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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
The Strategy Of Boilerplate, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Boilerplate can be exciting. It is this, perhaps hard-to-swallow, proposition that the present analysis attempts to convey. Particularly in invoking the work of Thomas Schelling on the role of focal points in coordination games, it offers what can be characterized as a "strategic" theory of boilerplate, in which boilerplate plays an active, even aggressive, role.
Contrary to the relatively inert quality of boilerplate implied by conventional treatments in the legal literature, boilerplate may serve essential signaling and coordination functions in contract bargaining. In appropriate circumstances, its proposed usage may be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of a bargaining party, …
A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee
A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
William H. Page
The Microsoft-Samba agreement is by far the most important tangible outcome of the European Microsoft case. The EC’s other remedial order in the case, which required Microsoft to create a version of Windows without Windows Media Player, was an embarrassing failure. The Samba agreement, however, is significant because it requires Microsoft to provide, to its most important rival in the server market, detailed documentation of its communications protocols, under terms that allow use of the information in open source development and distribution. There is good reason to believe that Samba will be able to use the information to compete more …
Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig
Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig
Margaret F Brinig
This paper considers whether an amendment to state divorce laws that strengthens its joint custody preference operates as a traditional default rule, specifying what most divorcing couples would choose or as a penalty default rule the parties will attempt to contract around.
While the Oregon statutes that frame our discussion here, like most state laws, do not state an explicit preference for joint custody, shared custody is certainly encouraged by Section 107.179, which refers cases in which the parties cannot agree on joint custody to mediation and by Section 107.105, which requires the court to consider awarding custody jointly. In …
Trading At Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules And Transactions Costs, Margaret F. Brinig, Michael V. Alexeev
Trading At Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules And Transactions Costs, Margaret F. Brinig, Michael V. Alexeev
Margaret F Brinig
No abstract provided.
Bargaining In The Dark: The Normative Incoherence Of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, Robert J. Condlin
Bargaining In The Dark: The Normative Incoherence Of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, Robert J. Condlin
Robert J. Condlin
No abstract provided.
Conceptual Foundations: Walton And Mckersie's Subprocesses Of Negotiations, Thomas A. Kochan, David B. Lipsky
Conceptual Foundations: Walton And Mckersie's Subprocesses Of Negotiations, Thomas A. Kochan, David B. Lipsky
David B Lipsky
[Excerpt] Walton and McKersie's 1965 book, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, provides much of the conceptual underpinnings of what grew into the modern-day teaching of negotiations in business, public policy, law, and other professional schools. We therefore believe that it is useful to outline the basic concepts and ideas introduced by these authors. We do so, however, with a word of caution. There is no substitute for the original. Every student should have the pleasure of struggling (as we did the first time it was assigned to us as students) with the tongue twisters like "attitudinal structuring" and the …
Level-Of-Aspiration Theory And Initial Stance In Bargaining, Bruce K. Macmurray, Edward J. Lawler
Level-Of-Aspiration Theory And Initial Stance In Bargaining, Bruce K. Macmurray, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This research focuses on the effect of initial stance in bargaining. Following level-of-aspiration theory, the research examines whether the pattern of early concession making modifies the impact of tough vs. soft initial stance. The experiment manipulated opponent's concession pattern (decreasing, constant, increasing) in the early phase of bargaining within an overall tough or soft initial stance. Results indicated that a decreasing concession pattern within the early bargaining extracted larger initial concessions than a constant or increasing concession pattern. Implications for Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) level-of-aspiration theory are discussed.
Power And Tactics In Bargaining, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Power And Tactics In Bargaining, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This paper develops and tests an analytical framework for analyzing the selection of tactics in bargaining. Using a variant of power-dependence theory, the authors propose that bargainers will use different dimensions of dependence, such as the availability of alternative outcomes from other sources and the value of the outcomes at stake, to select among different tactics. To test this model, the authors conducted two simulation experiments that portrayed an employee-employer conflict over a pay raise, manipulating four dimensions of dependence: employee's outcome alternatives, employee's outcome value, employer's outcome alternatives, and employer's outcome value. Within this context, respondents estimated the likelihood …
Rational Treaties: Article Ii, Congressional-Executive Agreements, And International Bargaining, John C. Yoo
Rational Treaties: Article Ii, Congressional-Executive Agreements, And International Bargaining, John C. Yoo
John C Yoo
This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution’s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement’s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.
Negotiating Federalism, Erin Ryan
Negotiating Federalism, Erin Ryan
Erin Ryan
Reporting On Palin: Negotiations In Political Theater, Erin Ryan
Reporting On Palin: Negotiations In Political Theater, Erin Ryan
Erin Ryan
"Every Day And In Every Way, We Are Becoming Meta And Meta:" Or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered The World (Of Bargaining Theory), Robert J. Condlin
"Every Day And In Every Way, We Are Becoming Meta And Meta:" Or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered The World (Of Bargaining Theory), Robert J. Condlin
Robert J. Condlin
Debate over the relative merits of communitarian and adversarial theories of dispute negotiation has pre-occupied legal bargaining scholarship for at least twenty years. Seen as a negotiation, this debate makes it clear that communitarians are by far the better bargainers. In a move one might think more characteristic of adversarial bargainers, communitarians changed the definition of bargaining effectiveness by reconstituting the world in which bargaining operates (the meta move of the title – in communitarian terms they “changed the game by changing the frame”), and in the process made adversarial bargaining obsolete. Many of the arguments and maneuvers used in …
Zoning, Taking, & Dealing: The Problems And Promise Of Bargaining In Land Use Planning, Erin Ryan
Zoning, Taking, & Dealing: The Problems And Promise Of Bargaining In Land Use Planning, Erin Ryan
Erin Ryan
Municipal land use bargaining may imply as many problems as it heralds promise, but it is widely acknowleged as the universal language of land use planning. Planners and scholars agree that public-private negotiation plays a central role in the vast majority of local land use decision-making. At least in part, this is a result of the peculiar attributes of the resource at issue. Land is, perhaps, the ultimate nonfungible. Each parcel of land possesses unique characteristics not only in its physical attributes, but also by virtue of its location, and its proximity to other unique parcels. Moreover, land uses implicate …