Law Commons^™

A Delaware Response To Delaware's Choice, Lawrence Hamermesh, Norman Monhait

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

This article is an invited response to Professor Subramanian’s article “Delaware’s Choice.” The article expresses skepticism, for two primary reasons, about the need for the change to Delaware’s takeover statute that Professor Subramanian proposes. First, there is uncertainty that the constitutionality of that statute would be evaluated today under a test as demanding as the one that was applied when the statute was upheld in the late 1980s. Second, citing an earlier article by A. Gilchrist Sparks and Helen Bowers, we question whether a constitutional evaluation of the takeover statute should be limited to data on tender offers that are …

Friends, Associates And Associations: Theoretically And Empirically Grounding The Freedom Of Association, Tabatha Abu El-Haj

Tabatha Abu El-Haj

This Article argues that while the freedom of association is back at the center of the First Amendment, it suffers from the fact that it has been both theoretically and doctrinally subsumed by the freedom of speech. The First Amendment’s self-governance interest is necessarily broader than an interest in political debate and a vibrant marketplace of political ideas.

Association and associations enable the political participation that can turn ideas and debate into the action required to create democratic accountability. Free association doctrine is, therefore, uniquely positioned to promote representative government by protecting conditions necessary for an active citizenry.

A reoriented …

M&A Under Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, Frederick Alexander, Lawrence Hamermesh, Frank Martin, Norman Monhait

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Noting the enthusiastic initial response to Delaware’s 2013 public benefit corporation statute, this Article presents a series of hypotheticals as vehicles for comment on issues that are likely to arise in the context of mergers and acquisitions of public benefit corporations. The Article first examines appraisal rights, concluding that such rights will be generally available to stockholders in public benefit corporations, and noting the potential for ambiguity in defining “fair value” where the corporation’s purposes extend to public purposes as well as private profit. Next, the Article examines whether and to what extent “Revlon” duties and limitations on deal protection …

Soft Law In The Organization And General Conduct Of Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, Thomas Stipanowich

Thomas J. Stipanowich

This commentary examines the growing use of Soft Law - non-binding guidelines that currently play an important role in organizing and conducting commercial arbitration proceedings. Standards such as the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, the ICC Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, and the Protocols for Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial Arbitration have evolved from professional discourse regarding process management and more particular concerns about cost, delay and inefficiency in arbitration. Collectively, these guidelines reflect a growing recognition that deliberate and proactive effort by business users, counsel, arbitrators and provider institutions is critical to making the most of arbitration …

Consent In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Recent Delaware case law explores and extends what the author describes as the “doctrine of corporate consent,” under which a stockholder is deemed to consent to changes in the corporate relationship that are adopted pursuant to statutory authority (such as by directors adopting bylaws). This essay examines whether and to what extent there may be limits on the application of the doctrine of corporate consent, and whether fee-shifting bylaws exceed those limits.

Director Nominations, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

“I don't care who does the electing, so long as I get to do the nominating.” William M. (“Boss”) Tweed. Shareholder election of directors is widely accepted as an important tool in corporate governance. As Boss Tweed’s aphorism demonstrates, the shareholder’s ability to nominate director candidates should therefore also be deemed important. With ever-increasing shareholder activism and increased sensitivity on the part of management to the prospect of director election contests, the scope of the right to nominate and the scope of permissible limitations of that right are likely to come under increasing scrutiny. Yet corporate statutes are largely silent …