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Full-Text Articles in Law

Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson Ph.D., Robert H. Lande Jul 1989

Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson Ph.D., Robert H. Lande

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When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate efficiency gains? The dominant belief has been that the government and courts should evaluate these mergers solely in terms of economic efficiency. Congress, however, wanted the courts to stop any merger significantly likely to raise prices. Substantially likely efficiency gains should therefore affect the legality of mergers to the extent that they are likely to prevent price increases. This standard is more strict than the economic efficiency criterion, because the latter would permit mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices, if sufficient efficiency gains …


Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, Robert H. Lande Jan 1989

Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

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My role today will be comparable to the small child's in the classic story of the Emperor's new clothes; I too have a simple truth to tell. The sole goal of antitrust is not to enhance economic efficiency. Increased economic efficiency is not even the primary goal of the antitrust laws. The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent firms from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for their goods and services. Congress was primarily concerned that corporations would use market power "unfairly" to extract wealth from consumers. These wealth transfers were of …


International Competitive Harm And Domestic Antitrust Laws: Forms Of Analysis, David J. Gerber Jan 1989

International Competitive Harm And Domestic Antitrust Laws: Forms Of Analysis, David J. Gerber

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No abstract provided.


Quality Of Care And Market Failure Defenses In Antitrust Health Care Litigation, Thomas L. Greaney Jan 1989

Quality Of Care And Market Failure Defenses In Antitrust Health Care Litigation, Thomas L. Greaney

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This article considers quality-based justifications for antitrust challenges to collaboration among health care professionals. It first examines doctrinal developments resisting such justifications and, with a skeptical eye, analyzes attempts to interject quality of care and worthy motive defenses into antitrust appraisals of horizontal restraints of trade. Next the article assesses the economic basis and the risks and benefits of a market failure defense that would allow some quality-enhancing restraints of trade to escape antitrust challenge. Its principle recommendation is that courts recognize a narrow, market failure defense subject to several limiting principles to cabin its reach. The article concludes by …


The Antitrust Movement And The Rise Of Industrial Organization, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 1989

The Antitrust Movement And The Rise Of Industrial Organization, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The modern science of industrial organization grew out of a debate among lawyers and economists in the waning years of the nineteenth century. For Americans, the emergent business "trust" provoked a dialogue about how the law should respond. Many of the formal theories of industrial organization, such as the ruinous competition doctrine, the potential competition doctrine, and the post-classical concern about vertical integration, were actually borrowed from the law.

Anglo-American and European economists disputed the proper domain of theory and description in economic analysis. The British approach was exemplified Alfred and Mary Paley Marshall's Economics of Industry, published in …