Law Commons^™

Why Is Corrective Justice Just?, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

No abstract provided.

Mandatory Arbitration For Customers But Not For Peers: A Study Of Arbitration Clauses In Consumer And Non-Consumer Contracts, Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

We conducted a study of contractual practices by well-known firms marketing consumer products, comparing the firms' consumer contracts with contracts the same firms negotiated with business peers. The frequency of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts has been studied before, as has the frequency of arbitration clauses in non-consumer contracts. Our study is the first to compare the use of arbitration clauses within firms, in different contractual contexts.

The results are striking: in our sample, mandatory arbitration clauses appeared in more than three-quarters of consumer contracts and less than one tenth of non-consumer contracts (excluding employment contracts) negotiated by the same …

Reparations And Unjust Enrichment, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

Despite an initial appearance of superior doctrinal fit, restitution is not an appropriate vehicle for reparations claims based on slavery and similar large-scale historical injustices. The justifying principle behind restitution—prevention of unjust enrichment—lacks the moral force necessary to resolve a controversial public dispute about moral rights and obligations among segments of society. At its core, a claim to restitution is an attempt to right a wrong not by alleviating the adverse consequences to oneself, but by diminishing the position of others. In other words, the notion of unjust enrichment is a comparative idea that draws on resentment and the desire …

Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, And The Possibility Of Efficient Fraud, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

Buried in the details of legal doctrine governing misrepresentation is a remedial anomaly that raises some interesting questions about how law should deal with moral wrongs such as fraud. We tend to think of deliberate deception--fraud--as a grave moral wrong. At least, we think of deception as gravely wrong when the deceiver's objective is not to avert harm or spare feelings, but to obtain someone's money or goods. Deception denies the autonomy of the person deceived and undermines the foundation of trust in human interaction. The law, however, does not penalize every instance of fraud. Moreover, the standards governing when …

The Jurisprudence Of Pleading: Rights, Rules, And Conley V. Gibson, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

In 1957, in the case of Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court announced a minimal standard for the contents of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and endorsed what has come to be known as 'notice' pleading. This article, prepared for a symposium on Conley, reviews the debate over pleading requirements that preceded the case. Unlike modern discussions of pleading, which focus on the level of factual specificity required in complaints, the pre-Conley debate was about the legal content of complaints - an question largely forgotten in the years following Conley.

The early twentieth century debate over …

Epstein's Property, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

In an era of skepticism about common law traditions and sensitivity to claims of distributive injustice, Richard Epstein has been an unflinching defender of private property rights. He has insisted that property rights are intelligible, and reminded us of their importance to social and economic welfare. In this paper, I shall offer what I believe is a friendly interpretation of Epstein's writings on property, and then pose some internal questions about the approach he has outlined. I begin with a quick summary of his description of property rights in an ideal legal regime.

Compensation And Revenge, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

No abstract provided.

A Defense Of Analogical Reasoning In Law, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

This Article defends the practice of reasoning by analogy on the basis of its epistemic and institutional advantages. The advantages identified for analogical reasoning include that it produces a wealth of data for decisonmaking; it represents the collaborative effort of a number of judges over time; it tends to correct biases that might lead judges to discount the force of prior decisions; and it exerts a conservative force in law, holding the development of law to a gradual pace. Notably, these advantages do not depend on the rational force of analogical reasoning. Rather, the author contends that, as open-ended reasoning …