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- Does Virginia Have a Title-Quieting Statute Applicable to Deeds of Trust? (1)
- Foreword (1)
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- The Doweress Is Wearing a New Look (1)
- The Physician-Patient Privilege in Virginia (1)
- University of Richmond School of Law (1)
- Usury in the Purchase of Negotiable Paper (1)
- Virginia law (1)
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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Foreward, William T. Muse
Foreward, William T. Muse
University of Richmond Law Review
This first issue of the University of Richmond Law Notes inaugurates a service by the Faculty of the Law School which we hope will be of some value to the lawyers of Virginia. If the bar thinks the undertaking worth- while it will become a permanent publication,-perhaps enlarged in scope and volume.
Usury In The Purchase Of Negotiable Paper, James H. Barnett Jr.
Usury In The Purchase Of Negotiable Paper, James H. Barnett Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
This monograph attempts to explore the nature of certain transactions in negotiable paper. In the transactions under consideration the plaintiff admittedly would qualify as a holder in due course under section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, hereafter referred to as the NIL. In Lynchburg National Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652 (1895), it was held that the maker's defense of usury between himself and the payee was not good against a subsequent holder in due course. The validity of that holding is not questioned here. It is important to distinguish the defense asserted in the unusual situations discussed herein …
Negligence Per Se And The Virginia Motor Vehicle Code, William T. Muse
Negligence Per Se And The Virginia Motor Vehicle Code, William T. Muse
University of Richmond Law Review
Wigmore, writing in 1911, said: "The general question... whether an injury caused by the defendant while violating a [criminal] statute is actionable per se is a troublesome one, open to much argument, and not yet settled by any generally accepted principle."
The Doweress Is Wearing A New Look, Harry L. Snead Jr.
The Doweress Is Wearing A New Look, Harry L. Snead Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
It is settled law in this state that a widow whose dower has not been assigned is not a competent party plaintiff in a partition suit. She has no estate in the land until her dower is assigned and therefore is not a joint tenant, a tenant in common, or a coparcener with her husband's heirs.
Does Virginia Have A Title-Quieting Statute Applicable To Deeds Of Trust?, Harry L. Snead Jr.
Does Virginia Have A Title-Quieting Statute Applicable To Deeds Of Trust?, Harry L. Snead Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
A title examiner finds a recorded deed of trust which has not been released on the margin. He does not find a recorded release deed. A perusal of the records, however, reveals that twenty-one years have elapsed from the maturity date of the note secured by the deed of trust. The title examiner adverses the trustee (or, as a short-cut, the grantor of the deed of trust), but does not find a record conveyance from the trustee. May the title examiner safely ignore the deed of trust?
University Of Richmond Law Notes Table Of Contents
University Of Richmond Law Notes Table Of Contents
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Physician-Patient Privilege In Virginia, James W. Payne Jr.
The Physician-Patient Privilege In Virginia, James W. Payne Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
It seems settled that at common law there was no privilege whereby either a patient or a physician could suppress evidence of communications made by one to the other. Most commentators have argued that there is no justification for such a privilege.