Law Commons^™

The Wage Earners' Plan: Its Purpose, Walter Chandler

Vanderbilt Law Review

Chapter XIII is the forerunner of the general revision of the National Bankruptcy Act in 1938. Introduced as a bill for the relief of harassed wage earners who desire to pay their debts if given sufficient opportunity, the bill attracted the attention of the Honorable Hatton W. Sumners, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. In view of the cumulative need for a definitive study of the law of bankruptcy with the end view of enacting a complete revision of the Act of 1898, a special subcommittee on bankruptcy was created; this subcommittee, with the …

A Decade Of The Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, Charles J. Steele

Vanderbilt Law Review

Corporations intent upon expanding via the acquisition route have had three statutory hurdles placed in their way by the Congress of the United States. As hurdles, the first two, the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, were failures. A judiciary which refused to give effect either to the language or intent of the acts nullified completely their usefulness as anti-merger weapons.

The third hurdle, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act, was enacted in 1950. Relatively few judicial opinions have interpreted this act, "new section 7," as it is called. It is clear, however, that it …

Bills And Notes -- 1961 Tennessee Survey, John A. Spanogle Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Tennessee courts decided three cases involving commercial paper this year. The Tennessee Supreme Court decided one case which, unless it is clarified in the near future, may upset principles which were heretofore well-established. Of the two cases decided by the appellate courts, one adopted a rule well-known in other jurisdictions, and the other adopted a sound minority view on a question not settled by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.

Federal Jurisdiction In Personam Of Corporations And Due Process, Thomas F. Green Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

A great deal has been written about the personal jurisdiction of state courts and particularly about the applicable due process requirements.' Much less has been contributed by commentators on the subject of due process requirements applying to in personam jurisdiction of a United States district court. Perhaps the reason is the difficulty of finding a rationale in the pertinent decisions. These fail to distinguish between the conditions necessary for valid service of federal court process as contrasted with those essential to the proper service of state process. They also fail to explain why the constitutional provision brings about the result …