Law Commons^™

The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Leo E. Strine, Jr. is closing in on Blair and Stout for the undisputed title of all-time top-scoring stakeholderist.³ I don't intend to squander this opportunity to roast and toast him by weighing the pros and cons of basketscoring primacy. Instead, my aim is to surface an overlooked argument in the debate over shareholder primacy and stakeholderism, the case for which has been recently reinvigorated by Strine's work. My argument is this: one underappreciated aspect of shareholder primacy's appeal is that it creates a competition with a single endpoint, basically a game, and that the exhilarating tournament that results, …

Should Labor Abandon Its Capital? A Reply To Critics, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Several recent works have sharply criticized public pension funds and labor union funds (“labor’s capital”). These critiques come from both the left and right. Leftists criticize labor’s capital for undermining worker interests by funding financialization and the growth of Wall Street. Laissez-faire conservatives argue that pension underfunding threatens taxpayers. The left calls for pensions to be replaced by a larger social security system. The libertarian right calls for them to be smashed and scattered into individually-managed 401(k)s. I review this recent work, some of which is aimed at my book, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon, …

Rethinking "Political" Considerations In Investment, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Five years ago, Professor David H. Webber was invited to deliver an address both to our Delaware Law School community and to the Delaware Bench and Bar as Visiting Scholar in Residence of Corporate and Business Law. Webber's Speech, "Rethinking 'Political' Considerations in Investment," made several predictions about the rise of politicized investment which were quite prescient. As relevant today as when it was delivered, this piece explores the consideration of investment factors outside the traditional realm of shareholder profit maximization, both in its current state and in the future. Webber's analysis of how investors balance the role of capital …

Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, I imagine a post-class action landscape for shareholder litigation. Assuming, for the sake of this exercise, an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms — most likely through the adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions — I assess what shareholder litigation would disappear, what would remain, and what a post-class action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional investors from having to pursue positive value claims against companies. Currently, the class action …

The Use And Abuse Of Labor's Capital, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

The recent financial crisis has jeopardized the retirement savings of twenty-seven million Americans who depend on public pension funds, leading to cuts in benefits, increased employee contributions, job losses, and the rollback of legal rights like collective bargaining. This Article examines ways in which public pension funds invest against the economic interests of their own participants and beneficiaries, and the legal implications of these investments. In particular, the Article focuses on the use of public pensions to fund privatization of public employee jobs. Under the ascendant — and flawed — interpretation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, public pension trustees …

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …

Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Unlike the failure of a nonfinancial firm, the failure of a systemically important financial firm will reduce the value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of economy-wide reductions in expected returns and a consequent increase in systematic risk. Thus, diversified shareholders of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk, whereas managerial shareholders and blockholders do not. This means that the governance model drawn from nonfinancial firms will not fit financial firms. Regulations that limit risk-taking by financial firms can thus provide a benefit, rather than necessarily impose a cost, for the typical diversified public shareholder. Managerial shareholding also gives rise …

Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope Of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 ushered in a new era of regulatory reform in the United States. The failure of several large banks prompted Congressional scrutiny ofthe U.S. bank regulatory system. Many critics highlighted the government's failure to intervene to prevent Lehman Brothers' insolvency, which resulted in economic turmoil not yet resolved. Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") in July 2010.

Dodd-Frank mandates institutional changes to minimize economic instability and establishes regulatory processes to guide the government's response to future bank failures. At the heart of the regulation is the Orderly …

Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This Article asserts that Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. should be at least as memorable as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., and is, in a practical sense, substantially more important. The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that Donahue announces admirable sentiments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression” claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white. In particular, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating …

Leaks, Lies, And The Moonlight: Fiduciary Duties Of Associates To Their Law Firms, Susan Saab Fortney

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium article examines the fiduciary duties of law firm associates. After applying agency principles to the firm-associate relationship, the article analyzes specific duties and discusses cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by associates. It explores associate duties in the current legal, organizational, and socio-technological environment in which associates practice. The article closes with observations on the importance of firm principals considering the effect of firm culture on associate attitudes and conduct.

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …

Finessing Well-Plead Derivative Lawsuits: The Implications Of The Minnesota Supreme Court's Selection Of Auerbach Over Zapata, James F. Hogg

Faculty Scholarship

This article begins with the factual background and subsequent procedural history of the UnitedHealth Group Inc. shareholder derivitve litigation, as an instance where Minnesota courts effectively disposed of the factual allegations in a well-pleaded derivative action, directed at the behavior and actions of members of a board of directors, without reviewing finding of facts or reasoning behind the SLC's report or conclusions. The purpose of this article is to understand how a board-appointed committee can convince a court to dismiss and settle a derivative suit without showing detailed justification, and this is achieved by reviewing the statutes, case law, and …

The Missing Link Between Insider Trading And Securities Fraud, Richard A. Booth

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent article, I argued that diversified investors - the vast majority of investors - would prefer that securities fraud class actions under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 be dismissed in the absence of insider trading or similar offenses during the fraud period. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berk. Bus. L. J. 1 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197. In this article, I draw on the classic case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Company, to show that the federal courts originally viewed securities fraud as inextricably connected to insider trading …

Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors In Troubled Companies, Royce De R. Barondes, Lisa M. Fairfax, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Robert Lawless, Jonathan C. Lipson, Russell C. Silberglied

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth

Faculty Scholarship

The most fundamental question of corporation law is to whom does the board of directors of a corporation owe its fiduciary duty. Recently, the question has tended to be whether and under what circumstances the board of directors has the duty to maximize stockholder wealth. But if a corporation is insolvent (or close to it), business decisions designed to maximize stockholder wealth may result in a reduction of creditor wealth. Although the conventional wisdom is that creditors must protect themselves by contractual means, there is a substantial body of case law that says that creditors can assert claims sounding in …

Agents Of The Good, Servants Of Evil: Harry Potter And The Law Of Agency, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Clark's Treatise On Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Almost 45 years ago, in an elegantly depressive account of the then current state of corporate law scholarship, Bayless Manning announced the death of corporation law "as a field of intellectual effort." Manning left us with an affecting image of a once grand field long past its prime, rigid with formalism and empty of content:

When American law ceased to take the "corporation" seriously, the entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but our great empty corporate statutes towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together …

Seven Points To Explain Why The Law Ought Not Allow The Elimination Of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses: Cardozo Is Dead; We Have Killed Him., Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Prepared as part of the author's work as co-reporter for the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, this essay argues against legislation that empowers private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty within a business organization. The essay considers: (i) the venerable role of fiduciary duty within business organizations and the limited predictive powers of those urging radical reform; (ii) the absence of prescience in contract drafters; (iii) the strict construction function of fiduciary law; (iv) the inevitable and inappropriate pressure that elimination would put on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing; (v) the differences in remedy available for fiduciary …

Drafting Attorneys As Fiduciaries: Fashioning An Optimal Ethical Rule For Conflicts Of Interest, Paula A. Monopoli

Faculty Scholarship

The American Bar Association recently revised the ethical rules that govern lawyers. Its Ethics 2000 Commission proposed a number of changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including revisions to the rules that affect how the profession handles conflicts of interest in the area of attorneys who draft instruments that name themselves as fiduciaries. The intersection of these changes, with their subsequent clarification by an ABA opinion issued in May 2002, has broad implications for attorneys practicing in this area. Given the increasing elderly population, the trillions of dollars that they are transferring to their baby-boomer children, and the …

Using Tort Law To Secure Patient Dignity, Robin Fretwell Wilson

Faculty Scholarship

The practice of using anesthetized patients to teach pelvic exams on female patients in university hospitals has been well documented for years. A 1992 study showed that 37 percent of U.S. and Canadian medical schools allowed students to use anesthetized women without their consent to learn how to perform pelvic exams. Anecdotal accounts in the U.S. confirm that men are not immune from such indignities. Although patients have been unable, thus, far to enforce their own interests and protect their dignity, the tort system may yet succeed in securing the right of patients to decide who touches their bodies and …

Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley

Faculty Scholarship

This session is entitled "Employee Stock Ownership After Enron," and I assume that title has drawn into this room people who know something about either Enron or employee stock, or both. For our purposes, the Enron story has as its focus the Enron 401(k) plan, which was the principal retirement plan for most Enron employees. Employees could make elective contributions to the 401(k) plan, which offered nineteen investment options, one of which was Enron stock. The 401(k) plan also provided that Enron would match employee contributions up to 3 percent of compensation. Enron's match, however, was made in Enron stock. …

Fiduciary Duty, Contract, And Waiver In Partnerships And Limited Liability Companies, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law

Faculty Scholarship

Among the controversies swirling around the promulgations of new uniform statutes governing partnerships and LLCs is the question whether and to what extend fiduciary duties should be made mandatory or waivable. Although courts and commentators have not traditionally focused on the costs of fiduciary duties, the costs are significant in that such duties may preclude agents from engaging in other legitimate ventures. Indeed, fiduciary duty may be used by those to whom it is owed to prevent competition or extort side benefits form participants. Mandatory duties effectively require participants who may identify multiple business opportunities to overinvest their human capital …

Stockholders, Stakeholders, And Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law

Faculty Scholarship

The traditional wisdom is that management should serve the interests of the corporation and the stockholders who own it by maximizing stockholder wealth. But a significant number of legal scholars argue that management duty should be more broadly construed to include other constituencies ("stakeholders"), such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and the community at large. The broader view of management duty means that management has more discretion and that stockholders will seldom have recourse if management fails to maximize profits. Nevertheless, many states have adopted so-called other constituency statutes permitting management to consider such other interests. The difference between the …

Resolving The Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

Although subsidiaries play a significant role in our economy, surprisingly little has been written about the duties of their directors. Despite widespread acceptance of holding companies as commonplace business entities, several legal problems inherent in the holding company form of ownership remain unresolved. Holding companies raise legal dilemmas for subsidiary directors that are easier to ignore than to resolve. This Article examines the subsidiary director's dilemma and demonstrates that traditional models of corporate structure are not adequate for the subsidiary-parent situation. The Author argues that the law should recognize the special relationship between a parent and its subsidiary and adopt …

Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This essay describes the contours of the shareholder’s duty to be fair and explores some of the problems caused by the law’s imprecision in defining the duty of fairness. Because this duty is best understood as a rejection of old norms, part one of this essay describes the traditional doctrines of intra-corporate responsibility. Part two describes the special characteristics of a close corporation and outlines how those characteristics pushed close corporation law to new concepts of fairness and shareholder duties. Part three attempts to delineate those duties of fairness and also to highlight some of the dangers that arise when …

From Tort To Crime: Some Reflections On The Criminalization Of Fiduciary Breaches And The Problematic Line Between Law And Ethics, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Within the context of mail and wire fraud prosecutions, criminal liability for breach of fiduciary duties is being imposed with increasing frequency. Professor Coffee discusses the disturbing failure of the courts to require that the fiduciary's conduct have caused legally cognizable harm to the beneficiary. He concludes that an affirmative defense should be available to fiduciaries to show the lack of proximate cause between a breach and the injury. In addition, federal enforcement should occur only after state and private remedies have proven inadequate.