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The Paradoxical Impact Of Scalia's Campaign Against Legislative History, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Kristen M. Renberg Jan 2020

The Paradoxical Impact Of Scalia's Campaign Against Legislative History, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Kristen M. Renberg

Faculty Scholarship

Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s position, in line with his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and judges should avoid invoking it. Reactions to his attacks among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideological quality, with greater support from ideological conservatives. In this Article, we consider the role that political party and timing of judicial nomination played in circuit judges’ use of legislative history. Specifically, we hypothesize that Republican circuit judges were more likely to respond to the attacks on legislative …


Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive And Entrenchment Effects Of Historical Practice In Federal Courts Law, Ernest A. Young Jan 2016

Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive And Entrenchment Effects Of Historical Practice In Federal Courts Law, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars examining the use of historical practice in constitutional adjudication have focused on a few high-profile separation-of-powers disputes, such as the recent decisions in NLRB v. Noel Canning and Zivotofsky v. Kerry. This essay argues that “big cases make bad theory” — that the focus on high-profile cases of this type distorts our understanding of how historical practice figures in constitutional adjudication more generally. I shift focus here to the more prosaic terrain of federal courts law, in which practice plays a pervasive role. That shift reveals two important insights: First, while historical practice plays an important constitutive role, structuring …


Brief Of Federal Courts Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of The Petitioner, Willaim Araiza, Howard M. Wasserman, Lawrence Sager, Stephen I. Vladeck, Ernest A. Young Jan 2015

Brief Of Federal Courts Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of The Petitioner, Willaim Araiza, Howard M. Wasserman, Lawrence Sager, Stephen I. Vladeck, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Effectiveness Of International Adjudicators, Laurence R. Helfer Jan 2014

The Effectiveness Of International Adjudicators, Laurence R. Helfer

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter, in the Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication, provides an overview of the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of international courts and tribunals (ICs). It considers four dimensions of effectiveness that have engendered debates among scholars or received insufficient scrutiny. The first dimension, case-specific effectiveness, evaluates whether the litigants to a specific dispute change their behavior following an IC ruling, an issue closely linked to compliance with IC judgments. The second variant, erga omnes effectiveness, assesses whether IC decisions have systemic precedential effects that influence the behavior of all states subject to a tribunal’s jurisdiction. The third approach, embeddedness …


Interpretive Methodology And Delegations To Courts: Are ‘Common-Law Statutes’ Different?, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2013

Interpretive Methodology And Delegations To Courts: Are ‘Common-Law Statutes’ Different?, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

It is hard to find consensus on questions of statutory interpretation. Debates rage on about the appropriate goals of interpretation and the best means of achieving those ends. Yet there is widespread agreement, even among traditional combatants on the statutory interpretation field, when it comes to so-called “common-law statutes.” Textualists concede that text is not controlling; originalists admit that judicial construction of common-law statutes need not be keyed to the specific intent of the enacting Congress; and staunch defenders of strict statutory stare decisis allow frequent departures from precedent.

So what are common-law statutes? It is easy enough to name …


Judging The Flood Of Litigation, Marin K. Levy Jan 2013

Judging The Flood Of Litigation, Marin K. Levy

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has increasingly considered a particular kind of argument: that it should avoid reaching decisions that would “open the floodgates of litigation.” Despite its frequent invocation, there has been little scholarly exploration of what a floodgates argument truly means, and even less discussion of its normative basis. This Article addresses both subjects, demonstrating for the first time the scope and surprising variation of floodgates arguments, as well as uncovering their sometimes-shaky foundations. Relying on in-depth case studies from a wide array of issue areas, the Article shows that floodgates arguments primarily have been used to protect three institutions: …


The New Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, And Abortion Rights: A Reply To Jeffrey Rosen, Neil S. Siegel Jan 2013

The New Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, And Abortion Rights: A Reply To Jeffrey Rosen, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher Jan 2011

Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Further Reflections On Not Being “Not An Originalist”, H. Jefferson Powell Jan 2010

Further Reflections On Not Being “Not An Originalist”, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Consequences Of Congress’S Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2010

The Consequences Of Congress’S Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

Although Congress delegates lawmaking authority to both courts and agencies, we know remarkably little about the determinants-and even less about the consequences-of the choice between judicial and administrative process. The few scholars who have sought to understand the choice of delegate have used formal modeling to illuminate various aspects of the decision from the perspective of the enacting Congress. That approach yields useful insight into the likely preferences of rational legislators, but tells us nothing about how (or whether) those preferences play out in the behavior of courts and agencies. Without such knowledge, we have no way of testing the …


On Not Being “Not An Originalist”, H. Jefferson Powell Jan 2010

On Not Being “Not An Originalist”, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Solicitor General As Mediator Between Court And Agency, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2009

The Solicitor General As Mediator Between Court And Agency, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes And The Nondelegation Doctrine, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2008

The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes And The Nondelegation Doctrine, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine is the subject of a vast and everexpanding body of scholarship. But nondelegation literature, like nondelegation law, focuses almost exclusively on delegations of power to administrative agencies. It ignores Congress's other delegate-the federal judiciary.

This Article brings courts into the delegation picture. It demonstrates that, just as agencies exercise a lawmaking function when they fill in the gaps left by broad statutory delegations of power, so too do courts. The nondelegation doctrine purports to limit the amount of lawmaking authority Congress can cede to another institution without violating the separation of powers. Although typically considered only with …


What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons From Positive Theories Of Communication And Legislation, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez Jan 2007

What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons From Positive Theories Of Communication And Legislation, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf Jan 2003

Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf

Faculty Scholarship

Although critics of judicial review sometimes call for making the entire Constitution nonjusticiable, many familiar norms of constitutional law state what we call "existence conditions" that are necessarily enforced by judicial actors charged with the responsibility of applying, and thus as a preliminary step, identifying, propositions of sub-constitutional law such as statutes. Article I, Section 7, which sets forth the procedures by which a bill becomes a law, is an example: a putative law that did not go through the Article I, Section 7 process and does not satisfy an alternative test for legal validity (such as the treaty-making provision …