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Legislative Officer Succession: Part I, Seth Barrett Tillman

Seth Barrett Tillman

A trilogy of highly influential and frequently cited articles published by Professors Akhil Reed Amar, Vikram David Amar, John F. Manning, and Steven G. Calabresi in the Stanford Law Review in 1995 generally took the position, with varying degrees of confidence, that as a matter of original public meaning, the Constitution precludes legislative officers from succeeding to the presidency under the Succession Clause. The Succession Clause provides:

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the …

Legislative Officer Succession: Part I And Part Ii, Seth Barrett Tillman

Seth Barrett Tillman

This article is the next installment of Legislative Officer Succession: Part I (posted on BEPRESS and on SSRN).

This section distinguishes "officers under the authority of the United States" from other classes of constitutional and statutory officers. It also responds to some of the Amars' structural arguments in defense of their "officer" (as used in the Succession Clause) equals "officer of the United States" (as used in the Appointments Clause) position.

The Amars state:

"It might be argued that an intermediate reading of the Succession Clause is possible -- one that insists that a successor be a federal, rather than …