Law Commons^™

Swearing In The Phoenix: Toward A More Sensible System For Seating Members Of The House Of Representatives At Organization, Brian C. Kalt

Marquette Law Review

Under U.S. House precedent, any member-elect can challenge the right of

any other member-elect to take the oath of office at the beginning of a new term.

The uncontested members-elect then swear in and decide the fate of those who

were forced to stand aside. If the House is closely divided and there are

disputed elections at the margins, a minority party could exploit this procedure

to try to seize control of the House.

Presidential Administration, The Appearance Of Corruption, And The Rule Of Law: Can Courts Rein In Unlawful Executive Orders?, Emily Morgan, Michael R. Barsa

Marquette Law Review

Many of President Trump’s executive orders aimed to “deconstruct” the administrative state by exercising unprecedented control over agency action. While presidents have exercised directive authority over executive agencies for several decades, these recent directives are particularly troubling because many of them direct agencies to act contrary to congressionally mandated procedures designed to ensure that agencies engage in predictable, transparent, and justified decision-making. This phenomenon poses a threat not only to agency rulemaking but also to corresponding rule of law principles—all at a time when public confidence in government officials has steadily declined and more and more Americans perceive their officials …

Reviving Legislative Generality, Evan C. Zoldan

Marquette Law Review

The Supreme Court does not recognize a constitutional principle disfavoring special legislation, that is, legislation that singles out identifiable individuals for benefits or harms that are not applied to the rest of the population. As a result, both Congress and state legislatures routinely enact special legislation despite the fact that it has been linked to a variety of social harms, including corruption and the exacerbation of social inequality. But the Court’s weak protections against special legislation, and the resulting harms, are not inevitable. Instead, special legislation can be limited by what may be called a value of legislative generality, that …

Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright

Marquette Law Review

In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the constitutional structure. This Article offers an explanation of divergent branch behavior and legal doctrine. Congress, much like a party to litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired information from the Executive and private parties. In contrast, the Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal branches. In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers want …