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Articles 1 - 14 of 14

Full-Text Articles in Law

Private Ordering With Shareholder Bylaws, Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, Marcus Hintze Mar 2011

Private Ordering With Shareholder Bylaws, Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, Marcus Hintze

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we propose legal reforms to empower shareholders in public corporations. Most shareholders participate in corporate governance in three ways: they vote, they sell, and they sue. We would expand the menu for shareholders in public corporations by enabling them to contract using shareholder bylaws. We contend that private ordering will improve shareholder monitoring of managers and create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire corporate governance system.


Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute Director Primacy, René Reich-Graefe Jan 2011

Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute Director Primacy, René Reich-Graefe

Faculty Scholarship

Microtheoretical models of the corporation which focus on corporate governance attempt to answer two deceptively simple, but fundamentally elusive questions: ‘Who are in control of the corporation?’ and ‘Whose interests ultimately control those in control of the corporation?’ Both questions remain partially unanswered within the models developed to date by corporate theoreticians. This Article proposes a radically new model: 'absolute director primacy.’ Existing microtheoretical models conceive that we only need to—and, indeed, can—determine the controlling interests guiding corporate decisionmaking in order to prove the existence of control over the decisionmaking latitude of corporate boards. The absolute director primacy …


Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Director Primacy Without Principle?, René Reich-Graefe Jan 2011

Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Director Primacy Without Principle?, René Reich-Graefe

Faculty Scholarship

If profit-maximizing is not enforced by corporate law, why does it nonetheless happen as a matter of almost overwhelming routine in today’s corporate reality? If indeed, director primacy is absolute and our theoretical models are all reliant on protolegal variables to explain general investor confidence ex-ante-investment despite the lack of director accountability ex-post-investment, then how can director primacy be understood and explained as a principled and, thus, just cor-porate governance structure in the first place? Or is director primacy not only absolute, but also without principle?

This Article provides a roadmap for purposes of answering this inquiry. Part II …


Governance In The Public Corporation Of The Future: The Battle For Control Of Corporate Governance, Z. Jill Barclift Jan 2011

Governance In The Public Corporation Of The Future: The Battle For Control Of Corporate Governance, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

Eight years after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress has again passed sweeping legislation in response to a corporate crisis. In addition to changes in the regulatory environment for Wall Street financial firms and banks, the Dodd-Frank Act (D-F Act) also proposes reforms to corporate governance.

In this article, the author examines the latest governance mandates under the D-F Act. In particular, this article focuses on the disclosure requirements on the CEO and chairman positions, and argues that disclosures of whether the CEO is also the chairman benefit shareholders' governance rights under state law. The new provisions under D-F Act …


Intraportfolio Litigation Essay, Amanda M. Rose, Richard Squire Jan 2011

Intraportfolio Litigation Essay, Amanda M. Rose, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

The modern trend is for investors to diversify. Shareholders who own one S&P 500 firm tend to own many of the others as well. This trend casts doubt on the traditional compensation and deterrence rationales for legal rules that hold corporations liable for the acts of their agents. Today, when A Corp sues B Corp (for breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, or any other legal wrong), many of the same shareholders own both the plaintiff and the defendant. For these shareholders, damages just shift money from one pocket to another, minus of course lawyer fees. We offer here …


Corporations, Corruption, And Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, Richard Briffault Jan 2011

Corporations, Corruption, And Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Few campaign finance cases have drawn more public attention than the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC. The Court's invalidation of a sixty-year-old federal law – and comparable laws in two dozen states – banning corporations from engaging in independent spending in support of or opposition to candidates strongly affirms the right of corporations to engage in electoral advocacy. Critics – and most, albeit not all, of both the popular and academic commentary on the decision has been critical – have condemned the idea that corporations enjoy the same rights to spend on elections as natural persons. …


The Milieu Of The Boardroom And The Precinct Of Employment, Deborah A. Demott Jan 2011

The Milieu Of The Boardroom And The Precinct Of Employment, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This Commentary explores differences between employer-employee relationships and service on a board of directors. Against this backdrop, this Commentary argues that the research findings surveyed by Brooke and Tyler (Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011)), although specific to the employment context, may be salient in assessing the impact of diversity among members of a board of directors.


The Puzzle Of Independent Directors: New Learning, Frederick Tung Jan 2011

The Puzzle Of Independent Directors: New Learning, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

In this symposium paper, I discuss and critique some new empirical learning on independent directors.

The independent director has always offered a sort of magic bullet for corporate governance, representing the idealized monitor of executives’ behavior. Yet we corporate law scholars also harbor some ambivalence about the magic of this bullet. As much as we want to trust in the promise of independent directors, no solid empirical evidence exists to suggest that independent directors add value. Moreover, we have seen spectacular failures in the face of independent boards.

How do we account for this disconnect between our intuitions and best …


Showcasing Diversity, Mitu Gulati, Patrick S. Shin Jan 2011

Showcasing Diversity, Mitu Gulati, Patrick S. Shin

Faculty Scholarship

Diversity initiatives are commonplace in today’s corporate America. Large and successful firms frequently tout their commitments to diversity, sometimes appointing women and racial minorities to highly visible posts, including seats on their boards of directors. Why would a profit-minded firm engage in such behavior? One frequently voiced explanation is that by creating such diversity, firms send out a positive signal about their attributes: a firm’s willingness to expend resources on diversity shows its commitment to workplace fairness and equality, which makes it more attractive to potential employees, customers and financiers. This claim has considerable surface appeal not only as an …


Does Critical Mass Matter? Views From The Board Room, Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley, Kimberly D. Krawiec Jan 2011

Does Critical Mass Matter? Views From The Board Room, Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we report and analyze the results of forty-six wide-ranging interviews with corporate directors and other relevant insiders on the general topic of whether and how the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of corporate boards matters. In particular, we explore their views on the concept of “critical mass” — that is, the theory that women and racial or ethnic minorities are unlikely to have an impact in the boardroom until they grow from a few tokens into a considerable minority of the board.

In contrast to other recent qualitative research on corporate boards, we find more limited support …


Dangerous Categories: Narratives Of Corporate Board Diversity, Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley, Kimberly D. Krawiec Jan 2011

Dangerous Categories: Narratives Of Corporate Board Diversity, Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, we report the results of a series of interviews with corporate directors about racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on corporate boards. On the one hand, our respondents were clear and nearly uniform in their statements that board diversity was an important goal worth pursuing. Yet when asked to provide examples or anecdotes illustrating why board diversity matters, many subjects acknowledged difficulty in illustrating theory with reference to practice.

This expressed reluctance to come to specific terms with general claims about the value of director diversity inspired our title phrase: dangerous categories. That is, while "diversity" evokes universal …


Showcasing: The Positive Spin, Katharine T. Bartlett Jan 2011

Showcasing: The Positive Spin, Katharine T. Bartlett

Faculty Scholarship

This Commentary outlines the positive case for showcasing diversity. Patrick Shin and Mitu Gulati criticize showcasing on the grounds that appointing women and minorities to board directorships is unreliable as a sign of true commitment to diversity and, further, that showcasing is detrimental to women and minorities because it treats them as objects or “prized trophies.” Drawing on social psychology, this Commentary highlights the mechanisms through which showcasing, despite the negative features emphasized by Shin and Gulati, also reinforces diversity values and strengthens the existing societal consensus in favor of diversity.


Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell Jan 2011

Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Inadequate civil regulatory liability can be an incentive for public enforcers to pursue criminal cases against firms. This incentive is undesirable in a scheme with overlapping forms of liability that is meant to treat most cases of wrongdoing civilly and to reserve the criminal remedy for the few most serious institutional delicts. This effect appears to exist in the current scheme of liability for securities law violations, and may be present in other regulatory structures as well. In this chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom," the author argues that enhancements of the SEC's enforcement processes likely would …


Kiobel And Corporate Immunity Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Struggle For Clarity Post-Sosa, Dorothy S. Lund Jan 2011

Kiobel And Corporate Immunity Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Struggle For Clarity Post-Sosa, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

In September 2010, a two-judge Second Circuit majority ruled that corporations are immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). This statute, which grants aliens access to federal district courts, has emerged as a controversial tool for international norm enforcement in the last thirty years. The unexpected decision to foreclose corporate liability has generated a wave of criticism from human rights activists and international law scholars who claim that the decision is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of international law.

This commentary examines the Kiobel decision against other recent interpretations of the ATS, especially those following the Supreme Court’s …