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Full-Text Articles in Law
Bargaining With The State: Offsets And Mitigation In Developing Land, Robert D. Cooter
Bargaining With The State: Offsets And Mitigation In Developing Land, Robert D. Cooter
Robert Cooter
According to the economic theory of bargaining, each party to a voluntary agreement must receive at least the amount that he can get on his own (“threat value”), plus a share of the surplus from the bargain. Courts frequently monitor bargains between citizens and the state. To protect citizens, the courts should focus on the fairness and efficiency of the threat points of the citizens. Unfortunately, courts often focus on the terms of the agreement, not the threat points. The wrong focus leads courts to impose rules that block bargains that would benefit both parties. I analyze an example where …
Introduction To Law And Economics, Robert Cooter, Thomas Ulen
Introduction To Law And Economics, Robert Cooter, Thomas Ulen
Robert Cooter
No abstract provided.
Total Liability For Excessive Harm, Robert D. Cooter, Ariel Porat
Total Liability For Excessive Harm, Robert D. Cooter, Ariel Porat
Robert Cooter
The total social harm caused by everyone is often verifiable and the harm that each actor causes is often unverifiable. In these circumstances, the authorities lack the information necessary to implement the usual liability rules or externality taxes. We propose a novel solution: Hold each participant in the activity responsible for all of the excessive harm that everyone causes. By “excessive harm” we mean the difference between the total harm caused by all injurers and the optimal total harm. We show that the rule of total liability for excessive harm creates incentives for efficient precaution and activity level. Consequently, actual …