Law Commons^™

Since its earliest days, the administrative state has been rationalized by a particular vision of the world. In the latter, public goods and free-rider problems, collective action and information failures, tragedies of the commons, and negative externalities constitute the “state of nature.” Regulation is the state’s response: command-and-control measures designed to alter the dominant incentives of individuals and institutions to defect from socially optimal equilibria. In environmental law, consumer protection, workplace safety regulation, and other domains of the modern administrative state, this Prisoner’s Dilemma is the motivating tale. To a growing degree, however, the demands of the social and economic …

Since its earliest days, the administrative state has been rationalized by a particular vision of the world. In the latter, public goods and free-rider problems, collective action and information failures, tragedies of the commons, and negative externalities constitute the “state of nature.” Regulation is the state’s response: command-and-control measures designed to alter the dominant incentives of individuals and institutions to defect from socially optimal equilibria. In environmental law, consumer protection, workplace safety regulation, and other domains of the modern administrative state, this Prisoner’s Dilemma is the motivating tale. To a growing degree, however, the demands of the social and economic …

Since its earliest days, the administrative state has been rationalized by a particular vision of the world. In the latter, public goods and free-rider problems, collective action and information failures, tragedies of the commons, and negative externalities constitute the “state of nature.” Regulation is the state’s response: command-and-control measures designed to alter the dominant incentives of individuals and institutions to defect from socially optimal equilibria. In environmental law, consumer protection, workplace safety regulation, and other domains of the modern administrative state, this Prisoner’s Dilemma is the motivating tale. To a growing degree, however, the demands of the social and economic …

Since its earliest days, the administrative state has been rationalized by a particular vision of the world. In the latter, public goods and free-rider problems, collective action and information failures, tragedies of the commons, and negative externalities constitute the “state of nature.” Regulation is the state’s response: command-and-control measures designed to alter the dominant incentives of individuals and institutions to defect from socially optimal equilibria. In environmental law, consumer protection, workplace safety regulation, and other domains of the modern administrative state, this Prisoner’s Dilemma is the motivating tale. To a growing degree, however, the demands of the social and economic …

Since its earliest days, the administrative state has been rationalized by a particular vision of the world. In the latter, public goods and free-rider problems, collective action and information failures, tragedies of the commons, and negative externalities constitute the “state of nature.” Regulation is the state’s response: command-and-control measures designed to alter the dominant incentives of individuals and institutions to defect from socially optimal equilibria. In environmental law, consumer protection, workplace safety regulation, and other domains of the modern administrative state, this Prisoner’s Dilemma is the motivating tale. To a growing degree, however, the demands of the social and economic …

This panel was convened at 9:00 a.m., Thursday, March 26, by its moderator, Robert Ahdieh of Emory University School of Law, who introduced the panelists: Michael Barr of the U.S. Treasury Department; Sean Hagan of the International Monetary Fund; Eric Pan of Cardozo University School of Law; Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research; and David Zaring of the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Business