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Full-Text Articles in Law

Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh Jan 2016

Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh

Journal Articles

If our law requires originalism in constitutional interpretation, then that would be a good reason to be an originalist. This insight animates what many have begun to call the “positive turn” in originalism. Defenses of originalism in this vein are “positive” in that they are based on the status of the Constitution, and constitutional law, as positive law. This approach shifts focus away from abstract conceptual or normative arguments about interpretation and focuses instead on how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law. On these grounds, originalism rests on a factual claim about the content of our law: …


Redrawing The Dividing Lines Between Natural Law And Positivism(S), Jeffrey Pojanowski May 2015

Redrawing The Dividing Lines Between Natural Law And Positivism(S), Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this …


What Is The Philosophy Of Law?, John Finnis Jan 2014

What Is The Philosophy Of Law?, John Finnis

Journal Articles

The philosophy of law is not separate from but dependent upon ethics and political philosophy, which it extends by that attention to the past (of sources, constitutions, contracts, acquired rights, etc.) which is characteristic of juridical thought for reasons articulated by the philosophy of law. Positivism is legitimate only as a thesis of, or topic within, natural law theory, which adequately incorporates it but remains transparently engaged with the ethical and political issues and challenges both perennial and peculiar to this age. The paper concludes by proposing a task for legal philosophy, in light of the fact that legal systems …


Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism And Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, James A. Gardner Feb 2005

Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism And Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, James A. Gardner

Journal Articles

It is frequently argued that state constitutions ought to be interpreted using a methodology of constitutional positivism, a familiar and commonplace theory of interpretational legitimacy that requires courts to treat a constitution as an authoritative expression of the will of the people who made it. I argue, contrary to this view, that orthodox constitutional positivism is not a viable interpretational methodology for subnational constitutions in a federal system. Although constitutional positivism makes sense for national constitutions, which furnish the paradigm case, subnational constitutions pose important problems for the political theory upon which constitutional positivism relies. According to that theory, the …


On The Incoherence Of Legal Positivism, John Finnis Aug 2000

On The Incoherence Of Legal Positivism, John Finnis

Journal Articles

Legal positivism is an incoherent intellectual enterprise. It sets itself an explanatory task which it makes itself incapable of carrying through. In the result it offers its students purported and invalid derivations of ought from is.

In this brief Essay I note various features of legal positivism and its history, before trying to identify this incoherence at its heart. I do not mean to renege on my belief that reflections on law and legal theory are best carried forward without reference to unstable and parasitic academic categories, or labels, such as "positivism" (or "liberalism" or "conservatism," etc.). I use the …


On 'Positivism' And 'Legal Rational Authority', John M. Finnis Jan 1985

On 'Positivism' And 'Legal Rational Authority', John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

This Article critiques Anthony Kronman’s book Max Weber, which provides an interpretation of Weber’s social theory of law concerning positivism and legal rational authority. In particular, the three premises of Kronman’s thesis regarding social theory are considered and their weaknesses are explained. Through this critique, the Author argues that no good reason has been presented to accept that Weber’s positivist theory is of value.