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Full-Text Articles in Law
Negligence And Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm In Torts, David Gilo, Ehud Guttel
Negligence And Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm In Torts, David Gilo, Ehud Guttel
Michigan Law Review
Conventional wisdom in tort law maintains that the prevention of undesirable risks mandates restriction of harmful conduct. Against this widely held conviction, this Article shows that undesirable risks often stem from insufficient, rather than excessive, activity. Because negligence requires investments in only cost-justified care, parties might deliberately limit their activity so that the size of the ensuing risk would be lower than the cost of welfare-enhancing precautions. Parties' incentives to strategically restrict their activity levels have striking implications for the inducement of efficient harm prevention. The overlooked paradigm of insufficient activity calls for the imposition of a new form of …
Private Production Of Public Goods: Liability For Unrequested Benefits, Ariel Porat
Private Production Of Public Goods: Liability For Unrequested Benefits, Ariel Porat
Michigan Law Review
This Article explores why the law treats negative externalities (harms) and positive externalities (benefits) differently. Ideally, from an economic perspective, both negative and positive externalities should be internalized by those who produce them, for with full internalization, injurers and benefactors alike would behave efficiently. In actuality, however, whereas the law requires that injurers bear the harms they create (or wrongfully create), benefactors are seldom entitled to recover for benefits they voluntarily confer on recipients without the latter's consent ( "unrequested benefits"). One aim of this Article is to explore the puzzle of the law's differing treatment of negative and positive …
In (Partial) Defense Of Strict Liability In Contract, Robert E. Scott
In (Partial) Defense Of Strict Liability In Contract, Robert E. Scott
Michigan Law Review
Many scholars believe that notions of fault should and do pervade contract doctrine. Notwithstanding the normative and positive arguments in favor of a fault-based analysis of particular contract doctrines, I argue that contract liability is strict liability at its core. This core regime is based on two key prongs: (1) the promisor is liable to the promisee for breach, and that liability is unaffected by the promisor's exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precautions; and (2) the promisor's liability is unaffected by the fact that the promisee, prior to the breach, has failed to take cost-effective precautions …
The Role Of Fault In Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, And Nonperformance, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
The Role Of Fault In Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, And Nonperformance, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
Michigan Law Review
It is often asserted that contract law is based on strict liability, not fault. This assertion is incorrect. Fault is a basic building block of contract law, and pervades the field. Some areas of contract law, such as unconscionability, are largely fault based. Other areas, such as interpretation, include sectors that are fault based in significant part. Still other areas, such as liability for nonperformance, superficially appear to rest on strict liability, but actually rest in significant part on the fault of breaking a promise without sufficient excuse. Contract law discriminates between two types of fault: the violation of strong …
Fault In Contract Law, Eric A. Posner
Fault In Contract Law, Eric A. Posner
Michigan Law Review
A promisor is strictly liable for breaching a contract, according to the standard account. However, a negligence-based system of contract law can be given an economic interpretation, and this Article shows that such a system is in some respects more attractive than the strict-liability system. This may explain why, as a brief discussion of cases shows, negligence ideas continue to play a role in contract decisions.
The Truth About Torts: Rethinking Regulatory Preemption And Its Impact On Public Health, William Buzbee, William Funk, Thomas Mcgarity, Nina A. Mendelson, Sidney Shapiro, David Vladeck, Matthew Shudtz
The Truth About Torts: Rethinking Regulatory Preemption And Its Impact On Public Health, William Buzbee, William Funk, Thomas Mcgarity, Nina A. Mendelson, Sidney Shapiro, David Vladeck, Matthew Shudtz
Other Publications
As consumers, we assume that the automobiles, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and other products we purchase are generally safe for their intended uses. We rely on manufacturers to design and produce safe products, and we assume that federal regulators are conscientious watchdogs of the marketplace. In most instances, our assumptions are valid and we safely go about our lives. But the regulatory system is now frayed to the point that dangerous products sometimes slip through the cracks. Vioxx, Firestone/ATX tires, and toxics-laden children’s toys have endangered and harmed millions. In these cases, society depends on the state courts as a venue …
Insufficient Activity And Tort Liability: A Rejoinder, David Gilo, Ehud Guttel
Insufficient Activity And Tort Liability: A Rejoinder, David Gilo, Ehud Guttel
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In our article, Negligence and Insufficient Activity, we proposed that tort scholarship has overlooked the risk that injurers will behave strategically in setting their activity levels. Whereas the standard literature has predicted that injurers who are subject to a negligence regime will often invest efficiently in care but choose excessive activity levels, we showed that they may do exactly the opposite: injurers may deliberately restrict their activity to avoid investments in socially desirable precaution. After reviewing the conditions that may give rise to the risk of insufficient activity, we examined the ways in which the legal system can minimize the …
Activity Levels Under The Hand Formula: A Comment On Gilo And Guttel, Richard A. Epstein
Activity Levels Under The Hand Formula: A Comment On Gilo And Guttel, Richard A. Epstein
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 277 (2009). Within the law and economics field, there often surfaces a near hypnotic attraction to the Hand formula as the one and only tool that drives tort law toward economic efficiency. Hand's intuition was, of course, that the test for efficiency requires a balancing of three variables. The burden of taking particular precautions is compared to the expected loss from some activity, which in turn consists of the likelihood of some particular harm multiplied by its anticipated severity. …
Another Theory Of Insufficient Activity Levels, Mark Grady
Another Theory Of Insufficient Activity Levels, Mark Grady
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). Professors David Gilo and Ehud Guttel have written an important article on the tendency of the negligence rule to produce inefficiently low activity levels. In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, the authors claim insufficient activity to be the "missing paradigm" in tort theory. Although I agree with Gilo and Guttel that this missing paradigm is central to negligence doctrine, I disagree with them about how insufficient activity levels arise.
Insufficient Analysis Of Insufficient Activity, Kenneth S. Abraham
Insufficient Analysis Of Insufficient Activity, Kenneth S. Abraham
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, David Gilo and Ehud Guttel argue that negligence law encourages inefficiently high and low levels of activity because negligence law ordinarily does not take activity levels into account. They suggest that the law should impose liability for failing to take safety precautions-even where precautions would not be cost-justified-whenever the threat of this liability negates the incentive for an actor to choose an insufficient level of activity. Until …
Dilution Of Liability And Multiple Tortfeasors In The Context Of Liability For Unrequested Precautions, Assaf Jacob
Dilution Of Liability And Multiple Tortfeasors In The Context Of Liability For Unrequested Precautions, Assaf Jacob
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A Response to Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. (2009). One of the more intriguing questions in tort law is the case of joint and several tortfeasors and the dilution-of-liability puzzle. When harm materializes and there are multiple potential tortfeasors, the law tends to limit the number of joint tortfeasors, focusing the final burden on a small number of actors. This limitation is achieved by several legal mechanisms, such as a no duty rule, a narrow interpretation of negligence, a restrictive implementation of the causal link (be it the but for …
When Is A Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions And Damages, Richard Craswell
When Is A Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions And Damages, Richard Craswell
Michigan Law Review
The existing literature on willful breach has not been able to define what should count as "willful." I argue here that any definition we adopt has implications for just how high damages should be raised in those cases where a breach qualifies as willful. As a result, both of these issues-the definition of "willful," and the measure of damages for willful breach-need to be considered simultaneously. Specifically, if a definition of "willful" excludes all breachers who behaved efficiently, then in theory we can raise the penalty on the remaining inefficient breachers to any arbitrarily high level ("throw the book at …