Law Commons^™

Insulation By Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, Young Ran Kim, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The recent rise of shareholder engagement has revamped companies’ corporate governance structures so as to empower shareholder rights and to constrain managerial opportunism. The general trend notwithstanding, this Article uncovers corporate spin-off transactions — which divide a single company into two or more companies — as a unique mechanism that insulates the management from shareholder intervention. In a spin-off, the company’s managers can fundamentally change the governance arrangements of the new spun-off company without being subject to monitoring mechanisms, such as shareholder approval or market check. Furthermore, most spin-off transactions enjoy tax benefits. The potential agency problems associated with the …

Exemplary Legal Writing 2018: Four Recommendations, Jed S. Rakoff, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

In an age of mass incarceration, it is not so easy to find good in the U.S. criminal justice system. But The Secret Barrister makes you appreciate the better aspects of our system by showing just how dysfunctional the corresponding English system has become. The book — written by an anonymous junior barrister — is a devastating, sometimes hilarious, and frequently heart-breaking account of how the criminal justice system in England and Wales is not only broke financially but broken in its ability to deliver justice, whether to prosecutors, defendants, victims, or the public.

Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.

This Article offers a novel perspective on this …