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Just Schools: The Idea Of Racial Equality In American Education, Michigan Law Review
Just Schools: The Idea Of Racial Equality In American Education, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Just Schools: The Idea of Racial Equality in American Education by David L. Kirp
In Defense Of Equality: A Reply To Professor Westen, Erwin Chemerinsky
In Defense Of Equality: A Reply To Professor Westen, Erwin Chemerinsky
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this essay analyzes Professor Westen's arguments that the concept of equality is unnecessary. My contention is that Professor Westen never demonstrates that equality is meaningless; his arguments only prove the obvious, that equality by itself is insufficient. Part II argues that equality is a necessary principle: It is the only concept that tells us that different treatment of people does matter. Part III addresses Professor Westen's suggestion that equality is misleading and points out that none of his criticisms of the idea of equality are in any way inherent to that concept. Finally, Part IV demonstrates that …
The Meaning Of Equality In Law, Science, Math, And Morals: A Reply, Peter Westen
The Meaning Of Equality In Law, Science, Math, And Morals: A Reply, Peter Westen
Michigan Law Review
I shall set forth my thesis in Part I, using the Declaration of Independence ("all men are created equal") to illustrate that the emptiness of equality inheres in its very meaning, and that the confusions of equality result from neglecting its meaning. In Part II, I respond to Professors Chemerinsky's and D' Amato's reasons for believing that equality has independent normative content of its own. In Part III, I respond to Professor Chemerinsky's separate reasons for believing that equality is rhetorically useful.
Is Equality A Totally Empty Idea?, Anthony D'Amato
Is Equality A Totally Empty Idea?, Anthony D'Amato
Michigan Law Review
Professor Peter Westen's essay asserting that the concept of equality has no substantive content whatsoever usefully brushes aside much of the equal-protection rhetoric that, as Westen carefully explains, appropriately belongs to substantive due process. However, his absolutist position is open to challenge. I would like to posit one hypothetical case that I used in my classes when I taught Constitutional Law that I think contradicts Professor Westen's thesis. If it does, then there will be other cases as well, and his position cannot stand as the logically tight construct that he repeatedly asserts that it is.