. But there are limits upon the methods which one can use …

Worldmarks And The Antitrust Law, Rudolf Callmann

Vanderbilt Law Review

Like all things, trademark rights can also be exploited for sinister purposes. A trademark can, for example, be used in violation of the antitrust laws and no elaborate references need be made to the legislative history of the Lanham Act to demonstrate that the Act was "not intended to undermine the anti-trust laws."' Certain specific provisions of the Act clearly disclose the legislative intent to dissuade a trademark owner from using his mark in violation of the antitrust laws.

Du Pont General Motors Case, James A. Hart

Vanderbilt Law Review

On June 3, 1957, the United States Supreme Court, in a four to two decision, held that the du Pont Company's ownership of twenty-three per cent of the voting stock of General Motors had tended to create a monopoly in a line of commerce and thus violated section 71 of the Clayton Act. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion and Justice Burton, joined by Justice Frankfurter filed a vigorous dissent. Three of the Justices, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Hence, a possibility remains that the present Court, with all nine …

A Note On Concentration Studies And Antitrust Policy, Jesse W. Markham

Vanderbilt Law Review

The current interest in industrial concentration studies almost rivals that which gave rise to the Temporary National Economic Committee's voluminous output on the subject two decades ago. Indeed,by almost any standard, 1957 was a banner year. The Federal Trade Commission opened the season with its 656-page report in January. The National Industrial Conference Board devoted a session to the topic at its forty-first annual meeting in May. In July the Bureau of the Census published its study performed at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. In June the Chamber of Commerce of the United States issued …

For H.R. Ii And S. Ii To Strengthen The Robinson-Patman Act And Amend The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, Wright Patman M.C.

Vanderbilt Law Review

H. R. 11 and S. 11 are modest and simple legislative proposals.'They provide for no change in our antitrust laws prohibiting price discrimination except to limit somewhat the use of the "good faith" defense. The extent of this limitation goes no further than to assist the Act by providing that the "good faith" defense shall not operate as an absolute and complete bar to a proceeding by the Government against the practices of destructive price discrimination: In other words, those discriminations which would have the effect of substantially lessening competition and tending to create a monopoly may not be defended …