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Full-Text Articles in Law
Expressive Law And The Americans With Disabilities Act, Alex C. Geisinger, Michael Ashley Stein
Expressive Law And The Americans With Disabilities Act, Alex C. Geisinger, Michael Ashley Stein
Michigan Law Review
The question of why people follow the law has long been a subject of scholarly consideration. Prevailing accounts of how law changes behavior coalesce around two major themes: legitimacy and deterrence. Advocates of legitimacy argue that law is obeyed when it is created through a legitimate process and its substance comports with community mores. Others emphasize deterrence, particularly those who subscribe to law-and-economics theories. These scholars argue that law makes certain socially undesirable behaviors more costly, and thus individuals are less likely to undertake them.
A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee
A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee
Michigan Law Review
This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system; rather it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost. By focusing only on offsetting escaped liability, the standard law and economics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between variance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement …
Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman
Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman
Michigan Law Review
While they often rely on the threat of penalties to produce deterrence, legal systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot implement such a regime in the form of equity compensation for directors. We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward regimes. While …
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
Michigan Law Review
Following the recent spate of corporate scandals, government enforcement authorities have increasingly relied upon corporate monitors to help ensure law compliance and reduce the number of future violations. These monitors also permit enforcement authorities, such as the Securities & Exchange Commission and others, to leverage their enforcement resources in overseeing corporate behavior. However there are few descriptive or normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors. This paper provides such an analysis. After sketching out the historical development of corporate monitors, the paper examines the most common features of the current set of monitor appointments supplemented by interviews …
Getting The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis Of Whistleblowing And Insider Trading, Jonathan Macey
Getting The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis Of Whistleblowing And Insider Trading, Jonathan Macey
Michigan Law Review
The purpose of this Article is to show that corporate whistleblowing is not analytically or functionally distinguishable from insider trading when such trading is based on "whistleblower information," that is, the information a whistleblower might disclose to the authorities. In certain contexts, both insider trading and whistleblowing, if incentivized, would reduce the incidence of corporate pathologies such as fraud and corruption. In light of this analysis, it is peculiar that whistleblowing is encouraged and protected, while insider trading on whistleblower information is not only discouraged but criminalized. Often, insider trading will be far more effective than whistleblowing at bringing fraud …
Road Signs And The Goals Of Justice, Joseph Sanders
Road Signs And The Goals Of Justice, Joseph Sanders
Michigan Law Review
Review of Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public Law Problem by Guido Calabresi
The Allocation Of Prosecution: An Economic Analysis, Michigan Law Review
The Allocation Of Prosecution: An Economic Analysis, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note uses economic theory to reassess the division of prosecutorial tasks between victims and the government for offenses other than victimless offenses. It attempts to answer in a general manner questions such as why the prosecutor should differ from offense to offense and where ,the line should be drawn between governmental and individual prosecution. Work done in the areas of welfare economics and public finance concerning the effectiveness of government and the private sector in providing different sorts of goods is drawn upon heavily. This Note views prosecution as an economic good and a victim's prosecution of an offender …