Law Commons^™

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman

Faculty Scholarship

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …

The Environmental, Social, Governance (Esg) Debate Emerges From The Soil Of Climate Denial, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman

Faculty Scholarship

It has been almost six decades since Rachel Carson’s ominous warning of pending environmental disaster. During 2019 the United Nations requested urgent action from world leaders, given that “just over a decade is all that remains to stop irreversible damage from climate change.” With every passing year, damage resulting from destructive climate change causes increased pain, suffering, death and massive property loss. During 2020 and 2021 alone, severe weather events have included: destructive fires in California; record breaking freeze, power outage, and threat to the electrical grid in Texas; continuation of disruptive drought in U.S. Western states; and record-breaking high …

Comment On 'Error And Regulatory Risk In Financial Institution Regulation', Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I agree with just about everything Jonathan Macey (2017) says in his symposium contribution. His claim that bureaucratic tendencies toward regularity—specifically, treating like cases alike—generate errors in categorization seems appropriate to me. His explanations of the pathologies in financial regulation should fall in the category of essential or required reading for anyone who chooses to write on the topic. Where I differ from Macey is in the choice of framework, or perspective from which to view the pathologies. Whereas Macey adopts an “error cost” framework, which is clearly appropriate for this symposium, I would build explicitly on a “public choice” …

Technology Regulation By Default: Platforms, Privacy, And The Cfpb, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

In the absence of a technology-focused regulator, diverse administrative agencies have been forced to develop regulatory models for governing their sphere of the data economy. These largely uncoordinated efforts offer a laboratory of regulatory experimentation on governance architecture. This symposium essay explores what the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has done in its first several years to regulate financial technology (“fintech”), in the context of broader technology-related concerns identified in the literature. It begins with a survey of what the CFPB has undertaken using more traditional administrative agency tools—enforcement and rulemaking—in areas such as privacy, consumer control over data, and …

A Story Of Three Bank-Regulatory Legal Systems: Contract, Financial Management Regulation, And Fiduciary Law, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

How should banks be regulated to avoid their failure? Banks must control the risks they take with depositors' money. If depositors lose their trust in their banks, and demand their money, the banks will fail. This article describes three legal bank regulatory systems: Contract with depositors (U.S.); a mix of contract and trust law, but going towards trust (Japan), and a full trust-fiduciary law regulating banks (Israel). The article concludes that bank regulation, which limits the banks' risks and conflicts of interest, helps create trustworthy banks that serve their country best.

Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative law and financial regulation have an uneasy relationship today. It was not always so. Indeed, the two were closely intertwined at the nation's birth. The Treasury Department was a major hub of early federal administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of federal administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs collection. One hundred and fifty years later, administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal's creation of the modern administrative state. This time it was James Landis, Chair of the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and author of the leading …

On Experimentation And Real Options In Financial Regulation, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Financial regulators have recently faced enhanced judicial scrutiny of their cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in advance of significant reforms. One facet of this scrutiny is judicial skepticism toward experimentation (and the real option to abandon) in the CBA calculus. That is, agencies have arguably been discouraged from counting as a benefit the value of information obtained through adopting new regulations on a provisional basis, with an option to revert to the status quo in the future. We study field experimentation versus more conventional forms of CBA (or analytic learning) in a regulatory-judicial hierarchical model. We demonstrate that there is no principled …

Three Proposals For Regulating The Distribution Of Home Equity, Ian Ayres, Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s recently-released “qualified mortgage” rules effectively discourage predatory lending but miss an equally important source of systemic risk: low-equity clustering. Specific “volatility-inducing” mortgage terms, when present in a substantial cluster of mortgage contracts, exacerbate macroeconomic risk by increasing the chance that the housing and lending markets will have to absorb a wave of simultaneous defaults after a downturn in housing prices. This Article shows that these terms became prevalent in a substantial proportion of residential mortgages in the years leading up to the home mortgage crisis. In contrast, during the earlier “amortization era” (when mortgagors were …

Paying Bank Examiners For Performance, Frederick Tung, M. Todd Henderson

Faculty Scholarship

Investigations into the recent financial crisis have found that banking regulators knew or should have known of many of the problems that would ultimately cripple the finance industry. We argue that their failure to address those problems prior to the crisis was at least partly due to misaligned incentives for bank examiners that encourage inadequate inspection and forbearance and discourage the curbing of ill-advised risk taking. We recommend changing examiners’ incentives to better align them with the public good. Specifically, banking regulators should be “paid for performance” — rewarded for nurturing long-term health for the banks they oversee as well …

Lincoln's Populist Sovereignty: Public Finance Of, By, And For The People, Timothy A. Canova

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Problems Of Securitizing Sub-Prime Loans, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

In October 2007, the board of directors of Merrill-Lynch, Smith & Fenner, one of the largest if not the largest brokerage houses in the United States, accepted the request for early retirement of its Chief Executive Officer. The brokerage firm disclosed that it has lost over $8 billion on its investments in sub-prime mortgage loans.¹ Merrill Lynch was not the only financial giant to sustain enormous losses. The losses caused market liquidity to dry up. The U.S. government took steps to ease the pressure.² But the high leverage of the system is still unravelling. The effect of these …

The Mysterious Ways Of Mutual Funds: Market Timing, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The term market timing was little known outside the arcane world of mutual funds until state attorneys general from across the country popularized it. The term's innocuous-sounding ring assumed a more pernicious note when the mysterious ways of mutual funds became more transparent. In its pernicious sense, market timing denominates mutual fund insiders using the inscrutable structures of mutual funds to provide benefits selectively to favored participants at the expense of less favored participants.

Mutual fund shares are not like common stocks; investments made using these vehicles are unlike those made through traditional securities markets. While the peculiar features of …

Mome In Hindsight, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Two decades ago, the Virginia Law Review published our article “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” (MOME), in which we tried to discern the institutional underpinnings of financial market efficiency. We concluded that the level of market efficiency with respect to a particular fact depends on which of several market mechanisms — universally informed trading, professionally informed trading, derivatively informed trading, and uninformed trading (each of which we explain below) — operates to reflect that fact in market price. Which mechanism is operative, in turn, depends on how widely the fact is distributed among traders, which, I turn, depends on the …

Regulation And Investors' Trust In The Securities Market, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The subject of investor confidence in the securities markets has received wide attention recently as details of fraud and avarice continue to emerge. Investors' trust in the securities markets is important for the reasons discussed in Professor Stout's marvelous paper.¹ This Comment focuses on the relationship between investors' trust and government regulation of the markets. By regulation I mean congressional legislation and actions by federal agencies. I exclude the courts mainly because their lawmaking is not primarily policy-based, and my aim is to sound the alarm for legislative and regulatory policy-directed actions. Many an economist and academic have argued …

The Pros And Cons Of A Self-Regulatory Organization For Advisers And Mutual Funds, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Congress is seriously considering bills to establish self-regulatory organizations (SROs) for investment advisers (advisers) and investment companies (Funds). These bills would require members of the investment management industry to regulate themselves under the watchful eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission, similar in approach to the regulation of broker-dealers by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the securities exchanges. Proposals to establish SRO for investment advisers have arisen before. However, those proposals did not cover Funds and their advisers,

The Dual State - Federal Regulation Of Financial Institutions - A Policy Proposal, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

In 1983 South Dakota passed an Act permitting its chartered banks to sell and underwrite insurance.¹ The issue that I address is whether states should have the power to pass such a law. I am not concerned here with interpretation of positive law but with public policy implications.

The issue is a matter of congressional policy. Like most financial intermediaries banks are regulated by both state and federal laws,² but it is clear that the federal government has the power to preempt state laws that regulate banks. Therefore, whether South Dakota can pass the statute is not a …