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Fair Use And Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation , Ben Depoorter, Francesco Parisi
Fair Use And Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation , Ben Depoorter, Francesco Parisi
Ben Depoorter
Copyright scholars suggest that computer technology has reduced transaction costs associated with copyright transfer, allegedly eliminating the need for the fair use doctrines that were developed to allow limited use of copyrighted material in situations where the transaction costs of securing authorized use would be prohibitive. According to this emerging view, in an ideal world with no contracting costs, third party use of copyrighted material could realistically only take place with the express consent of the copyright holder. This would give the author absolute power to dispose of his work, including the right to veto uses, without the possibility of …
Simultaneous And Sequential Anticommons, Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, Ben Depoorter
Simultaneous And Sequential Anticommons, Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, Ben Depoorter
Ben Depoorter
This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a …
The Market For Copyrights: The Price Theory Of Copyright Collectives , Ben Depoorter, Francesco Parisi
The Market For Copyrights: The Price Theory Of Copyright Collectives , Ben Depoorter, Francesco Parisi
Ben Depoorter
This paper applies a model of complementary oligopoly and anticommons pricing to the market for intellectual property rights. Our model demonstrates a surprising and interesting overlooked result: In the market for complementary goods, price coordination and monopolistic pricing do not necessarily represent inefficient equilibria, when compared to the alternative Nash equilibrium. Due to the peculiar cross-price effects in the supply of complementary goods, price coordination and monopolistic supply often constitute an improvement over the alternative equilibrium outcomes. To be precise, the welfare effects of competition and price coordination depend on the nature of the intellectual product concerned. This has significant …