Law Commons^™

How Do Roles Generate Reasons? On The Methods Of Legal Ethics, Stephen Galoob

Stephen Galoob

Debates about legal ethics should be oriented around the generative problem, which asks two fundamental questions. First, how does the lawyer’s role generate normatively compelling reasons for action? Second, what kinds of reasons can this role generate?

Every substantive theory of legal ethics is based on a solution to the generative problem. On the generative problem method, we should evaluate these theories based on their implicit solutions to the generative problem. None of the main theories of legal ethics is based on a solution to the generative problem that is both structurally valid and empirically verified.

The generative problem method …

The Hollow Promise Of Freedom Of Conscience, Nadia N. Sawicki

Nadia N. Sawicki

Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson asserted that no law “ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority." Since then, freedom of conscience has continued to be heralded as a fundamental principle of American society. Indeed, many current policy debates – most notably in the medical and military contexts – are predicated on the theory that claims of conscience are worthy of legal respect. This Article challenges established assumptions, concluding that claims about the importance of conscience in American society have been highly exaggerated.

This Article first …

Unclear And Unconvincing: The Truthiness Requirement Of California's Ballot Pamphlet Arguments, Michael Boardman

Michael Boardman

“Truthiness,” as defined by TV satirist Steven Colbert, has found its way into the English lexicon. Unfortunately for California, its principles have also been incorporated into the state’s official ballot pamphlet. Misleading, and often demonstrably false, arguments written by special interests distort the political process yet the state continues to publish and distribute them to voters with little judicial recourse. Admirably, California permits private causes of action challenging the accuracy of these arguments, but the statutory scheme it has created to govern the challenges largely fails to promote its main goal: providing a central and convenient place for voters to …

The Rise Of The Common Law Of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly And The Application Of Judicial Experience, Henry S. Noyes

Henry S. Noyes

With its decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a new federal pleading standard: a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Many commentators have written about the meaning of plausibility. None has focused on the Court’s statement that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief...will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” In this article, I make and support several claims about the meaning and application of judicial experience. First, in order to understand and define the plausibility standard, one must understand …