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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason Scott Johnston
The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason Scott Johnston
Michigan Law Review
Among attorneys, judges, and legal academics, there is virtual consensus that the widespread use by business firms of standard-form contracts in their dealings with consumers has completely eliminated bargaining in consumer contracts. I believe that this perception is false, that rather than precluding bargaining and negotiation, standard-form contracts in fact facilitate bargaining and are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance of cooperative relationships between firms and their customers. On this view, which I elaborate below, firms use clear and unconditional standard form contract terms not because they will insist upon those terms, but because they have given their …
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
Michigan Law Review
That boilerplate is pervasive is hardly surprising. In a variety of ways, standardized terms in day-to-day contracts serve an essential cost-saving function. By this measure, one might expect less frequent reliance on boilerplate in high-value contracts among sophisticated parties. Yet standard terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the sophisticated. Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to craft comprehensive and detailed, but also particularized, contracts, such parties will commonly conclude agreements comprised heavily of traditional terms--contracting norms of a sort-rather than terms tailored to the distinct features of their particular bargain. Examples of seemingly suboptimal …
Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Russell Korobkin, Chris Guthrie
Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Russell Korobkin, Chris Guthrie
Michigan Law Review
In this article, we seek to substantiate "psychological barriers," as illustrated by the constructs described above, as a third explanation for the failure of legal disputants to settle out of court. Although we are not the first to hypothesize that psychological processes can, in theory, affect legal dispute negotiations, we attempt to give more definition to the otherwise vague contours of the psychological barriers hypothesis by bringing empirical data to bear on the question. To achieve this end, we conducted a series of nine laboratory experiments - involving nearly 450 subjects - designed to isolate the effects of the three …
Bargaining With The State, Jonathan D. Hacker
Bargaining With The State, Jonathan D. Hacker
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Bargaining with the State by Richard A. Epstein
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure Of Contract Interpretation, David Charny
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure Of Contract Interpretation, David Charny
Michigan Law Review
The argument here amplifies the contract literature with respect to basic contract theory and its doctrinal applications. The argument extends and corrects the current understanding of contract theory in several respects. First, it clarifies the role of liberal and communitarian argument in constructing interpretive conventions for contract. As currently understood among lawyers, the predominant noninstrumental theories of contract are in large measure indeterminate as to the question of default rules. Nonetheless, as I shall explain, these theories do have limited implications for the ground rules that govern interpretive conventions. The argument here, then, clarifies the role of noninstrumental theory in …
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery Katz
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery Katz
Michigan Law Review
The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two types of …
Labor Law - Certified Union's Loss Of Majority Status During Certification Year And Without Fault Of Employer As Justification For Refusal To Bargain, Eugene Alkema S.Ed.
Labor Law - Certified Union's Loss Of Majority Status During Certification Year And Without Fault Of Employer As Justification For Refusal To Bargain, Eugene Alkema S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
The "one year certification rule" was originated in the early years of the National Labor Relations Board and has been consistently applied by it. Essentially it provides that after certification an employer is required to bargain with the certified union for a reasonable time, which is usually one year in the absence of "unusual circumstances." The certified union is conclusively presumed to represent a majority of employees in the unit for that period, the presumption afterward becoming rebuttable. This system of successive conclusive and rebuttable presumptions represents a compromise between the competing policies of giving a union time to establish …
Labor Law - Collective Bargaining - Contract Ratification And Strike Authorization Clauses As Statutory Proposals, Arne Hovdesoen S.Ed.
Labor Law - Collective Bargaining - Contract Ratification And Strike Authorization Clauses As Statutory Proposals, Arne Hovdesoen S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
After continued employer demands to discuss contract ratification and strike authorization clauses, the union discontinued contract negotiations on the ground that such proposals constituted interference with its internal affairs and as such were not within the scope of mandatory collective bargaining as defined by sections 8 (d) and 9 (a) of the amended National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board found the union's action to be the result of the employer's refusal to bargain in compliance with section 8 (d) and issued an appropriate order directing the company to cease and desist from insisting upon these proposals to …