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Rational Treaties: Article Ii, Congressional-Executive Agreements, And International Bargaining, John C. Yoo
Rational Treaties: Article Ii, Congressional-Executive Agreements, And International Bargaining, John C. Yoo
John C Yoo
This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution’s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement’s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.
Hamdan V. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case For Foreign Affairs Deference To The Executive Branch, John C. Yoo, Julian Ku
Hamdan V. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case For Foreign Affairs Deference To The Executive Branch, John C. Yoo, Julian Ku
John C Yoo
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld represents a radical new judicial approach to the interpretation of laws relating to foreign affairs. Not only did the Hamdan Court fail to defer to the executive's reasonable interpretations of the relevant statutes, treaties, and customary international law of war relating to military commissions, but it did not even justify its failure to depart from longstanding formal doctrines requiring such deference. In this Essay, we offer a functional defense of the doctrines requiring judicial deference to executive interpretations of laws affecting foreign affairs in wartime; doctrines that the Hamdan Court largely ignored. …