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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Information Escrows, Ian Ayres, Cait Unkovic
Information Escrows, Ian Ayres, Cait Unkovic
Michigan Law Review
A variety of information escrows - including allegation escrows, suspicion escrows, and shared-interest escrows - hold the promise of reducing the first-mover disadvantage that can deter people with socially valuable private information from disclosing that information to others. Information escrows allow people to transmit sensitive information to a trusted intermediary, an escrow agent, who only forwards the information under prespecified conditions. For example, an allegation escrow for sexual harassment might allow a victim to place a private complaint into escrow with instructions that the complaint be lodged with the proper authorities only if the escrow agent receives at least one …
A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee
A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee
Michigan Law Review
This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system; rather it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost. By focusing only on offsetting escaped liability, the standard law and economics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between variance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement …
Toward Economic Analysis Of The Uniform Probate Code, Daniel B. Kelly
Toward Economic Analysis Of The Uniform Probate Code, Daniel B. Kelly
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Insights from economics and the economic analysis of law may be useful in analyzing succession law, including intestacy and wills as well as nonprobate transfers such as trusts. After surveying prior works that have examined succession from a functional perspective, I explore the possibility of utilizing tools like (i) transaction costs, (ii) the ex ante/ex post distinction, and (iii) rules versus standards, to illuminate the design of the Uniform Probate Code. Specifically, I investigate how these tools, which legal scholars have employed widely in other contexts, may be relevant in understanding events like the nonprobate revolution and issues like "dead …
The Meaning Of The Market Myth, Benjamin Means
The Meaning Of The Market Myth, Benjamin Means
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
This Book Review contends that the perfectly rational market may be a myth, not just in the sense of a false or over-simplified account of reality, but also in the deeper, anthropological sense of cultural explanation. Part I describes how rational-market theories were developed by financial economists and applied to Wall Street, sometimes without adequate appreciation for the difference between simplified economic models and real-world behavior. Part II contends that if the rational-market theory has met with acceptance that outstrips its empirical support, the favorable reception may be explained in part by the theory’s congruence with broader normative views about …
The Dog That Didn't Bark: Private Investment Funds And Relational Contracts In The Wake Of The Great Recession, Robert C. Illig
The Dog That Didn't Bark: Private Investment Funds And Relational Contracts In The Wake Of The Great Recession, Robert C. Illig
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the contract rights of numerous hedge funds and venture capital funds were breached. These contracts were complex and sophisticated and had been negotiated at great time and expense. Yet despite all of the assumptions of neo-classical contracts theory, nothing happened. Practically none of these injured parties sued to enforce their rights. Professor Illig uses this dearth of litigation to conduct a form of natural experiment as to the value of contract law. Discrete market participants contracted before the crash and then pursued their rights in court afterwards, while relational market participants contracted …
Climate Justice, Daniel A. Farber
Climate Justice, Daniel A. Farber
Michigan Law Review
Eric Posner and David Weisbach take the threat of climate change seriously. Their book Climate Change Justice offers policy prescriptions that deserve serious attention. While the authors adopt the framework of conventional welfare economics, they show a willingness to engage with noneconomic perspectives, which softens their conclusions. Although they are right to see a risk that overly aggressive ethical claims could derail international agreement on restricting greenhouse gases, their analysis makes climate justice too marginal to climate policy. The developed world does have a special responsibility for the current climate problem, and we should be willing both to agree to …
The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman
The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
A 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration claims that federal regulations impose annual economic costs of $1.75 trillion. This estimate has been widely circulated, in everything from op-ed pages to Congressional testimony. But the estimate is not credible. For costs of economic regulations, the estimate reflects a calculation that rests on a misunderstanding of the definition of the relevant data, flunks an elementary question on the normal distribution, pads the analysis with several years of near-identical data, and fails to recognize the difference between correlation and causation. For costs of environmental regulation, …