Law Commons^™

Sailing Toward Safe Harbor Hours: The Constitutionality Of Regulating Television Violence, Eric C. Chaffee

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Because of the recent focus on television violence, it is more a question of "when," rather than "if," Congress will take action on this issue. "Safe harbor" regulation, or restricting violent programming to certain hours of the day, is one form of regulation that is recurrently suggested as a means for dealing with the potential ills created by television violence. The possibility of such regulation implicates numerous constitutional issues. This Article addresses whether "safe harbor" regulation of television violence is feasible without violating the First Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution.

Take Us Back To The Ball Game: The Laws And Policy Of Professional Sports Ticket Prices, Nathan R. Scott

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The prices of professional sports tickets have skyrocketed in recent years, depriving many fans of the time-honored tradition of taking their families out to a ball game. This Article argues that legal reform and political action are appropriate responses to these soaring prices.

First, the Article rebuts the threshold objection that economics alone justify current ticket prices. Professional sports teams reap a windfall from the public through corporate welfare, special-interest legislation, and favorable antitrust and tax laws. This preferential legal treatment undercuts the argument that teams are simply charging, or should charge, what the market will bear. In addition, teams …

A Shadow Government: Private Regulation, Free Speech, And Lessons From The Sinclair Blogstorm, Marvin Ammori

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Because of the economics of online information, thousands who do not know each other can band together in hours, without previous organizational coordination or any persistent central coordination, to affect others and conform society to their idea of the social good. This changes the dynamic of political action and the ability of unaffiliated, lone individuals to respond to social acts where government and the market have not. Through ad hoc volunteerism, the Sinclair participants produced regulatory action against a private party with whom they were not transacting--because they believed government failed to do so. Although ad hoc volunteerism has received …

Technology Wars: The Failure Of Democratic Discourse, Gregory N. Mandel

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Conflicts over the use and regulation of various technologies pervade public discourse and have dramatic implications for the public interest. Controversies over the regulation of genetically modified products, nuclear power, and nanotechnology, among others, provoke some of the most socially and politically volatile debates of our time. These technology conflicts extract a substantial price from society--they create costly inefficiencies, prevent society from optimally managing new technologies, consume vast resources, and retard technological growth. This Article develops a framework for understanding technology controversies, and consequently proposes new means for resolving or ameliorating a variety of seemingly intractable legal and regulatory standoffs. …

Transgovernmental Networks Vs. Democracy: The Case Of The European Information Privacy Network, Francesca Bignami

Michigan Journal of International Law

The perspective offered by this Article is twofold. The emergence of transgovernmental networks gives rise to two questions, one causal and the other normative. First, how do we explain transnational cooperation through networks? Why do governments and regulators choose to establish networks rather than retain virtually limitless discretion over policymaking, conditioned only by international legal obligations? Based on the author’s examination of the records of the intergovernmental negotiations on the Data Protection Directive, this Article concludes that one precondition for fettering national discretion through networks is common preferences among governments on the substance of the policy to be administered. Compared …