Law Commons^™

Precise Punishment: Why Precise Punitive Damage Requests Result In Higher Awards Than Round Requests, Michael Conklin

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Imagine a setting where someone asks two people what the temperature is outside. The first person says it is 80 °F, while the second person says it is 78.7 °F. Research regarding precise versus round cognitive anchoring suggests that the second person is more likely to be believed. This is because it is human nature to assume that if someone gives a precise answer, he must have good reason for doing so. This principle remains constant in a variety of settings, including used car negotiations, eBay transactions, and estimating the field goal percentage of a basketball player.

This Article reports …

Saliency, Anchors & Frames: A Multicomponent Damages Experiment, Bernard Chao

Michigan Technology Law Review

Modern technology products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of different features. Nonetheless, when electronics manufacturers are sued for patent infringement, these suits typically accuse only one feature, or in more complex suits, a handful of features, of actual patent infringement. But damages verdicts often do not reflect the relatively small contribution an individual patent makes to an infringing product. One study observed that verdicts in these types of cases average 9.98% of the price of the entire product. While both courts and commentators have blamed the law of patent damages, the role cognitive biases play in these outsized damages …

Ask And What Shall Ye Receive? A Guide For Using And Interpreting What Jurors Tell Us, Barbara O'Brien, Samuel R. Sommers, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

We review the extensive body of studies relying on jurors' self-reports in interviews or questionnaires, with a focus on potential threats to validity for researchers seeking to answer particularly provocative questions such as the influence of race in jury decision-making. We then offer a more focused case study comparison of interview and questionnaire data with behavioral data in the domain of race and juror decision-making. Our review suggests that the utility of data obtained from juror interviews and questionnaire responses varies considerably depending on the question under investigation. We close with an evaluation of the types of empirical questions most …

'Race Salience' In Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, And Unanswered Questions, Samuel R. Sommers, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

In two frequently cited articles, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000, 2001) concluded that the influence of a defendant’s race on White mock jurors is more pronounced in interracial trials in which race remains a silent background issue than in trials involving racially charged incidents. Referring to this variable more generally as "race salience," we predicted that any aspect of a trial that leads White mock jurors to be concerned about racial bias should render the race of a defendant less influential. Though subsequent researchers have further explored this idea of "race salience," they have manipulated it in the same way as …

Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, And The Protection Of The Holdout Juror, Jason D. Reichelt

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The holdout juror in felony criminal trials is a product of the near-universal decision rule in federal and state courts of a unanimous verdict. In recent years, courts have increasingly inquired into a jury's deliberations when a holdout juror has been identified amid allegations of misconduct. This Article helps bridge the considerable gap between cognitive psychology and legal scholarship, analyzing the thought processes of the holdout juror through the application of empirical evidence and psychological modeling, to conclude that the improved protection of the holdout juror is a necessary and critical component to the preservation of a defendant's right to …

The Cognitive Psychology Of Circumstantial Evidence, Kevin Jon Heller

Michigan Law Review

Empirical research indicates that jurors routinely undervalue circumstantial evidence (DNA, fingerprints, and the like) and overvalue direct evidence (eyewitness identifications and confessions) when making verdict choices, even though false-conviction statistics indicate that the former is normally more probative and more reliable than the latter The traditional explanation of this paradox, based on the probability-threshold model of jury decision-making, is that jurors simply do not understand circumstantial evidence and thus routinely underestimate its effect on the objective probability of the defendant's guilt. That may be true in some situations, but it fails to account for what is known in cognitive psychology …

Psychology, Factfinding, And Entrapment, Kevin A. Smith

Michigan Law Review

Through the entrapment defense, the law acknowledges that criminal behavior is not always the result of a culpable mind, but is sometimes the result of an interaction between the individual and his environment. By limiting the amount of pressure and temptation that undercover agents may bring to bear on a target, the defense recognizes that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen can be persuaded, cajoled, or intimidated into criminal activity that, he would never consider absent law-enforcement interference. Appropriate application of the defense requires, however, that courts be able to accurately separate the truly wicked from the merely weak-willed, and offensively coercive …

One Inspiring Jury, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Reviews

Americans love to complain about the jury. They complain about being called for jury duty. They complain about jury verdicts in highly publicized cases. They are outraged by the failure to convict "obviously guilty" criminals, such as the police officers in the cases of Rodney King and Amadou Diallo, the Menendez brothers in their first trial, and of course O.J. Simpson. In civil cases, they are appalled when plaintiffs win huge damage awards in "obviously frivolous" lawsuits. Juries are ignorant and uneducated, juries are gullible, juries are swayed by passion and prejudice rather than reason. Criticizing jury verdicts allows us …

Some Steps Between Attitudes And Verdicts, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Book Chapters

Most research that has attempted to predict verdict preferences on the basis of stable juror characteristics, such as attitudes and personality traits, has found that individual differences among jurors are not very useful predictors, accounting for only a small proportion of the variance in verdict choices. Some commentators have therefore concluded that verdicts are overwhelmingly accounted for by "the weight of the evidence," and that differences among jurors have negligible effects. But there is a paradox here: In most cases the weight of the evidence is insufficient to produce firstballot unanimity in the jury (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; Hastie, Penrod, …

How Much Do We Really Know About Race And Juries? A Review Of Social Science Theory And Research, Samuel R. Sommers, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

The past decade has witnessed numerous high-profile criminal trials in which controversial verdicts have been attributed to racethe race of the defendant, the racial composition of a jury, an attorney "playing the race card," and so on. A predominantly Black jury's acquittal of O.J. Simpson and White jurors' leniency in the police brutality cases of Rodney King and Amadou Diallo not only sparked public debate, but also led to rioting and violence. In the wake of trials such as these, many have questioned the viability of the American jury system.' More specific questions regarding the influence of race on jury …

Race In The Courtroom: Perceptions Of Guilt And Dispositional Attributions, Samuel R. Sommers, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

The present studies compare the judgments of White and Black mock jurors in interracial trials. In Study 1, the defendant’s race did not influence White college students’ decisions but Black students demonstrated ingroup/outgroup bias in their guilt ratings and attributions for the defendant’s behavior. The aversive nature of modern racism suggests that Whites are motivated to appear nonprejudiced when racial issues are salient; therefore, the race salience of a trial summary was manipulated and given to noncollege students in Study 2. Once again, the defendant’s race did not influence Whites when racial issues were salient. But in the non-race-salient version …

Linking The Visions, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Other Publications

Professor Phoebe Ellsworth talks about her teaching and work.

The Role Of "Stories" In Civil Jury Judgments, Reid Hastie

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

A brief review of psychological theories of juror decision making is followed by an introduction to "explanation-based" theories of judgment. Prior empirical studies of explanation-based processes in juror decision making are then reviewed. An original empirical study of jurors' judgments concerning liability for punitive damages is presented to illustrate the explanation-based approach to civil decisions.

The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The Views Of Trial Participants, Judges, And Jurors, Valerie P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford, G. Thomas Munslerman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court reformed the jury trial process by allowing civil jurors to discuss the evidence presented during trial prior to their formal deliberations. This Article examines and evaluates the theoretical, legal, and policy issues raised by this reform and presents the early results of afield experiment that tested the impact of trial discussions. Jurors, judges, attorneys, and litigants in civil jury trials in Arizona were questioned regarding their observations, experiences, and reactions during trial as well as what they perceived to be the benefits and drawback of juror discussions. The data revealed that the majority of …

Sticks And Stones, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

I believe that research should be refuted by research. More and more of our scarce journal space is being taken up by attacks, rebuttals, and rebuttals to the rebuttals, often ending with a whimper of recognition that the adversaries were not so very far apart to begin with, and that the only way (if possible) to resolve the disagreement is through empirical research. Communication of scientific disagreement does not require a published article. Grant proposals and manuscripts submitted to refereed journals like this one are sent out to reviewers, who provide written evaluations that are communicated to the author. Papers …

Some Steps Between Attitudes And Verdicts, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Book Chapters

Most research that has attempted to predict verdict preferences on the basis of stable juror characteristics, such as attitudes and personality traits, has found that individual differences among jurors are not very useful predictors, accounting for only a small proportion of the variance in verdict choices. Some commentators have therefore concluded that verdicts are overwhelmingly accounted for by "the weight of the evidence," and that differences among jurors have negligible effects. But there is a paradox here: In most cases the weight of the evidence is insufficient to produce firstballot unanimity in the jury (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; Hastie, Penrod, …

Real Jurors' Understanding Of The Law In Real Cases, Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

A survey of 224 Michigan citizens called for jury duty over a 2-month period was conducted to assess the jurors' comprehension of the law they had been given in the judges' instructions. Citizens who served as jurors were compared with a base line of those who were called for duty but not selected to serve, and with those who served on different kinds of cases. Consistent with previous studies of mock jurors, this study found that actual jurors understand fewer than half of the instructions they receive at trial. Subjects who received judges' instructions performed significantly better than uninstructed subjects …

To Tell What We Know Or Wait For Godot?, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

Professor Elliott raises two questions about the American Psychological Association's practice of submitting amicus briefs to the courts. First, are our data sufficiently valid, consistent, and generalizable to be applicable to the real world issues? Second, are amicus briefs adequate to communicate scientific findings? The first of these is not a general question, but must be addressed anew each time the Association considers a new issue. An evaluation of the quality and sufficiency of scientific knowledge about racial discrimination, for example, tells us nothing at all about the quality and sufficiency of scientific knowledge about sexual abuse. "Are the data …

Understanding The Jury With The Help Of Social Science, Stephen Saltzburg

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Inside the Jury by Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod and Nancy Pennington

Reconstructing Reality In The Courtroom: Justice And Judgement In American Culture, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgement in American Culture by W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman

Legal Psychology: Eyewitness Testimony--Jury Behavior, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Legal Psychology: Eyewitness Testimony--Jury Behavior by L. Craig Parker

Judgment Non Obstantibus Datis, Reid Hastie

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Jury Trials by John Baldwin and Michael McConville

Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research And The Jury-Size Cases, Richard O. Lempert

Michigan Law Review

My point is not that verdict differences associated with jury size cannot be revealed through careful empirical investigation. Indeed, at several places in this article I will suggest research strategies likely to reveal such differences. Rather, it is that typical strategies of legal-impact research, such as those utilized in the Colgrove real-world studies, are unlikely to uncover differences associated with jury size however well they control for those plausible rival hypotheses that form the usual threats to the validity of impact research. The reason lies in the unamenability of the jury-size problem to the usual techniques of aggregate data analysis.

A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, Shari Seidman Diamond

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Researchers in the behavioral sciences have watched with some pride as the courts have given increased attention to social science studies. Judicial interest in empirical studies is a desirable development but one not quite free of danger. The courts are not yet fully accustomed to dealing critically with such evidence. The United States Supreme Court ruled recently, in Colgrove v. Battin, that six-member juries in civil cases meet the seventh amendment requirement of trial by jury. This decision was not surprising in light of Williams v. Florida, in which the Court ruled that six jurors were sufficient to …