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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal
The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal
Publications
There has been an explosion in new types of startup finance instruments. Whereas twenty years ago preferred stock dominated the field, startup companies and investors now use at least eight different instruments—six of which have only become widely used in the last decade. Legal scholars have yet to reflect upon the proliferation of instrument types in the aggregate. Notably missing is a way to organize instruments into a common framework that highlights their similarities and differences.
This Article makes four contributions. First, it catalogues the variety of startup investment forms. I describe novel instruments, such as revenue-based financing, which remain …
The Diverging Meaning Of Good Faith, Mark J. Loewenstein
The Diverging Meaning Of Good Faith, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
This article explores the meaning of "good faith" in the context of corporations and unincorporated entities. The courts, particularly in Delaware, have developed two different approaches. In the corporate arena, the courts are fashioning a notion of good faith that seems to require an examination of director motivations. In the unincorporated arena, good faith has a meaning grounded in contract law. These are two different concepts and reflect the fundamental differences between corporations and unincorporated entities, with the former based on fiduciary duties and the latter on contract. There are, however, indications that this "divergence" is starting to disappear, and …
Unocal Revisited: No Tiger In The Tank, Mark J. Loewenstein
Unocal Revisited: No Tiger In The Tank, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein
The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
Much of the scholarship on executive compensation that appears in law reviews assumes that large U.S. corporations overpay their chief executive officers ("CEOs"). This assumption is understandable, as many of these compensation packages are indeed stunning. The question of whether CEOs are overpaid, however, is complicated. Some scholars in other disciplines, principally in economics and management science, have studied the issue but, as this Article demonstrates, this literature does not confirm the assumption. Indeed, some studies suggest that CEO pay is competitive. Moreover, efforts to reduce the level of executive compensation may have the unintended consequence of achieving the opposite …
Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang
Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang
Publications
No abstract provided.
Corporate Finance, Corporate Law And Finance Theory, Peter H. Huang, Michael S. Knoll
Corporate Finance, Corporate Law And Finance Theory, Peter H. Huang, Michael S. Knoll
Publications
No abstract provided.
Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein
Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.
Reflections On Executive Compensation And A Modest Proposal For (Further) Reform, Mark J. Loewenstein
Reflections On Executive Compensation And A Modest Proposal For (Further) Reform, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Publications
No abstract provided.
Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis
Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis
Publications
No abstract provided.
Removal Of The Corporate Director During His Term Of Office, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Removal Of The Corporate Director During His Term Of Office, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Publications
The traditional rules governing the removal of corporate directors have evolved so as to insulate the board of directors from the shareholders who elect them. Professor Travers in his article examines initially the interests being advanced by protecting the board members from removal by their electorate. He then critically analyzes the law as it relates to these interests in order to suggest a more rational approach.