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Full-Text Articles in Law

James Wilson And The Moral Foundations Of Popular Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum Apr 2016

James Wilson And The Moral Foundations Of Popular Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper explores the moral philosophy underlying the constitutional doctrine of popular sovereignty. In particular, it focuses on the Scottish sentimentalism that informed James Wilson’s understanding of that doctrine. Wilson, a transplanted Scotsman, was perhaps the nation’s preeminent lawyer in the middle 1780s. He was one of the most important delegates to the Constitutional Convention, one of the nation’s first law professors, and served as Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court. In these capacities, he developed the most sophisticated and coherent account of popular sovereignty among the founding generation. My initial effort is to enrich our understanding of Wilson’s …


National Federation Of Independent Business V. Sebelius, Brannon P. Denning, Glenn H. Reynolds Jan 2013

National Federation Of Independent Business V. Sebelius, Brannon P. Denning, Glenn H. Reynolds

Brannon P. Denning

Using our now-famous "Five Takes" format, Glenn Reynolds and I analyze NFIB v. Sebelius from five different perspectives: (1) Sebelius as Marbury; (2) Sebelius as Bakke; (3) Sebelius and the "legitimating" power of judicial review; (4) Sebelius as a Thayerian decision; and (5) Sebelius as part of some long game of Chief Justice Roberts'.


The Ministerial Exception And The Limits Of Religious Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum Jul 2012

The Ministerial Exception And The Limits Of Religious Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper explores the scope of independent religious sovereignty in the context of the ministerial exception.


The Modalities Of Constitutional Argument: A Primer, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2012

The Modalities Of Constitutional Argument: A Primer, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This piece is a contribution to Linda Edwards upcoming book Readings In Persuasion: Briefs That Changed the World (forthcoming Wolters Kluwer). In it I offer a short primer on the modalities of constitutional argument, as Philip Bobbitt has described them. As someone who teaches Constitutional Law with the primary goal of educating future practitioners, I have always brought Bobbitt’s very practical (while also very theoretical) work into my classroom discussions. I have regularly used the first chapter of Bobbitt’s Constitutional Interpretation as introductory text on the subject, but I have sometimes found the reading to be too long and/or theoretical …


Constitutional Value Judgments And Interpretive Theory Choice, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2012

Constitutional Value Judgments And Interpretive Theory Choice, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

Philip Bobbitt’s remarkable work describing the ‘modalities’ of constitutional argument is an immense contribution to the study of constitutional law. He describes a typology of six forms of argument alive in our interpretive practice, and offers a limited account of how these modalities interact, and sometimes conflict, in actual constitutional decisions. One of the persistent puzzles Bobbitt’s description leaves open, however, is how we should account for the choice between conflicting modalities in cases where that choice is likely outcome-determinative. Because the modalities are ‘incommensurable’—a term’s meaning in one modality may not be fully translatable into another—there is no internal …


Anti-Evasion Doctrines In Constitutional Law, Brannon P. Denning, Michael B. Kent Jan 2012

Anti-Evasion Doctrines In Constitutional Law, Brannon P. Denning, Michael B. Kent

Brannon P. Denning

Recent constitutional scholarship has focused on how courts—the Supreme Court in particular—“implements” constitutional meaning through the use of doctrinal constructs that enable judges to decide cases. Judges first fix constitutional meaning, what Mitchell Berman terms the “constitutional operative proposition,” but must then design “decision rules” that render the operative proposition suitable to use in the third step, the resolution of the case before the court. These decision rules produce the familiar apparatus of constitutional decisionmaking—strict scrutiny, rational basis review, and the like. For the most part, writers have adopted a binary view of doctrine. Doctrinal tests can defer or not …


Nonpublic Reasons And Political Paradigm Change, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2011

Nonpublic Reasons And Political Paradigm Change, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article was a contribution to the 2010 Religious Legal Theory symposium held at St. John's Law School.

John Rawls famously argued that citizens in a just democracy have a moral duty to ensure that “the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.” This so-called “duty of civility” obligates us to cast our votes on “constitutional questions and matters of basic justice” for reasons that we can explain in terms of the public good and the “ideals and principles expressed by society’s conception of political justice.” Rawls contrasts these …


Constitutional Rights And Judicial Independence: Lessons From Iowa, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2011

Constitutional Rights And Judicial Independence: Lessons From Iowa, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

Iowa held its 2010 judicial retention elections in the shadow of Varnum v. Brien, the 2009 Supreme Court opinion recognizing same sex marriage. As the result of highly politicized campaign, three talented jurists lost their seats on the Court.

This commentary examines that election and offers a structural solution that might better protect constitutional rights against majoritarian intimidation.


Common Law Constitutional Interpretation: A Critique, Brannon P. Denning Jan 2011

Common Law Constitutional Interpretation: A Critique, Brannon P. Denning

Brannon P. Denning

This is a review of David Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010). In it, I critique his claim that common law constitutional interpretation is a superior alternative to originalism.


Salazar V. Buono: Sacred Symbolism And The Secular State, Ian C. Bartrum Sep 2010

Salazar V. Buono: Sacred Symbolism And The Secular State, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This short piece discusses some doctrinal and theoretical implications of the Court's recent decision.


Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2010

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional theory. …


The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2010

The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article builds on Philip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian insights into constitutional argument and law. I examine the way that we interact with canonical texts as we construct arguments in the forms that Bobbitt has described. I contend that these texts serve as metonyms for larger sets of associated principles and values, and that their invocation usually is not meant to point to the literal meaning of the text itself. This conception helps explain how a canonical text's meaning in constitutional argument can evolve over time, and hopefully offers the creative practitioner some insight into the kinds of arguments that might accomplish …


The Political Origins Of Secular Public Education: The New York City School Controversy, 1840-1842, Ian C. Bartrum Sep 2008

The Political Origins Of Secular Public Education: The New York City School Controversy, 1840-1842, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

THE ORIGINS OF SECULAR PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE NEW YORK SCHOOL CONTROVERSY, 1840-1842 As the title suggests, this article explores the historical origins of secular public education, with a particular focus on the controversy surrounding the Catholic petitions for school funding in nineteenth-century New York City. The article first examines the development of Protestant nonsectarian common schools in the northeast, then turns to the New York controversy in detail, and finally explores that controversy’s legacy in state constitutions and the Supreme Court. It is particularly concerned with two ideas generated in New York: (1) Bishop John Hughes’ objection to nonsectarianism as …


¿Otro Modelo Constitucional Para Europa?, Antonio-Carlos Pereira-Menaut May 2008

¿Otro Modelo Constitucional Para Europa?, Antonio-Carlos Pereira-Menaut

Antonio-Carlos Pereira-Menaut

La historia interminable de las peripecias constitucionales europeas parece centrarse en si se aprueba o no una determinada constitución (o tratado). Pero no se discute el modelo de constitución. Desde el momento en que hay varios modelos, eso significa que el inglés y el americano son dejados fuera del juego en favor de un modelo que denominaremos, a falta de otra palabra, franco-alemán. Aquí se sugiere que la elección desafortunada de modelo constitucional tiene que ver con los problemas producidos.


Privacy 3.0--The Principle Of Proportionality, Andrew B. Serwin Feb 2008

Privacy 3.0--The Principle Of Proportionality, Andrew B. Serwin

Andrew B. Serwin

Individual concern over privacy has existed as long as humans have said or done things they do not wish others to know about. In their groundbreaking law review article The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis posited that the common law should protect an individual's right to privacy under a right formulated as the right to be let alone - Privacy 1.0. As technology advanced and societal values also changed, a belief surfaced that the Warren and Brandeis formulation did not provide sufficient structure for the development of privacy laws. As such, a second theoretical construct of privacy, Privacy 2.0 …


The New Doctrinalism In Constitutional Scholarship And Heller V. District Of Columbia, Brannon P. Denning Jan 2008

The New Doctrinalism In Constitutional Scholarship And Heller V. District Of Columbia, Brannon P. Denning

Brannon P. Denning

This brief essay examines an apparent new trend in constitutional scholarship that focuses less on the fixing of constitutional meaning--the usual focus of constitutional theory--and more on the rules courts develop to implement constitutional commands. This new doctrinalism offers a way forward from the stalemated debates of constitutional theory, and perhaps can bridge the oft remarked upon divide between academics on the one hand, and judges and practitioners on the other. While the New Doctrinalism has already attracted critics who question whether interpretation and doctrine can meaningfully be separated, the essay concludes that its emergence is a welcome one in …


The Constitutional Structure Of Disestablishment, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2007

The Constitutional Structure Of Disestablishment, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article proceeds in the structuralist tradition, which Professor Charles Black describes as "the method of inference from the structure and relationships created by the Constitution." The article takes a structural approach to the Establishment Clause: it reexamines the theoretical foundations of disestablishment, and infers a constitutional structure designed to create a dialectical relationship between political institutions and social institutions. The structural thesis requires that our political institutions safeguard individual liberty of conscience by bracketing all religious questions. The antithesis ensures the existence of free and independent social organizations dedicated to building public virtue. The article then applies the structural …


The Relevance Of Constitutional Amendments: A Response To David Strauss, Brannon P. Denning, John R. Vile Jan 2002

The Relevance Of Constitutional Amendments: A Response To David Strauss, Brannon P. Denning, John R. Vile

Brannon P. Denning

This article responds to David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457 (2001). Strauss had argued that constitutional amendments are neither necessary nor sufficient to produce lasting constitutional change. We respond that Strauss downplays their import in some circumstances. In any event, the evidence he musters, we argue, does not support his irrelevancy thesis.