Law Commons^™

Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

This article begins with the premise that nothing - not even an intellectual structure as imposing as the Chicago School - lasts forever. In fact, a certain amount of stagnation is already apparent. Most of the creative intellectual work of the Chicago School has already been done - done very well, to be sure. The new work too often reveals the signs of excessive self-acceptance, particularly of quiet acquiescence in premises that ought to be controversial.

Today the cutting edge of antitrust scholarship is coming, not from protagonists of the Chicago School, but rather from its critics. The critics began …

The Applicability Of The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974 To Voluntary Dismissals, Jon B. Jacobs

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that Congress should amend the APPA to require a judicial public interest determination prior to the entry of a voluntary dismissal in government-initiated civil antitrust actions. Part I of this Note briefly describes the APPA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Part II asserts that APPA procedures do not currently apply to voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1). Part III concludes that the purposes underlying the APPA and general policy considerations support the legislative extension of the Act to dismissals. Part IV responds to objections to this proposal. Finally, Part V presents a specific amendment to the …

Modifications Of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Over A Double Barrel, John D. Anderson

Michigan Law Review

This Note will attempt to determine the correct standard of review for all modifications of existing consent decrees. Part I. A. examines the current standards for modifications of consent decrees. It concludes that the APP A does not apply to such orders. Part I. B. then examines the differing standards that are currently applied to defendant-initiated modification motions without the government's consent, government-initiated modification motions without the defendant's consent, and consented-to modifications. Part II argues that these varying standards have little justification since the same substantive concerns exist in all modification cases. Part III explores the two major concerns - …

The Distinction Between The Scope Of Section 2(A) And Sections 2(D) And 2€ Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that sections 2(d) and 2(e) were meant to cover only disguised discriminations not within the scope of section 2(a). If the seller's conduct falls within the scope of section 2(a), that section must be applied regardless of whether or not the conduct also falls within the language of section 2(d) or 2(e). Only when section 2(a) does not apply is recourse available under sections 2(d) and 2(e). Part I of this Note looks at general antitrust policy, the limitations of the Clayton Act that led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the legislative history of …