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Full-Text Articles in Law

Substantive Due Process For Noncitizens: Lessons From Obergefell, Anthony O'Rourke Sep 2015

Substantive Due Process For Noncitizens: Lessons From Obergefell, Anthony O'Rourke

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The state of Texas denies birth certificates to children born in the United States—and thus citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment—if their parents are undocumented immigrants with identification provided by their home countries’ consulates. What does this have to do with same-sex marriage? In a previous article, I demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s substantive due process analysis in United States v. Windsor is particularly relevant to the state’s regulation of undocumented immigrants. This Essay builds on my earlier analysis by examining United States v. Obergefell’s applications outside the context of same-sex marriage. Obergefell’s due process holding, I argue, can …


Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look At The End Of Life And Personal Autonomy, Yale Kamisar Jan 2008

Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look At The End Of Life And Personal Autonomy, Yale Kamisar

Articles

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to find a right to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single Justice dissented. One would expect such a ruling to be quite secure. But Lawrence v. Texas, holding that a state cannot make consensual homosexual conduct a crime, is not easy to reconcile with Glucksberg. Lawrence certainly takes a much more expansive view of substantive due process than did Glucksberg. It is conceivable that the five Justices who made up the Lawrence majority-all of whom still sit on the Court-might overrule Glucksberg. For various reasons, …


Due Process Traditionalism, Cass R. Sunstein Jan 2008

Due Process Traditionalism, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

In important cases, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of "substantive due process" by reference to tradition, but it has yet to explain why it has done so. Due process traditionalism might be defended in several distinctive ways. The most ambitious defense draws on a set of ideas associated with Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek, who suggested that traditions have special credentials by virtue of their acceptance by many minds. But this defense runs into three problems. Those who have participated in a tradition may not have accepted any relevant proposition; they might suffer from a systematic bias; and …


Substantive Due Process After Gonzales V. Carhart, Steven G. Calabresi Jan 2008

Substantive Due Process After Gonzales V. Carhart, Steven G. Calabresi

Michigan Law Review

This Article begins in Part I with a doctrinal evaluation of the status of Washington v. Glucksberg ten years after that decision was handed down. Discussion begins with consideration of the Roberts Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart and then turns to the subject of Justice Kennedy's views in particular on substantive due process. In Part II, the Article goes on to consider whether the Glucksberg test for substantive due process decision making is correct in light of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article concludes in Parts II and III that Glucksberg is right to confine …


In The Laboratory Of The States: The Progress Of Glucksberg'S Invitation To States To Address End-Of-Life Choice, Kathryn L. Tucker Jan 2008

In The Laboratory Of The States: The Progress Of Glucksberg'S Invitation To States To Address End-Of-Life Choice, Kathryn L. Tucker

Michigan Law Review

It has now been ten years since the Supreme Court handed down Glucksberg and Quill, rulings on laws that forbid "assisted suicide." In that time, normative and legal developments in the fields of law, medicine, and psychology have changed the landscape of the discourse on the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill individual to choose to self-administer medications to bring about a peaceful death. Although the Court rejected petitioners' claims that state laws denying them the ability to end their terminal illnesses through self-administered medication violated the Constitution, it left states with the opportunity to experiment with legislation …


De-Moralized: Glucksberg In The Malaise, Steven D. Smith Jan 2008

De-Moralized: Glucksberg In The Malaise, Steven D. Smith

Michigan Law Review

Ten years down the road, what is the enduring significance of the "assisted suicide" cases, Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill? The cases reflect an unusually earnest, but nonetheless unsuccessful, attempt by the Supreme Court to grapple with a profound moral issue. So, why was the Court unable to provide a more satisfying justification for its conclusions? This Article, written for a symposium on the tenth anniversary of Glucksberg,, discusses that question. Part I examines some of the flaws in reasoning in the Glucksberg and Quill opinions and suggests that these flaws stem from the opinion writers' …


Scrutiny Land, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2008

Scrutiny Land, Randy E. Barnett

Michigan Law Review

Scrutiny Land is the place where government needs to justify to a court its restrictions on the liberties of the people. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court began limiting access to Scrutiny Land. While the New Deal Court merely shifted the burden to those challenging a law to show that a restriction of liberty is irrational, the Warren Court made the presumption of constitutionality effectively irrebuttable. After this, only one road to Scrutiny Land remained: showing that the liberty being restricted was a fundamental right. The Glucksberg Two-Step, however, limited the doctrine of fundamental rights to those (1) narrowly defined …


Washington V. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, Erwin Chemerinsky Jan 2008

Washington V. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, Erwin Chemerinsky

Michigan Law Review

Properly focused, there were two questions before the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg. First, in light of all of the other non-textual rights protected by the Supreme Court under the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause, is the right to assisted death a fundamental right? Second, if so, is the prohibition of assisted death necessary to achieve a compelling interest? Presented in this way, it is clear that the Court erred in Washington v. Glucksberg. The right of a terminally ill person to end his or her life is an essential aspect of autonomy, comparable to aspects …


Death, Dying, And Domination, Marc Spindelman Jan 2008

Death, Dying, And Domination, Marc Spindelman

Michigan Law Review

This Article critiques conventional liberal arguments for the right to die on liberal grounds. It contends that these arguments do not go far enough to recognize and address private, and in particular structural, forms of domination. It presents an alternative that does, which is thus more respectful of true freedom in the context of death and dying, and also more consistent with liberalism. After discussing obstacles to the achievement of a right to die that encompasses freedom from both public and private domination, the Article closes with a significant reform project within bioethics that might help bring it about.


The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence V. Texas, Brian Hawkins Nov 2006

The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence V. Texas, Brian Hawkins

Michigan Law Review

On their faces, Washington v. Glucksberg and Lawrence v. Texas seem to have little in common. In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting assisted suicide and rejected a claim that the Constitution protects a "right to die"; in Lawrence, the Court struck down a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy and embraced a claim that the Constitution protects homosexual persons' choices to engage in intimate relationships. Thus, in both subject matter and result, Lawrence and Glucksberg appear far apart. The Lawrence Court, however, faced a peculiar challenge in reaching its decision, and its response to that challenge brings …


Euthanasia In America - Past, Present, And Future: A Review Of A Merciful End And Forced Exit, Edward J. Larson May 2004

Euthanasia In America - Past, Present, And Future: A Review Of A Merciful End And Forced Exit, Edward J. Larson

Michigan Law Review

Nearly 170 years ago, in the classic first volume of his Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." De Tocqueville viewed this as a peculiarly U.S. development. He attributed it to the authority of the judiciary in the United States to review governmental enactments and establish individual rights based on judicial interpretation of the federal and state constitution. "Whenever a law that the judge holds to be unconstitutional is invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he may …


The Case Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined, Ani B. Satz May 2002

The Case Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined, Ani B. Satz

Michigan Law Review

In Toni Morrison's acclaimed novel Beloved, Sethe, a runaway slave woman on the brink of capture, gruesomely murders one of her infant children and is halted seconds before killing the second. Cognizant of the approaching men, Sethe's actions are deliberate, swift, confident, and unflinching. Afterwards, she sits erect in the Sheriff's wagon. The reader is left to struggle, situating the horror of the event within the context of the reality of slavery. Was this an act of mercy tQ prevent the suffering Sethe's child would know as a slave? Is loss of autonomy, even rising to the condition of slavery, …


Political Questions, Judicial Questions, And The Problem Of Washington V. Glucksberg, Carl E. Schneider Jan 2000

Political Questions, Judicial Questions, And The Problem Of Washington V. Glucksberg, Carl E. Schneider

Other Publications

Over a century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville famously said, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Physician-assisted suicide superbly illustrates Tocqueville's acute observation. For a number of years, assisted suicide was the prototype of a (nonpartisan) political question. Interest groups brought it to public attention. Public discussion of it flourished. Legislatures debated it. Citizens in several states decided in referenda whether to make it legal. Almost suddenly, however, this classic political process was transformed into a judicial one by the startling and strongly stated …


Concluding Thoughts: Bioethics In The Language Of The Law, Carl E. Schneider Jan 2000

Concluding Thoughts: Bioethics In The Language Of The Law, Carl E. Schneider

Book Chapters

What happens when the language of the law becomes a vulgar tongue? What happens, more particularly, when parties to bioethical disputes are obliged to borrow in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings? How suited are the habits and tastes and thus the language of the judicial magistrate to the political, and more particularly, the bioethical, questions of our time? We must ask these questions because, as the incomparable Tocqueville foresaw, it has become American practice to resolve political—and moral—questions into judicial questions. We now reverently refer to the Supreme Court as the great …


On The Meaning And Impact Of The Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases. (Symposium: Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After Glucksberg And Quill), Yale Kamisar Jan 1998

On The Meaning And Impact Of The Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases. (Symposium: Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After Glucksberg And Quill), Yale Kamisar

Articles

I read every newspaper article I could find on the meaning and impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's June 1997 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg' and Vacco v. Quill.2 I came away with the impression that some proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) were unable or unwilling publicly to recognize the magnitude of the setback they suffered when the Court handed down its rulings in the PAS cases.


Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented By The Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, Yale Kamisar Jan 1998

Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented By The Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld New York and Washington state laws prohibiting the aiding of another to commit suicide,2 the spotlight will shift to the state courts, the state legislatures and state referenda. And once again proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) will point to a heartwrenching case, perhaps the relatively rare case where a dying person is experiencing unavoidable pain (i.e., pain that not even the most skilled palliative care experts are able to mitigate), and ask: What would you want done to you if you were in this person's shoes?


The Future Of Physician-Assisted Suicide, Yale Kamisar Jan 1998

The Future Of Physician-Assisted Suicide, Yale Kamisar

Articles

I believe that when the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in 1997 in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacca v. Quill, proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) suffered a much greater setback than many of them are able or willing to admit.