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Articles 1 - 17 of 17
Full-Text Articles in Law
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Jonathan Baker
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
Video link: https://vimeo.com/352303633Audio link: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/audio/economics-big-data-privacy-competition-introductionThe Federal Trade Commission held the sixth session in its Hearings initiative, with two and a half days of sessions on November 6 – 8, 2018, at American University Washington College of Law, in Washington, D.C.The hearings examined the role that data play in competition and innovation and will also consider the antitrust analysis of mergers and firm conduct where data is a key asset or product.The Commission invited public comment on these issues, including the questions listed below. Comments were due January 7, 2019. If any entity has provided funding for research, analysis, or commentary …
The Perils Of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro
The Perils Of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This brief comment responds to the analysis of Obama administration merger policy in Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement? 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012).
Market Definition, Jonathan Baker, Lawrence White, Eduardo Perez Motta, Joseph Simons
Market Definition, Jonathan Baker, Lawrence White, Eduardo Perez Motta, Joseph Simons
Presentations
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) solicited public comments and held joint public workshops to explore the possibility of updating the Horizontal Merger Guidelines that are used by both agencies to evaluate the potential competitive effects of mergers and acquistions. The goal of the workshops was to determine whether the Horizontal Merger Guidelines accurately reflect the current practice of merger review at the Department and the FTC as well as to take into account legal and economic developments that have occurred since the last significant Guidelines revision in 1992.
The Role Of Market Definition In Unilateral Effects Analysis And In The Litigation Of Unilateral Effects Cases, Jonathan Baker, Kathryn Fenton, Richard Parker, Daniel Wall, Jeffrey Schmidt
The Role Of Market Definition In Unilateral Effects Analysis And In The Litigation Of Unilateral Effects Cases, Jonathan Baker, Kathryn Fenton, Richard Parker, Daniel Wall, Jeffrey Schmidt
Presentations
The Federal Trade Commission is planning to host a public workshop on February 12, 2008 to examine the application of unilateral effects theory to mergers of firms that sell competing, but differentiated products. ”Unilateral effects” as a formal theory of competitive harm was added to the joint FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992. The theory recognizes that, in some instances, mergers may create or enhance market power by allowing the merged firm to profitably raise prices, without accommodation of other rival market incumbents. While section 2.2 of the Guidelines explains that unilateral competitive effects can arise in a variety of …
Efficiencies And High Concentration: Heinz Proposes To Acquire Bech-Nut (2001), Jonathan Baker
Efficiencies And High Concentration: Heinz Proposes To Acquire Bech-Nut (2001), Jonathan Baker
Contributions to Books
This chapter discusses the FTC’s court challenge, in 2001, to the proposed merger of two baby food producers, Heinz and Beech-Nut. The chapter describes the economic issues at stake in the litigation, with a particular focus on the possibility that efficiencies could justify a merger in an industry in which post-merger concentration would be high.
Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, Jonathan Baker
Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This essay surveys important issues in antitrust market definition. It identifies settings in which market definition is useful, and evaluates methods of defining markets. It considers whether markets should be defined with respect to demand substitution only or whether supply substitution also should count. It addresses practical issues in defining markets, including the probative value of various types of evidence, how much buyer substitution is too much, application of the market definition algorithm of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Cellophane fallacy, and the advantages and disadvantages of defining submarkets. It also evaluates several controversial approaches to market definition, including price …
A Turning Point In Merger Enforcement: Federal Trade Commission V. Staples, Jonathan B. Baker, Robert Pitofsky
A Turning Point In Merger Enforcement: Federal Trade Commission V. Staples, Jonathan B. Baker, Robert Pitofsky
Contributions to Books
This book chapter (forthcoming in Antitrust Stories) tells the story of the FTC's successful 1997 effort to block the proposed Staples/Office Depot merger. It describes the competing presentations of the FTC and the merging firms during the preliminary injunction hearing and places that trial in a broader context.
Why Did The Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects, Jonathan Baker
Why Did The Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Mavericks, Mergers, And Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under The Antitrust Laws, Jonathan Baker
Mavericks, Mergers, And Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under The Antitrust Laws, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Should Concentration Be Dropped From The Merger Guidelines?, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Should Concentration Be Dropped From The Merger Guidelines?, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
As members of the ABA Antitrust Section's Task Force on Fundamental Theory, we are pleased to provide a briefdiscussion of the appropriate role of market concentration in the review of mergers under the antitrust laws. Thispaper, organized in four main parts, will offer some suggestions for revising the Department of Justice and FederalTrade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines. A final section of this work will analyze whether it would bepreferable to conduct merger analysis by applying Professor Michael E. Porter's business strategy framework ratherthan the Merger Guidelines.
Policy Watch: Developments In Antitrust Economics, Jonathan Baker
Policy Watch: Developments In Antitrust Economics, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the federal courts transformed antitrust rules and the federal enforcement agencies altered their case selection criteria in response to theories developed by industrial organization economists. These developments in economic thinking, often associated with the Chicago school, led current antitrust law and practice toward a greater skepticism about the relationship between market concentration and market power and a greater recognition of the possible efficiency-enhancing role of vertical agreements (contracts between firms and their customers or suppliers) than was present in the 1950s and 1960s.This survey will begin where those developments leave off by highlighting more …
Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Mergers And Acquisitions In The European Community And The United States: A Movement Toward A Uniform Enforcement Body, David Snyder
Mergers And Acquisitions In The European Community And The United States: A Movement Toward A Uniform Enforcement Body, David Snyder
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Fringe Firms And Incentives To Innovate, Jonathan Baker
Fringe Firms And Incentives To Innovate, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
The Antitrust Analysis Of Hospital Mergers And The Transformation Of The Hospital Industry, Jonathan Baker
The Antitrust Analysis Of Hospital Mergers And The Transformation Of The Hospital Industry, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.